"No postponement on account of the weather."
Other cases might doubtless be put; but these are sufficient to enable us to test the question of right and wrong. And no labored argument is necessary. Dr. Fuller admits (what we have already proved) that slaveholding is most generally wrong, because it is accompanied by the mental and moral degradation of the slaves. But, by voluntarily retaining the ownership of his slaves, he renders just such a degradation almost inevitable even for them. Without the slightest necessity for so doing, and solely because he wishes so to do, he renders almost certain the hopeless degradation of his fellow-man. Such conduct cannot be right, even though (as doubtless in his case) pursued from right motives. No one has the right unnecessarily to impede our spiritual or mental culture, even in the slightest degree,—much less unnecessarily to expose us, almost certainly, to hopeless degradation. No more have we the right, by holding our fellows in slavery, to render almost inevitable the death of their souls.
Slaveholding, then, is always wrong, because it either deliberately murders the souls of its victims, or else renders such spiritual death almost inevitable. Nor is slaveholding ever made right by the fact that the slaves will not consent to be emancipated; for no man can rightfully consent to his own degradation. What man would consent to become even the favored slave of Dr. Fuller?
CHAPTER XI.
THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION.
The Constitution is not what it ought to be, not what we wish it to be; not what is consistent with sound morals, but simply what its words meant in 1789,—nothing more, nothing less.
The Constitution of the United States was drawn up by a Convention, of which Washington was president. The people, assembled in their State Conventions, adopted the draft, because it aptly expressed the kind of union they wished to have, because it fully and exactly expressed their meaning. In order, therefore, to ascertain the character of our political union with the Slave States, we have only to ascertain the true meaning of the words of the Constitution, or their plain, obvious, and common meaning, at the time the Constitution was adopted. Every writer who wishes to be understood uses his words in their usual signification. Every one supposes that we mean just what our words commonly mean now. When we read Chaucer, or Shakspeare, or Dr. Johnson, we understand him to mean just what his words commonly meant at the time he wrote, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified by the context, in which case we adopt this new or qualified meaning. In like manner, the people of the United States are to be understood to mean, by the words of the Constitution, just what those words commonly meant when the Constitution was adopted, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified by the context; in which case, a regard for truth obliges us to adopt this new or qualified meaning.
This simple, true, and universally practised rule is thus laid down by Judge Story (Comm. on Const. Abr. § 210):—