Slavery and the Constitution

by William I. Bowditch

"We will extend to the slaveholder all the courtesy he will allow. If he is hungry, we will feed him; if he is in want, both hands shall be stretched out for his aid. We will give him full credit for all the good that he does, and our deep sympathy in all the temptations under whose strength he falls. But to help him in his sin, to remain partners with him in the slave-trade, is more than he has a right to ask."—Wendell Phillips.

No wrong action can be rightfully done. No wrong can be rightfully supported. We can neither rightfully hold slaves nor support others in slaveholding, because, as we have seen, slaveholding is under all circumstances wrong. Some of the provisions of the Constitution, as we have seen, were expressly designed for the purpose of supporting slavery, and for over half a century have very materially supported it. Consequently, these provisions cannot be rightfully obeyed or supported. It is wrong to offer a bounty on slaveholding,—to give the oppressor power and influence, in proportion as he tramples on the rights of his fellow-man; it is wrong to return, or aid in returning, a fugitive slave; it is wrong to aid in keeping the slave in his fetters. These things are wrong, and not all the Constitutions and laws of the universe can make them right. We cannot, therefore, rightfully obey the pro-slavery clauses of the Constitution.

If we cannot rightfully obey them ourselves, we cannot rightfully, voluntarily support others in obeying them. If it is wrong for me to return a fugitive slave, it is wrong for me voluntarily to aid or support another man in doing the act. If it is wrong for me to commit murder, it is no less wrong for me to hand the pistol to the assassin. Whatever it is wrong for us to do ourselves, it is wrong for us voluntarily to aid or support others in doing. Consequently, it is wrong for us voluntarily to aid or support others in obeying the pro-slavery requirements of the Constitution.

If we cannot rightfully obey them, it is wrong for us to promise such obedience. If it is wrong for us voluntarily to support others in their obedience, it is wrong for us to promise any such support. If it is wrong for us to return a fugitive slave, it is wrong for us to promise to return one. If it is wrong for us voluntarily to aid the slave-hunter, it is wrong for us to promise such aid. Whatever it is wrong for us to do or aid others in doing, it is wrong for us to promise to do or aid others in doing. Consequently, it is wrong for us to promise to support these constitutional provisions. We cannot, therefore, accept any office, either state or national, which renders it necessary for us to support these clauses, or to promise to support them. We cannot, therefore, rightfully hold any executive or judicial office, either state or national, or become a member of any State legislature or of Congress; for all these officers are obliged solemnly to swear or affirm that they will "support the Constitution;" and to support the Constitution is to support all of its clauses, as well those which favor slavery as those which do not. If we take this oath, meaning to keep it, we do wrong. If we take it, meaning not to keep it, we add to our wrong, perjury; for we mentally break our oath at the very instant it passes our lips.

Some good men seek to avoid the difficulty by saying, "When I swear to support the Constitution, I mean I will support the good clauses in it, and disobey the bad, and submit to the penalty for such disobedience." But such a course is not a compliance with the terms of the oath. You have sworn "to support the Constitution;" that is, the whole Constitution,—all its clauses,—the bad as sacredly as the good. Your oath is not in the alternative, "I will support the clause requiring the return of fugitive slaves, or pay five hundred dollars for every slave I aid in escaping;" but simply, without any qualification, "I will support the side of the oppressor." If you aid the fugitive slave to escape from his master, you do not support the latter in retaking his property, merely by paying the legal penalty for not giving such support. You would not support a bad law, and yet you say your oath to support it is not broken, because you submit to the penalty for not supporting it. The thief does not support the law of private property, merely by submitting to the legal punishment of his crime. To support is to be active: to submit is to be passive. You swear to be active, and you do not comply with your oath by being merely passive. You have sworn actively to support the recapture of slaves. You break your oath, if you refuse to do this, or do any thing less or different from this.

Others think to find a good excuse for taking the oath, by adopting another alternative, equally unauthorized. "We will support the Constitution," say they, "until we are called on to act under any of its bad clauses; and then we will resign our office, and refuse obedience." Doubtless, honor requires you to resign, if you cannot comply with the terms of your oath; but what right have you to adopt or imagine an alternative in your oath where the law has made none,—where the officer administering it will admit of none? Who does not see the wide difference between an honest oath to support the return of fugitive slaves, and an oath to support such return, but with a firm resolve on your part to refuse such support when called on for it, and to resign? What right have you to take an oath which you have previously resolved not to keep, when called on to comply with? You admit that a bad clause cannot be rightfully supported, else why do you not support it? You admit that the oath obliges you to support the bad clauses of the Constitution as well as the good; else why do you resign, if refusal to support the bad clauses is consistent with your oath? You openly avow, therefore, that, at the very moment you swear to support a clause, you determine never to support it. You swear, and determine not to keep your oath! Such a course seems to us inconsistent with the plainest rules of honesty. We have no right to promise to do wrong, even though we have resolved to do right when the time for action shall arrive.

Others say, "We swear to support the Constitution as we understand it, and we consider it an anti-slavery instrument." In other words, you swear to support an interpretation which is contrary to the plain, obvious, and common meaning of the instrument; contrary to the interpretation put upon it by its framers; contrary to that followed by all the executive and legislative departments of the government, from its first establishment until now; and contrary to that which has been adjudged to be its true interpretation by the final arbiter of its meaning. Of course, you intend to support the true meaning of the Constitution. Do you really believe that the people of the United States did not mean by their words what those words then commonly meant? Do you really doubt the historical fact of the humiliating compromise between the delegates from the Southern and Eastern States in the Philadelphia Convention, by which the latter undertook to barter the moral sense of their constituents for what was supposed to be their interest? Do you really believe that the people have suffered their servants to go on in ignorance of the true meaning for sixty years? In fact, do you venture to affirm, or do you in perfect sincerity and truthfulness believe, that your interpretation has ever at any time been considered right by the people of the United States, or by any considerable number of them? You deceive yourself with words! What is the Constitution? Not the meaning which you or I, or any third person, may please to put upon it; but that meaning, and that meaning only, which consists with its being, what it declares itself to be, the supreme law of the land. Until, therefore, you can show that the Constitution may properly receive as many different interpretations as there are oaths to support it, and still be in fact the supreme law, the one, single, definite rule for all, States as well as people, you have no right to say, "I will support the pro-slavery clauses as I understand them." To support them in any other sense than that which is affixed to them, as the supreme law of the land, is merely to evade the true meaning of your oath.

Others say, "We took the oath before we had any of our present scruples. We would not take the oath now; but, nevertheless, we shall continue in office, and disregard our oath." This excuse seems to us very objectionable. How can you reap the honorary or pecuniary advantages of your office, and honestly refuse compliance with your part of the bargain? When you took office, you were really told, that, if you would swear to support the return of fugitive slaves, &c. you should enjoy these honors and these profits. The conscientious man, who, in striving to better himself, not his condition, discovers afterwards that he cannot rightfully aid, or promise to aid, the slaveholder in retaking his slaves, will not think of claiming the reward which was offered to him solely because he swore to give such aid. He will make haste to resign honors and rewards which he feels can be retained only at the price of his own degradation.

If we cannot rightfully hold any office, state or national, which requires of us a promise to support the Constitution, it is wrong to place, or voluntarily aid in placing, any other person in such office; for, by so doing, we ask him to do wrong. If we vote for Horace Mann, by this act alone we say to him, as distinctly as if the words passed our lips,—"We wish to elect you as representative to Congress. If chosen, we expect and ask you to qualify yourself to act as representative, by swearing to give slavery all constitutional support." Merely by voting for him, we ask him to do wrong, hoping that good may come, almost knowing that good will come! So little faith have we in the final triumph of right and justice, by pursuing only right and just ways! Of so little consequence do we consider it, that the earnest advocate of freedom should commence his holy work by promising very materially to strengthen slavery! But a short time has elapsed since we read one of his most eloquent rebukes of slavery. Our heart beat quickly as we read his earnest words. But if, in the midst of his address, some slaveholder had turned and asked him, "How happens it, sir, that you, who are so very earnest and disinterested in behalf of the rights of the slave, have been willing to swear to support this terrible wrong, to any extent or for any time?" And what answer could be returned? The eloquent tongue would be palsied! Surely that man who has solemnly called God to witness that he will support the oppressor, cannot fail, at some time or another, to feel himself to be unworthy to plead the cause of freedom.

Finally, some say, "This reasoning leads to non-resistance. You disregard the fact that all human governments must contain a greater or less amount of evil; and consequently, if you are ever to support any government in all its requirements, you must support evil." Very true is it that human governments and laws fall short of our relative standard of right, and always of absolute right. What is our duty? Clearly, as moral beings, to support the right, and refuse to support the wrong; as peaceful citizens, to support the right, and submit to the penalty of disobeying the wrong. Nothing more than this is required of us. Nothing less than this is our duty. We are not put into the world, blindly to support all existing governmental wrongs, until they can be constitutionally abolished. We are to be true to ourselves as moral beings. If we can be true to our own souls and support the government, we may give such support,—not otherwise! Right and wrong are not creatures of agreement and law. Neither the Philadelphia Convention that framed the Constitution, nor the State Conventions that adopted it, had power to make wrong in the slightest degree right, or alter at all the moral character of slaveholding. Right is right, the Revised Statutes to the contrary notwithstanding. Wrong is wrong, the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding. We say, therefore, we will obey the good requirements of the Constitution, and peacefully submit to the penalty of disobeying the bad. This is all that government has a right to ask of us. Institutions were made for man, not man for them. Constitutions are the work of man, and man is to be reverenced before his works. We see no inconsistency or impropriety in supporting the system of free-trade between the States, and refusing to support the domestic slave-trade; in supporting the patent laws, and refusing to aid in returning a runaway slave. We are good-government men, not no-government men. All governments are partly good. All we are willing to support in part: we will actively support the Constitution and laws, so far as conscience permits; we will peacefully submit to legal exaction for disobeying the rest.