During the few days of suspense between the arrival of Boutakoff's orders and the arrival of the courier which should confirm or revoke them, the act of brutality to which I have alluded came to quicken decision. I had received news that a Turkish frigate, hoisting English colors, had run in near the coast of Sphakia, and when the unfortunate refugees, expecting aid, came down to the shore, the Turks opened on them with shot and shell. A Turkish cannonade is generally a pretty harmless affair, except for accidental casualties, but the affair gave me all the justification I needed to put a pressure on Dendrino to issue a requisition for the Grand Admiral to go at once to the south coast of the island. That night the post steamer was due, and, from the absence of any despatches to the Italian commander similar to those to the Russian, I anticipated that the movement had failed, and that counter-orders would come to Boutakoff by the post. I went at once, therefore, to Dendrino, and, putting the most energetic pressure on him, dictated a letter to Boutakoff, who was on board the frigate at Suda, requesting him to get up steam and go to the Sphakian coast without delay, and did not leave till I saw the messenger on the way and beyond recall, knowing that if I left Dendrino it would stop there. Boutakoff, nothing loth, fired up at once, and at nine P.M. was on his way. At midnight the post arrived, as anticipated, with counter orders, but too late. Except myself, no one was so glad that the countermand failed as General Ignatieff, the Russian minister.

The Grand Admiral went to Tripiti, where were thousands of non-combatants hiding in caves and living amongst the rocks, waiting the relieving European ships, but when the Russian boats ran in they were fired on by the Cretan guards, made suspicious by the Turkish frauds. Once assured of their friends, however, the people swarmed out of their holes like ants, and, as Boutakoff told me, in a few minutes the whole coast was lined with them, more than he could possibly stow. He took about 1,200, and sailed for Peiræus.

This deportation had a triple effect: first, in strengthening the Russian party in the island by assuring the Cretans of the good faith of the Russian Government, that party having been hitherto very inconsiderable; second, in relieving a large body of men of the care of their families; and, third, in deciding doubtful and uninvaded districts to take up arms, and breaking off the negotiations between the Commissioner and the Sphakiote chiefs, by which the former had hoped to have Sphakia given up without combat. The most tempting offers were refused, and the people of Eastern Sphakia, under the command of old Costa Veloudaki, entered on the war-path again, and, surprising a Turkish post at Episkopí, drove the garrison, with serious losses, back to Retimo; and, near the same time, Coroneos and Korakas on one slope of Ida, and Petropoulaki, the chief of the Mainote volunteers, on the other, harassed and drove back all the outposts in the open country, and shut up the Turks of the central district in the fortress of Retimo; while some battles, better worth the name than the desultory skirmishes which most of the combats had been, were fought in the open country around Candia, where Reschid Effendi proved himself a shrewd and capable strategist, and drove the insurgents back to the western slopes of Ida after sharp fighting, in which the dissensions of the Greek and Cretan chiefs were more conspicuous than their wisdom; but everywhere the insurrection showed new vigor.


[CHAPTER IX.]

Immediately after the affair of Arkadi, I had, in conveying to our Government the petition of the Cretans for ships to be sent to carry away their families, recapitulated the course I had taken, and proposed to the Government that, if an American man-of-war came to Crete for the deportation of non-combatants, and the local government made any protest, I should reply that, their conduct having been in violation of every dictate of humanity and law, they were not entitled to appeal to the latter in their own behalf, and that I should advise the officer in command to remove the families without reference to Turkish prohibition. I received in reply the following despatch:

Department of State, Washington, Dec. 25, 1866.
W. J. Stillman, Esq., U. S. Consul, Canéa:

Sir: Your despatch No. 32, with regard to the Cretan insurrection and the attitude you have assumed in the matter, has been received.

Your action and proposed course of conduct, as set forth in said despatch, are approved. Mr. Morris, our minister resident at Constantinople, will be informed of the particulars set forth in your despatch, and of the approval of your proceedings.

Rear-Admiral Goldsborough has been instructed to send a ship-of-war to your port.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. Seward.

This despatch was immediately communicated to Mr. Morris; by him to the Hellenic minister at Constantinople; and thence to the committee at Athens; thence to the insurgents, through whom it rapidly spread and confirmed their warlike resolutions. The Russian commander, like Pym, had been obliged to desist from any new attempt, and waited for our steamer to come. The Italian commanders were eager to avail themselves of their standing instructions to follow the ships of other nations in this work, and so a new phase of the struggle awaited the appearance of the Stars and Stripes.