The rumor which accompanied the Serdar Ekrem, that in spite of his professions of moderation and legality (as opposed to Mustapha's policy) he had secret orders to stamp out the disaffection by the severest rigor, found now clear confirmation. What under the Commissioner, subsequent to Arkadi, was variable and overlooked barbarity in the subordinates, was, under the Generalissimo, the law and order of things, and he himself partook of the plunder of the defenceless, and rejuvenated the lusts of his old age with the pick of the captive Cretan maidens. The testimony of several of the European officers in the army was offered me, proving that Omar Pasha dishonored even his adopted country by his violation of his word, by his depravity and his cruelty, and himself set the example to his army of everything which could add to the misery and despair of unhappy Crete.
It is as natural for the Turkish authorities to deny as for the Christians to exaggerate the atrocities committed, but evidence of a nature not to be rejected, or even questioned in its general import, establishes that the policy adopted was one of subduing Crete by terror, and to this end full license was given to the soldiery. One entry in a memorandum book kept by Geissler (Dilaver Pasha), Omar's chief of artillery, and which I had the chance to read, said, noting the entry into one of the villages near Goïdaropolis: "O. Pasha ordered the division to ravage and rape." All villages were burned, and all prisoners murdered or worse. The chiefs of four villages who came to make their submission were at once beheaded. The population invariably fled to the high mountains on the approach of the troops.
It will hardly be edifying to follow further in detail this barbarity; and with the general statement that the policy here indicated was followed throughout Omar's campaign unflinchingly, and that the French consul was refused permission to accompany Omar in his movements, that no civilized witness might bring his deeds to light, I shall drop the theme, which sickens me to recall even at this long interval. My duty then compelled me to investigate, as now to declare, these things, but I spare the civilized world and myself any further recital of the deeds of the Croat Pasha.
The 6th of May a force of volunteers, commanded by Dimitrikarakos, landed in the eastern provinces, where up to that time hostilities had been very unimportant. A large body of insurgents quickly rallied round the volunteers, and, establishing their headquarters at Lasithe, they swept the country up to the walls of Candia. This compelled a new concentration of forces to meet the new emergency, and Omar set out, via Retimo, through Mylopotamo to Candia, sending word to Reschid Effendi to come to meet him en route. Coroneos, meanwhile, had not been idle, and while Zimbrakaki and Costa Veloudaki, with the Apokoroniotes, some volunteers, and most of the Sphakiotes, remained to keep Mehmet in check, and profit by an unguarded moment to attack him, Coroneos and his followers kept near the army of Omar Pasha, waiting until he should be entangled in the ravines of Mylopotamo to attack him, and when he had reached Margaritas, he was beset furiously by the whole body of the men of Agios Basilios and the Amariotes, with the volunteers who accompanied Coroneos. The Turks, shut into narrow ravines overlooked by bold heights, defended themselves with difficulty, and were soon entirely hemmed in, unable to advance or retreat. The fire of the Cretan rifles penetrated into every part of the Turkish encampment, Omar's tent being several times pierced. At a council of war, called on the emergency, the opinion was general that the position was critical, and some considered it as next to hopeless. There was nothing to do but take shelter and wait for Reschid and his irregulars, who, well acquainted with the mountains and the Cretan method of fighting, would be able to form an advance-guard, and, by skirmishing vigorously, protect the march of the regulars, utterly helpless in this kind of warfare.
The passage of the troops through this section was described to me by several eye-witnesses as anything but military. They cowered at the first attack, and refused to move forward in the ravines except when preceded by a cloud of irregulars to drive back the Christians, every onslaught of whom produced a panic; but, as they were behind as well as before, retreat was impossible, and there was no alternative to the Turks but to take to such defences as the ground permitted and defend themselves as they best could. The Albanians and Circassians were not sufficiently acquainted with the country, cut up with interminable ravines, covered with olive groves, and defended by men who knew every inch of the ground. The wretched Turks lost all courage, even that of despair, and a European officer in the Egyptian service who was present said to me that most of his comrades entertained no hope of escape, and Coroneos has since assured me that if the other chiefs had responded to his call for help, the total destruction of the army, including the Serdar Ekrem and his staff, was practicable.
As has generally been the case in Greek wars, the jealousies of the chiefs were the safety of the Turks. Petropoulaki, a Mainote palikari of the old war, who commanded in Malavisi and Temenos, and watched Candia from the eastern slopes of Ida, refused to come to the aid of Coroneos; and when Reschid moved from the east, entered the defiles of Mylopotamo at Damasta, instead of throwing himself before the Turkish division and delaying their advance, he attacked them in the rear after they had gone through, and, though he inflicted severe losses on them and took much of the baggage, he rather facilitated than otherwise the junction of the two Turkish corps, and, after a short pursuit, abandoned him, instead of following up and uniting with Coroneos. Skoulas, chief of Mylopotamo, alone kept up the chase, and Coroneos, warned in time of the advance of Reschid, despatched a small body of men to oppose his junction with Omar. Reschid, however, with the greatest obstinacy and gallantry, hammered away regardless of loss, and, fighting all night long, effected his junction, with which Coroneos's hope of bottling up Omar was lost. The Generalissimo embraced Reschid as his saviour, and promoted him on the spot. What made the matter still worse for the Cretans was that their ammunition was exhausted, and supplies did not arrive in time, so Coroneos reluctantly fell back, leaving the way open. The next day his ammunition arrived.
[CHAPTER XII.]
