Note 6, page 101—Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Oxford, 1906, pp. 22, 178. The argument in case the belief should be doubted would be the higher synthetic idea: if two truths were possible, the duality of that possibility would itself be the one truth that would unite them.
Note 7, page 115.—The World and the Individual, vol. ii, pp. 385, 386, 409.
Note 8, page 116.—The best _un_inspired argument (again not ironical!) which I know is that in Miss M.W. Calkins's excellent book, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, Macmillan, 1902.
Note 9, page 117.—Cf. Dr. Fuller's excellent article,' Ethical monism and the problem of evil,' in the Harvard Journal of Theology, vol. i, No. 2, April, 1908.
Note 10, page 120.—Metaphysic, sec. 79.
Note 11, page 121.—Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, secs. 150, 153.
Note 12, page 121.—The Nature of Truth, 1906, pp. 170-171.
Note 13, page 121.—Ibid., p. 179.
Note 14, page 123.—The psychological analogy that certain finite tracts of consciousness are composed of isolable parts added together, cannot be used by absolutists as proof that such parts are essential elements of all consciousness. Other finite fields of consciousness seem in point of fact not to be similarly resolvable into isolable parts.
Note 15, page 128.—Judging by the analogy of the relation which our central consciousness seems to bear to that of our spinal cord, lower ganglia, etc., it would seem natural to suppose that in whatever superhuman mental synthesis there may be, the neglect and elimination of certain contents of which we are conscious on the human level might be as characteristic a feature as is the combination and interweaving of other human contents.