Anti-Prag.:—The truth does; the truth knows it; or rather not exactly that, but any one knows it who possesses the truth. Any true idea of the reality represents the truth concerning it.
Prag.:—But I thought that we had agreed that no knower of it, nor any idea representing it was to be supposed.
Anti-Prag.:—Sure enough!
Prag.:—Then I beg you again to tell me in what this truth consists, all by itself, this tertium quid intermediate between the facts per se, on the one hand, and all knowledge of them, actual or potential, on the other. What is the shape of it in this third estate? Of what stuff, mental, physical, or 'epistemological,' is it built? What metaphysical region of reality does it inhabit?
Anti-Prag.:—What absurd questions! Isn't it enough to say that it is true that the facts are so-and-so, and false that they are otherwise?
Prag.:—'It' is true that the facts are so-and-so—I won't yield to the temptation of asking you what is true; but I do ask you whether your phrase that 'it is true that' the facts are so-and-so really means anything really additional to the bare being so-and-so of the facts themselves.
Anti-Prag.:—It seems to mean more than the bare being of the facts. It is a sort of mental equivalent for them, their epistemological function, their value in noetic terms. Prag.:—A sort of spiritual double or ghost of them, apparently! If so, may I ask you where this truth is found.
Anti-Prag.:—Where? where? There is no 'where'—it simply obtains, absolutely obtains.
Prag.:—Not in any one's mind?
Anti-Prag.:—No, for we agreed that no actual knower of the truth should be assumed.