[275] Metaphysik, § 245 fin. This writer, who in his early work, the Medizinische Psychologie, was (to my reading) a strong defender of the Soul-Substance theory, has written in §§ 243-5 of his Metaphysik the most beautiful criticism of this theory which exists.
[276] On the empirical and transcendental conceptions of the self's unity, see Lotze, Metaphysic, § 244.
[277] Appendix to book i of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature.
[278] Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the 'Self' of which we are 'conscious' is the empirical Self—not the soul.
[279] Compare again the remarks on [pp. 158-162] above.
[280] System of Psychology (1884). vol. i, p. 114.
[281] 'Distinct only to observation,' he adds. To whose observation? the outside psychologist's, the Ego's, their own, or the plank's? Darauf kommt es an!
[282] Analysis, etc., J. S. Mill's Edition, vol. i, p. 331. The 'as it were' is delightfully characteristic of the school.
[283] J. Mill's Analysis, vol. ii, p. 175.
[284] Examination of Hamilton. 4th ed. p. 263.