Will, [486]
Voluntary movements: they presuppose a memory of involuntary movements, [487]. Kinæsthetic impressions, [488]. No need to assume feelings of innervation, [503]. The 'mental cue' for a movement may be an image of its visual or auditory effects as well as an image of the way it feels, [518]. Ideo-motor action, [522]. Action after deliberation, [528]. Five types of decision, [531]. The feeling of effort, [535]. Unhealthiness of will: 1) The explosive type, [537]; 2) The obstructed type, [546]. Pleasure and pain are not the only springs of action, [549]. All consciousness is impulsive, [551]. What we will depends on what idea dominates in our mind, [559]. The idea's outward effects follow from the cerebral machinery, [560]. Effort of attention to a naturally repugnant idea is the essential feature of willing, [562]. The free-will controversy, [571]. Psychology, as a science, can safely postulate determinism, even if free-will be true, [576]. The education of the Will, [579]. Hypothetical brain-schemes, [582].
Hypnotism, [594]
Modes of operating and susceptibility, [594]. Theories about the hypnotic state, [596]. The symptoms of the trance, [601].
Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience, [617]
Programme of the chapter, [617]. Elementary feelings are innate, [618]. The question refers to their combinations, [619]. What is meant by 'experience,' [620]. Spencer on ancestral experience, [620]. Two ways in which new cerebral structure arises: the 'back-door' and the 'front-door' way, [625]. The genesis of the elementary mental categories, [631]. The genesis of the natural sciences, [633]. Scientific conceptions arise as accidental variations, [636]. The genesis of the pure sciences, [641]. Series of evenly increasing terms, [644]. The principle of mediate comparison, [645]. That of skipped intermediaries, [646]. Classification, [646]. Predication, [647]. Formal logic, [648]. Mathematical propositions, [652]. Arithmetic, [653]. Geometry, [656]. Our doctrine is the same as Locke's, [661]. Relations of ideas v. couplings of things, [663]. The natural sciences are inward ideal schemes with which the order of nature proves congruent, [666]. Metaphysical principles are properly only postulates, [669]. Æsthetic and moral principles are quite incongruent with the order of nature, [672]. Summary of what precedes, [675]. The origin of instincts, [678]. Insufficiency of proof for the transmission to the next generation of acquired habits, [681]. Weismann's views, [683]. Conclusion, [688].