The hell bomb

by William L. Laurence

One may visualize the masters of the Kremlin gnashing their teeth in impotent rage at what they no doubt regard as a diabolical plot on our part to sabotage their A-bomb effort. Indeed, there can be no question that our decision to proceed with the H-bomb was an answer to Russia’s challenge to our atomic supremacy, and it appears quite plausible that one of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would force Russia either to build great additions to her atomic plants, at great expense in money and materials and at the loss of considerable precious time, or to curtail her production of A-bomb material. And while any such motive could not possibly have been the determining factor, the ultimate effect of our decision was the same as though we had succeeded in getting a team of expert saboteurs behind the Iron Curtain to plant a good-sized monkey wrench in the Soviet atomic machinery.

With this in mind we begin to appreciate how dangerous a move it would be, to ourselves and to world peace, if we were to make a solemn declaration at the outset, even before we have a single H-bomb, that we will never use it, “no matter how righteous our cause,” unless it is used first against us or our allies. By making such a unilateral declaration, without even making it conditional upon Russia issuing a similar solemn renunciation, we would, in effect, be saying to Russia: “We humbly beg your pardon. We did not realize that we would be putting a nasty monkey wrench in the machinery of your vital A-bomb program. We shall remove the wrench at once so that you may proceed with your program unhindered by us in any way.”

The masters of the Kremlin would, indeed, have every right to laugh long and loud, and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further evidence of what they call “the decadence of the bourgeois democracies.” For, once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of the one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent against war, without even bothering to ask Russia publicly to do likewise, Russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up her A-bomb stockpile, with the complete assurance from us that she need not worry about our H-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or our allies. After she has accumulated an adequate A-bomb stockpile—and fifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint—she would then be in a position, already attained by us now, to proceed with her H-bomb program, knowing full well that we would never use H-bombs against her while she is still without them. And while she obviously could not use anything she does not have, she could well afford to make aggressive war even before she has an H-bomb, or to bide her time until she does, the choice being entirely hers. And if she waits until she has the H-bomb, the decision whether to use it or not would still be entirely hers, so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to her advantage to do so, whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure, having morally bound ourselves, without qualification, not to use it first, even if our very existence depended on it.

It can thus be easily seen that this “after you, my dear Alphonse” gesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence would be more than quixotic. It is likely to prove suicidal. It will not improve the prospects of world peace; on the contrary it will weaken them. It will not enhance our moral stature, since the world does not have much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the clouds.

But while we must keep our feet planted on the ground, we need not lose sight of the stars. Our refusal to expose ourselves by giving Russia the great advantages mentioned, does not mean that we retain the right to use the H-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon. There are, I shall presently show, both legitimate and illegitimate uses to which the H-bomb can be put, and it is the failure so far, even by eminent scientists, to distinguish between these two types of possible uses that is responsible for a great deal, if not all, of the confusion and much futile debate that have followed the President’s announcement of his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb, and for the flood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we take time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the H-bomb.

One of the major difficulties in our approach to the subject stems from the general tendency to talk about the H-bomb as though it were just one weapon, which obviously it is not. As we know, it is several weapons in one package, which can be designed for various uses, depending on the intent of its designer. It is, on the one hand, a weapon that can cause total destruction by blast over a radius of ten miles, or an area of more than 300 square miles, with graduated lesser damage over a much larger area. Secondly, it is a weapon that can produce fires and severe flash burns over a radius of twenty miles—that is, over an area of more than 1,200 square miles. These two functions, destruction by blast and by fire, go together. They are inseparable as far as the bomb itself is concerned, though their relative effects can be regulated by the height from which the bomb is dropped, by the terrain over which it is used, and by its mode of delivery other than by air.

Then, of course, there is the third weapon of terror, the tremendous quantities of deadly radioactive particles that the H-bomb may release in the atmosphere, which, as Dr. Einstein said, would bring within the range of technical possibilities “the annihilation of life on earth.” This, however, would depend on the choice and purpose of the designer. If he so chooses, he can design an H-bomb that would produce only slightly greater radioactivity than its A-bomb trigger. Or he can rig it in such a manner that one bomb would release into the atmosphere the equivalent of nearly five million pounds of radium that would poison the atmosphere for thousands of miles, killing all life wherever it goes. The catchword here is “rig,” and the rigging depends entirely, not on the contents of the bomb itself, but on the material of which its outer shell is composed. If, for example, the casing chosen is a material such as steel, the radioactivity produced would be practically harmless. If the shell is made of cobalt, the radiations released would cause untold havoc. The reason for the vast difference is not difficult to understand. The H-bomb, when it explodes, releases tremendous quantities of neutrons, the most penetrating particles in nature. As soon as it is liberated, a neutron enters the nucleus of the nearest element at hand. This may produce a wide variety of changes in the nature of the element penetrated by the neutron, the changes depending on the element. Some elements, such as cobalt, become intensely radioactive, others only mildly so, and still others not at all. Furthermore, each element thus made radioactive has its own characteristic decay period, lasting from seconds to many years, so that the designer of the bomb has a great variety to choose from.

From this it can be seen that, instead of one, there are actually two types of H-bombs—the non-rigged and the rigged. With this vital distinction in mind the problem of its use becomes much more simplified. We are in a position to reach full agreement with the scientists that no nation has the right to use such a “rigged” bomb, no matter how righteous its cause. For the rigged H-bomb would add nothing to the military value of the non-rigged H-bomb, which is already more than enough to achieve any military objective. It would merely be piling horror upon horror for no purpose beyond wanton destruction for its own sake. Its use even in small numbers would ruin large segments of the earth for years. It would, as the scientists said, “be a betrayal of morality and of Christian civilization itself.” There can therefore be no question that when this distinction between the non-rigged and the rigged H-bomb is made clear to the American people—something the scientists failed to do—they would overwhelmingly lend their support to a move on the part of our government solemnly declaring that we would never use the rigged H-bomb first; that our only aim in building it is to prevent its use, and that the only circumstances under which we would find ourselves forced to use it would be in retaliation for its use against us or our allies.

We can, and should, make such a solemn declaration unilaterally, regardless of whether Russia makes a similar declaration. We would lose nothing by doing so from a military or strategic point of view, and we would gain enormously in moral stature and on the battlefront of ideas if we were to do it now. Otherwise we run the risk that Russia might do it first. If she takes advantage of this lost opportunity of ours, we shall have handed her a great moral victory. In fact, the law of nations compels us to make such a declaration. Unlike the A-bomb, in which the radioactivity is part and parcel of the bomb itself, the rigged H-bomb is purposely designed to produce radioactive poisoning in the atmosphere. Since it has to be specially incorporated into the casing of the bomb, it comes under the international convention outlawing the use of poison gas. For there can be no question that a radioactive cloud that may lay waste to whole areas is the most diabolical and deadly poison gas so far invented.

But the twelve scientists do not seem to be satisfied with the mere renunciation of the rigged H-bomb. They ask us to declare that we would not be the first to use even the non-rigged bomb, on the grounds that it “is no longer a weapon of war, but a means of extermination of whole populations.” This requires closer scrutiny.