Throughout 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission continued its investigations of the control problem. On December 31, 1946, the Commission issued its First Report. It revealed that the essential features of the Baruch proposals had won the support of all the members of the Commission except the Soviet Union and Poland.
The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947
A year after it suggested a convention for “outlawing” atomic weapons, the Soviet Union came forward with a set of control proposals.
A chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the Soviets now assented to “periodic inspection of facilities for mining and production of atomic materials” by an international inspectorate. In answer to a United Kingdom inquiry, however, the Russians stated that “normally, inspectors will visit only declared plants”—with this supplemented by special investigations when there were “grounds for suspicion” of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The power of the Control Commission would be further limited to making recommendations to governments and to the Security Council. On other matters that separated the Soviet Union from the majority position—such as international ownership and management, and the veto question—there was no change in the Russian position.
The subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of the U.S.S.R. stand. On August 11, 1947, Mr. Gromyko seemingly brought the Soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that “the idea of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission....”
The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948
The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission spelled out in detail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of any international agency in implementing an effective control plan. When the Report was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 40 to 6, the plan developed in the UNAEC became a world plan—to which only the Soviet Union and her satellites took exception.
By the spring of 1948 the UNAEC became convinced that the Soviet Union’s refusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of controlling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which made further negotiations on the Commission level fruitless.
The Third Report stated that “the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field....”
It appeared to the Commission that the atomic deadlock was but one manifestation of the more widespread dispute between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. In view of this, the Commission majority recommended that negotiations in the Commission be suspended until the permanent members of the UNAEC found that “there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy....”