Nonetheless, the new Soviet proposal gave no indication that the Soviets would accede to what the majority regard as an effective control plan. Furthermore, the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was considered to be physically impossible to implement. “The development of atomic energy is the world’s newest industry, and already is one of the most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight. Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of time and by a series of stages.”
The record of negotiations from the fall of 1948 to the present is largely one of inaction.
On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the sponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between them “had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the other five powers.”
Despite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the permanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and keep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On the same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained favorably the principle of quotas.
On January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the Chinese Government.
C
THE ATOMIC IMPASSE
Regarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy.
All nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites “put world security first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.”
This basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other members of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority control proposals.
The specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows: