Are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded inseparably?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
Since the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious that the two problems are inseparable.
3. Is the existing United Nations plan technically adequate to control H-bombs?
The United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
For instance, the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission defines “atomic energy” as including “all forms of energy released in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission or of other nuclear transformation.” “Source material” is taken to mean “any material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as the international agency may by regulation determine.” “Key substance” is defined to mean “uranium, thorium and any other element from which nuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international agency.” (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines “nuclear fuel” as “plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing the foregoing, and any other material which the international agency determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material.” (p. 71.) The report likewise observes that: “Dangerous activities or facilities are those which are of military significance in the production of atomic weapons. The word “dangerous” is used in the sense of potentially dangerous to world security.” (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.]
Does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and source materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly controlled, through the existing UN plan?
Since nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for controlling U-235 and plutonium?
It may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no provision for physically protecting informants who advise the international agency of violations. Might potential informants keep silent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this factor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons?
What safeguards would assure that the employees of an international control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some national government—perhaps a national government other than that of their own country?