[FN] Letters of Washington, during the months of May, June, and July, 1777.
Before the close of June, however, the designs of the enemy in regard to the North became obvious. A person from Canada, arrested as a spy, and brought before General Schuyler, stated on his examination, "that the British forces were approaching St. Johns, and were to advance through Lake Champlain under General Burgoyne; and also that a detachment of British troops, Canadians and Indians, was to penetrate the country by the way of Oswego and the Valley of the Mohawk. He added many particulars, respecting the strength and arrangements of the British army, which turned out in the end to be nearly accurate, but of which no intelligence had before been obtained, or by many anticipated." [FN]
[FN] Sparks—Note in Life and Cor. of Washington, vol. iv.
The movements of General Howe were still equivocal, even after Burgoyne had commenced his descent upon the North—thus adding to the embarrassments of Washington. And in order the more certainly to mislead the American commander as to his real intentions. General Howe wrote a feigned despatch to Burgoyne, on the subject of ascending the Hudson to join him, the bearer of which fell purposely into the hands of the Americans, while pretending to be on his way to Canada. Unable, therefore, to determine whether such might not be his design, (although the intercepted despatch was regarded with strong suspicion,) or whether, on the other hand, it might not be the purpose of Howe to pass round to the Chesapeake and thence strike at Philadelphia, the American General was compelled to remain inactively watching his motions, strengthening, in the mean time, to the utmost of his power, his positions in the highlands—without being able to detach any large number of troops to the assistance of General Schuyler, then commanding the Northern Department. And even after General Howe had embarked his troops and dropped down to Sandy Hook—having evacuated New Jersey on the 30th of June [FN-1]—Washington was still in doubt whether it might not yet be his intention to return with the tide, and pass up the river in the night. [FN-2] Such, however, was no part of the plan of the British commander. His destination, on leaving the harbor of New-York, was the Chesapeake and Philadelphia; and the latter branch of the campaign indicated in the opening of the present chapter, was so far successful, that after a series of victories over the forces of General Washington, commencing at Brandywine and ending at Germantown, General Howe took possession of, and established himself in, the capital of Pennsylvania.
[FN-1] It is a pleasing evidence of the sound religious views of Washington, that he was a firm believer in the immediate interpositions of Providence in directing and controlling the affairs of men. His letters abound in passages that might be cited, showing his quickness to discern the finger of Providence, and his readiness to make the acknowledgment. Thus, in regard to the departure from New Jersey by General Howe, he says:—"The evacuation of Jersey at this time seems to be a peculiar mark of Providence, as the inhabitants have an opportunity of securing their harvests of hay and grain, the latter of which would in all probability have undergone the same fate with many farm-houses, had it been ripe enough to take fire."—Letter of Washington to Maj. Gen. Armstrong, July 4, 1777.
[FN-2] "If we were certain Gen. Burgoyne were approaching Ticonderoga with his whole army, I should not hesitate a moment in concluding that it is in consequence of a preconcerted plan with Gen. Howe, and that the latter is to co-operate with him by pushing his whole force up the North River, and aiming a stroke in the first instance and immediately at the Highlands."—Letter of Washington to the President of Congress, July 2. Again, in several successive letters, after the embarkation of General Howe's army from Staten Island, Washington spoke of the perplexity in which he was kept by the shifting manœuvres of the fleet. On the 22d of July he wrote—"I cannot give you any certain account of General Howe's operations. His conduct is puzzling and embarrassing beyond measure; so are the informations which I get. At one time the ships are standing up toward the North River; in a little while they are going up the Sound; and in one hour after, they are going out of the Hook."—Letter to General Schuyler. The fleet actually sailed for the Capes of Virginia on the 23d of July.
But a far different fortune attended the arms of Burgoyne. The regular troops of his command, English and German, amounted to above seven thousand men, added to which were large numbers of American and Canadian loyalists, together with many hundred Indians; a species of force, which, it has been held by British historians, Sir Guy Carleton was reluctant to employ, while General Burgoyne, it has been alleged, entertained no such scruples. It has ever been claimed as a virtue on the part of Carleton, and carried to the credit of his humanity, that, rather than employ the Indians, he submitted to the injustice of having the command of this expedition, properly belonging to him, conferred upon an officer who was not entitled to lead the enterprise. It is perhaps true, from his more intimate knowledge of the Indian character, that he had formed such an estimate of their services as to render him somewhat less sanguine than others as to their value. His experience could not but have taught him the extent of their inutility in war, the capriciousness of their character, their intractableness and inconstancy. He must have known that their ideas of war were totally different from those of civilized nations; by reason of which, notwithstanding their ferocity, and the incredible examples of passive valor which they sometimes afford in cases adapted to their own opinions, they were nevertheless utterly regardless of, and looked with contempt upon, those belligerent usages which are considered as honorable, generous, and fair in the modern service of civilized men. He could not have been ignorant of the fact, that the object and design of most of the wars in which the Indians engage, are not so much to conquer by manly and open battle, as to murder and destroy after their own peculiar fashion. In one word, that accomplished officer very well knew the services of the Indians to be uncertain; their rapacity to be insatiable; their faith at all times doubtful; and their action cruel to barbarity. Still, as we have already shown beyond contradiction, he was among the first to court the alliance and obtain the services of Brant and his Mohawks, on their descent to Montreal in 1775. The commendations, therefore, that have been bestowed upon Sir Guy Carleton upon this subject, at the expense of Burgoyne, were as undeserved by the one as unjust toward the other. True, the march of Burgoyne was tracked with blood, which a high-souled officer should scorn in such manner to shed; [FN] but the footsteps of Carleton might have been equally sanguine had the command been entrusted to him.