[FN-2] Holmes, who follows Stedman. General Wilkinson denies that Arnold shared much in this battle. He says:—"Not a single general officer was on the field of battle on the 19th, until evening, when General Lamed was ordered out. About the same time Generals Gates and Arnold were in front of the centre of the camp, listening to the peal of small arms, when Colonel Morgan Lewis, deputy quartermaster General, returned from the field, and being questioned by the General, he reported the undecisive progress of the action—at which Arnold exclaimed, 'by G— I will put an end to it,' and clapping spurs to his horse, galloped off at full speed. Colonel Lewis immediately observed to General Gates, 'You had better order him back, the action is going well, and he may by some rash act do mischief.' I was instantly despatched, overtook, and remanded Arnold to camp."—Memoirs, vol. i, Chap. vi.
[FN-3] Memoirs of General Wilkinson, vol. i. chapter vi.
General Wilkinson, at that time Adjutant General, who was himself in the battle, and whose account of it is the best that has been written, sustains the remark made above, that the engagement was perfectly accidental; neither of the opposing Generals meditating an attack at that time, and yet, by a mutual misconception of each other's purposes, they were kept the whole day acting upon the defensive; confining themselves to the ground occupied at first by accident, "and neither attempting a single manœuvre during one of the longest, warmest, and most obstinate battles fought in America. General Gates believed that his antagonist intended to attack him, and circumstances seemed to justify the like conclusion on the part of Burgoyne; and, as the thickness and depth of an intervening wood concealed the position and movements of either army from its adversary, sound caution obliged the respective commanders to guard every assailable point. Had either of the Generals been properly apprised of the dispositions of his antagonist, a serious blow might have been struck either on the left of the American army, or on the enemy's right;" but although the combatants changed ground a dozen times in the course of the day, the contest was terminated by the darkness, on the spot where it began. [FN-1] Few actions have been more remarkable than this, both for vigor of attack and obstinacy of resistance. [FN-2]
[FN-1] Idem.
[FN-2] Stedman. The loss on the part of the Americans, in killed and wounded, was between three and four hundred. Among the former were Colonels Colburn and Adams, and several other valuable officers. The loss of the British was from six hundred to a thousand, killed, wounded, and taken.
Both armies remained in the same positions until the beginning of October—each entrenching itself within lines and redoubts, which, in the most eligible positions, were strengthened with batteries. The engineer having the direction of the American works at Behmus's Heights, was the celebrated Polish patriot, Thaddeus Kosciusko, who had also served in the same capacity at Ticonderoga.
The action of the 19th of September had again essentially diminished the strength of Burgoyne, added to which were the great and increasing difficulties of obtaining supplies, and the perpetual annoyances to which he was subjected by the American scouts, and still larger detachments, who were attacking his pickets, hanging upon his flanks, and cutting off his foraging parties. By the 4th of October his supplies were so far reduced that the soldiers were placed upon short allowance, and his position was in other respects becoming so critical, that, hearing nothing from Sir Henry Clinton, for whose cooperation from New-York he had been waiting since the battle of the 19th, the idea of advancing was relinquished, and instead thereof, discussions were held respecting the practicability of a retreat. This could only be done by first dislodging the Americans, whose forces, disciplined and undisciplined, now far out-numbered his own, from their posts on the heights. On the 4th of October, Burgoyne sent for Generals Phillips, Riedesel, and Frazer, to consult with them on the best measures to be taken. His project was to attack and attempt to turn the left wing of the Americans at once; but the other Generals judged that it would be dangerous to leave their stores under so feeble a protection as eight hundred men, according to the proposition of their commander. A second consultation was held on the 5th, at which General Riedesel positively declared that the situation of the army had become so critical, that they must either attack and force the entrenchments of Gates, and thus bring about a favorable change of affairs, or recross the Hudson, and retreat upon Fort George. Fraser approved of the latter suggestion, and Phillips declined giving an opinion. General Burgoyne, to whom the idea of retreating was most unwelcome, declared that he would make, on the 7th, a reconnaissance as near as possible to the left wing of the Americans, with a view of ascertaining whether it could be attacked with any prospect of success. He would afterward either attack the army of Gates, or retreat by the route in the rear of Battenkill. This was his final determination, and dispositions were made accordingly. [FN]
[FN] Memoirs of Madame the Baroness de Riedesel.