[FN] "The cruelties which mark the retreat of your army, in burning the gentlemen's and farmers' houses as it passed along, are almost, among civilized nations, without precedent; they should not endeavor to ruin those they could not conquer; their conduct betrays more of the vindictive malice of the monk than the generosity of a soldier."—Letter of Gates to Burgoyne, Oct. 12, 1777.
Well knowing that a farther retreat, with a view, if possible, of reaching his depot at Fort George, and escaping through the lakes, was now the only movement to which Burgoyne could have recourse to save the shattered remains of his army, Gates lost no time in throwing several strong detachments of troops into his rear. A division of fourteen hundred was stationed on the heights opposite the ford at Saratoga; two thousand in his rear, to prevent his retreat upon Fort Edward; and fifteen hundred at a ford yet higher up. Apprehensive that he should be entirely penned up, Burgoyne sent forward a corps of artificers to repair the bridges; but these, though strongly guarded, were driven precipitately back. His thoughts were next directed to the opening of a passage by the way of Fort Edward; but the Americans had already re-possessed themselves of that work, and were well provided with artillery. Thus environed with difficulties, which were increasing; every hour, his effective force reduced to less than three thousand five hundred men,—the American army increasing every moment, and now forming an almost entire circle around him,—harassed at all points, especially by the sharp-shooters who hovered about him,—Burgoyne was driven to the necessity of entering into a convention with General Gates, which was done by the unanimous consent of a general council of his officers. The preliminaries were soon adjusted; and on the 17th of October, the royal army surrendered prisoners of war. At the opening of the campaign, the army of Burgoyne numbered nine thousand two hundred and thirteen men. The number that laid down their arms, was five thousand seven hundred and fifty-two. His Indian allies had all, or nearly all, abandoned him several days before.
On the same day that the articles of capitulation were carried into effect, Burgoyne, with his general officers, was received in the quarters of General Gates, and entertained by him at dinner. They were received with the utmost courtesy, and with the consideration due to brave but unfortunate men. The conversation was unrestrained, affable, and free. [FN-1] Indeed, the conduct of Gates throughout, after the terms of the surrender had been adjusted, was marked with equal delicacy and magnanimity, as Burgoyne himself admitted in a letter to the Earl of Derby. In that letter, the captive General particularly mentioned one circumstance which, he said, exceeded all he had ever seen or read of on a like occasion. It was the fact, that when the British soldiers had marched out of their camp to the place where they were to pile their arms, not a man of the American troops was to be seen—General Gates having ordered his whole army out of sight, that not one of them should be a spectator of the humiliation of the British troops, nor offer the smallest insult to the vanquished. This was a refinement of delicacy, and of military generosity and politeness, reflecting the highest credit upon the conqueror; and was spoken of by the officers of Burgoyne in the strongest terms of approbation. [FN-2]
[FN-1] Memoirs of the Baroness de Riedesel. The first meeting of Burgoyne with Gates is thus described by Wilkinson:—"General Gates, advised of Burgoyne's approach, met him at the head of his camp—Burgoyne in a rich royal uniform, and Gates in a plain blue frock; when they had approached nearly within sword's length, they reined up and halted. I then named the gentlemen, and General Burgoyne, raising his hat most gracefully, said—'The fortune of war. General Gates, has made me your prisoner;' to which the conqueror, returning a courtly salute, promptly replied—'I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your Excellency.'"
[FN-2] Remembrancer of 1777, pages 482, 83. A letter published in that repository of the events of the American Revolution, at the same time, stated that "some few of the New England men desired to have Burgoyne in their hands for half an hour. Being asked for what purpose, they said they would do him no manner of harm; they would only tar and feather him, and make him stand on the head of one of his own empty beef-barrels, and read his own proclamation."—481, 82. If made at all, the suggestion must have been merely the sportive sally of a wag.
It was, perhaps, no fault of General Gates, that he had been placed in command at the North just at the auspicious moment when the discomfiture of Burgoyne was no longer problematical. He was ordered by Congress to the station, and performed his duty well. But it is no less true that the laurels won by him ought to have been harvested by Schuyler. General (then Colonel) Wilkinson, who was not only an active officer in that campaign, but a member of Gates's own military family, has placed this question in its true aspect. He maintains that not only had the army of Burgoyne been essentially disabled by the loss of a heavy detachment, artillery and baggage, and by the defeat of the Hessians at Bennington, before the arrival of Gates, but that the repulse of St. Leger at Fort Schuyler had deranged his plans, while safety had been restored to the western frontier, and the panic thereby caused to subside. He likewise maintains that after the reverses at the North, no wise in justice attributable to him, and before the arrival of Gates, the zeal, patriotism, and salutary arrangements of General Schuyler had vanquished the prejudices excited against him; that by the defeat of Baum and St. Leger, Schuyler had been enabled to concentrate and oppose his whole Continental force against the main body of the enemy; and that by him, also before the arrival of Gates, the friends of the Revolution had been re-animated and excited to manly resistance, while the adherents of the royal cause were intimidated, and had shrunk into silence and inactivity. From these premises, which are indisputable, it is no more than a fair deduction to say, "that the same force which enabled Gates to subdue the British army, would have produced a similar effect under the orders of General Schuyler; since the operations of the campaign did not involve a single instance of professional skill, and the triumph of the American arms was accomplished by the physical force and valor of the troops, under the protection and direction of the god of battles." [FN]
[FN] Wilkinson's Memoirs, vol. i. chap. v.
Flushed with his fortuitous success, or rather with the success attending his fortuitous position, Gates did not wear his honors with any remarkable meekness. On the contrary, his bearing even toward the Commander-in-chief was far from respectful. He did not even write to Washington on the occasion, until after a considerable time had elapsed. In the first instance Wilkinson was sent as the bearer of despatches to Congress, but did not reach the seat of that body until fifteen days after the articles of capitulation had been signed; and three days more were occupied in arranging his papers before they were presented. [FN-1] The first mention which Washington makes of the defeat of Burgoyne, is contained in a letter written to his brother on the 18th of October—the news having been communicated to him by Governor Clinton. He spoke of the event again on the 19th, in a letter addressed to General Putnam. On the 25th, in a letter addressed to that officer, he acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the articles of capitulation from him—adding, that that was the first authentic intelligence he had received of the affair, and that he had begun to grow uneasy, and almost to suspect that the previous accounts were premature. And it was not until the 2d of November that Gates deigned to communicate to the Commander-in-chief a word upon the subject, and then only incidentally, as though it were a matter of secondary importance. [FN-2]