The presents having been delivered, the Indian deputies expressed a desire to give a name to the President of Congress. Permission for that purpose having been granted, a chief of the Onondagas arose, and saluted the President by the name of Ka-ran-dua-an, or the Great Tree; by which name John Hancock was afterward known among the Six Nations.
Although it would appear upon the surface of these resolutions, that Congress was yet persevering in the humane policy of keeping the Indians in a state of neutrality, yet candor and truth require a different record. Much as sound moralists had condemned the employment of this species of force in civilized warfare, and strongly as Congress had exerted its influence the preceding year to prevent the Indians from taking the field in behalf of either of the combatants, that policy was abandoned. On the 25th of May, 1776, the Congress resolved "that it was highly expedient to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies;" and they empowered the Commander-in-Chief to employ, in Canada and elsewhere, a number not exceeding two thousand, offering them "a reward of one hundred dollars for every commissioned officer, and thirty dollars for every private soldier of the King's troops, that they should take prisoner in the Indian country, or on the frontiers of these Colonies." The Congress also authorized General Washington to employ the Indians of Penobscot, St. John's, and Nova Scotia, who had proffered their services, and were to receive the same pay as the Continental soldiers. [FN]
[FN] Sparks's Life and Cor. of Washington, vol. iv, Appendix. [Mr. Sparks seems to have fallen into an error as to the immediate motive of Congress in changing its Indian policy at this time. He leaves his readers to infer, that the measure was one of retaliation for the conduct of the British and Indians at the Cedars. But such could not have been the fact. The battle of the Cedars was fought on the 20th of May, and these resolutions were passed on the 25th—before the news, in those days, could possibly have reached Philadelphia.]
Whether any of those Eastern Indians were ever actually engaged in the American service, is not known. In regard to the employment of the Northern Indians, Washington forthwith entered into a correspondence with General Schuyler upon the subject, and pressed him to carry the resolutions into effect. The latter, however, was averse to the measure—as much so as at the first. He disliked to employ such a force under any circumstances, contending that they were too fickle and uncertain to allow any well-founded reliance to be placed upon them at the moment of emergency. At that particular conjuncture, especially when our troops, broken and dispersed, were flying like fugitives from Canada, he thought the chances of obtaining Indian auxiliaries exceedingly slender; and as to the number prescribed, (two thousand,) the General intimated in one of his letters to the Commander-in-Chief, that it would have been well if Congress had condescended to inform him where so many Indian warriors, not already in the service of the enemy, were to be found. In short, General Schuyler's opinion was correct from the beginning, that the Colonies could expect no essential aid from the Indians; and whatever aid they might receive, would be sure to cost more than it would come to. So the event proved. But, although the British profited most by the employment of the Indians, they are not alone to blame for using them. So far, certainly, as principle and intention are concerned, the Americans are equitably entitled to a due share of the censure. [FN]
[FN] Sparks.
In recurring to coincident events transpiring in other parts of the country, it must be remarked, that the Commander-in-Chief was often placed in circumstances not the most promising. On his first arrival at the camp before Boston, the preceding year, he had found only "the materials for a good army"—not the organized army itself. The troops were mostly undisciplined; and having taken arms to fight for liberty, it was no easy matter to bring them into those habits of subordination, which necessarily render a soldier a mere machine to be moved at the will of his commander. The first object of General Washington, therefore, was to bring the troops into a state of discipline. But another difficulty presented itself in the fact, that, owing to the short periods of enlistment, the times of service of the greater portion of the army were to expire in November and December. To which was added the embarrassing discovery, that all the powder at his command was barely sufficient to supply nine rounds of cartridges per man. There was, moreover, a general want of camp equipage and clothing, and indeed of every thing necessary alike to the comfort and the efficiency of an army. But Heaven, in its mercy, seemed to have devolved the command upon the man of all others best calculated to meet the emergency and overcome it. His destitution of ammunition was artfully and effectually concealed from the enemy; and although, on the discharge of those of his troops who would not re-enlist, at the close of December, (1775,) he had no more than 9650 men left, he yet contrived to sustain himself and keep the enemy beleaguered in Boston during the whole winter. "It is not in the pages of history, perhaps," he wrote to Congress, "to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy for six months together, without amunition, and at the same time to disband one army and recruit another, within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more, probably, than was ever attempted." [FN]
[FN] Holmes's Annals.