It is not known at what time of the year 1786 Captain Brant turned his back upon the gay metropolis of England, to bury himself once more in the deep forests toward the setting sun. It must, however, have been soon after receiving Lord Sidney's dispatch of April 6th, since, among the papers of the chief, there is a letter addressed to him after his return, by Major Matthews, who was attached to the military family of Sir Guy Carleton, dated at Montreal, July 24, 1786. Early in the month of December following he will also be found attending an Indian Council far in the country of the Great Lakes.

[CHAPTER IX.]

Difficulties between Great Britain and the United States after the Treaty—Refusal of the former to surrender the western posts—Mission of Baron Steuben to Canada—Indications of fresh Indian hostilities—Movements of Captain Brant—Grand Indian Council at the Huron Village—Address to the United States—Letter of the Secretary at War, General Knox, to Captain Brant—Letter of Sir John Johnson to Brant—Letter of Major Matthews to Brant, disclosing the views of Lord Dorchester respecting the retention of the western posts—Message from the Hurons to the Five Nations, proposing another grand Council—Preparations of General St. Clair for negotiating with the Indians—Brant begins to distrust them all—Letter of Brant to Patrick Langan, Sir John Johnson's Secretary—Letter of Brant to Sir John Johnson—Great Council at Miamis—Letter of Captain Brant to Patrick Langan—St. Clair's negotiations at Fort Harmar—The policy of dividing to conquer—letter of Captain Brant to Major Matthews—Jealousies of Brant among the Indians—Council against him at Montreal—Letter to him from Major Matthews—Letter of Brant in reply—Letter to Colonel McDonnell—Suspected plot against the English at Detroit, and Brant and his Mohawks, by the Hurons, Chippewas, and Pottawattamies—Letter to Brant from Sir John Johnson—Brant turns his attention to the cultivation of letters—Endeavors to obtain a stated Missionary—Resumes the preparation of Religious books—Letter from President Willard—John Norton—Land difficulties among the Indians in the state of New-York—Letter from Governor Clinton to Brant.

Unhappily the treaty of peace did not bring the United States and Great Britain immediately to so good an understanding with each other as could have been desired. Several important questions remained for subsequent arrangement. The treaty proposed a general restoration of confiscated property to all such loyalists as had not actually borne arms in the service of the King. The American Congress passed a resolution recommending the fulfillment of this clause of the treaty by the several states; but it was not considered binding, and South Carolina alone approached to a compliance therewith. There was, likewise, an explicit provision in the treaty, respecting the payment of debts due by Americans to British subjects, not resting upon a recommendation only; the fulfillment of which was sadly neglected. Indeed, the states in which those debts chiefly lay, showed but too plainly an indisposition to aid in carrying the stipulation into effect. On the other hand, the Negroes belonging to American citizens who were in the possession and service of the officers of the British army, were not restored; and, contrary to all expectation, Great Britain refused to surrender the military posts upon the American side of the great lakes. The surrender of those posts was expected with the utmost conscience, as one of the most immediate consequences of the ratification of the treaty. To this end, Congress instructed the Commander-in-chief to make all the necessary arrangements to receive and occupy the posts in the Summer of 1783; and in July of that season, the Baron Steuben was despatched by General Washington on a mission to Sir Frederick Haldimand at Quebec, to concert the necessary dispositions, and proceed along the frontiers as far as Detroit, to examine the different posts, and report in regard to their condition, and how many and which of them it would be expedient for the United States permanently to occupy. [FN-1] The Baron met General Haldimand at Sorel, on his way to visit the country of the lakes himself. But on making known his business, the British commander informed him that he had received no instructions for the evacuation of the posts, or for any other objects than a cessation of hostilities, with which he had complied. He did not consider himself at liberty to enter, into any negotiations with the Baron upon the subject, and even refused him the necessary passports for visiting Niagara and Detroit. [FN-2] In addition to this, under the pretext that the government of the United States had not sufficient power to enforce the observance of a commercial treaty, Great Britain refused to join in the negotiation of such an instrument. [FN-3] Thus situated—the government and people of each nation complaining of the other—crimination and recrimination ensued, until the public feeling became irritated almost to exasperation.


[FN-1] Letter of Washington to General Haldimand, July 12, 1783. Also, Instructions of the same to Baron Steuben.

[FN-2] Sparks.

[FN-3] The fact was but too true. After the common danger of the war had ceased to bind the States together, the articles of the Confederation were but a rope of sand. The government was, indeed, but a rickety concern until the formation of the Constitution of 1787.

The Indians, in the mean time, brooding over the real or fancied wrongs they had sustained at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, and irritated at the onward current of the white population pressing in their own direction, were becoming restiff; particularly the more distant tribes at the south-west; and their movements indicated any thing but pacific intentions. Indeed, along some portions of the western frontier, particularly on the Ohio river, it could scarcely be said that they had been at peace. Both in 1785 and in 1786, acts of individual hostility were not unfrequent on the banks of the Ohio and on the Kentucky border; and in both of those years larger parties had repeatedly attacked the crews of boats descending the river. It was likewise certain that two years only had elapsed after the close of the war before a hostile combination of the great north-western nations was supposed to have been formed; and documentary proof has been adduced in the preceding pages that a powerful and influential messenger, in the person of Captain Brant, had been instructed by those nations to ascertain prospectively the measure of assistance they might, in the event of hostilities, expect to receive from Great Britain. It is true that Lord Sidney, in his reply to the message of Thayendanegea, had avoided committing himself either way upon this point. But the message of the Mohawk chief; and the reply of the minister, were alike unknown to the public at that day. Still, it was to the detention of the posts on the lakes that the hostile temper manifested by the Indians, and their frequent outrages on the frontier, were ascribed; with more justice, as will hereafter appear, than Great Britain would be willing to allow.

The conduct of Captain Brant, moreover, when illustrated by his private correspondence as well as his public actions, will presently appear very mysterious, if not equivocal. By retiring with his own nation into Canada, the Mohawks had not withdrawn from the Confederacy of the Six Nations, nor had Thayendanegea relinquished his official rank as the principal or superior chief of the whole, though five of them remained within the United States. The differences which thus early sprang up between the United States and the Indians, arose upon a question of boundary; the latter maintaining that the Ohio river was not to be crossed by the people of the former. Captain Brant espoused the cause of the Indians at large upon this question, and had early and strenuously exerted himself to compass a grand confederation of all the north-western tribes and nations, of which, it is believed, he intended to be the head. The incipient steps to the formation of such a confederacy, the reader has already seen, had been taken in 1785, previous to his departure for England. On his return in the following year, his efforts for that object were renewed. [FN] In December, 1786, a grand confederate council of the Indians north west of the Ohio, including the Six Nations, was held at Huron Village, near the mouth of the Detroit River. This council was attended by the Six Nations, and the Hurons, Ottawas, Twitchtwees, [Miamis,] Shawanese, Chippewas, Cherokees, Delawares, Pottawattamies, and the Wabash Confederates. On the 18th of that month, an address to the Congress of the United States was agreed upon, the tone of which was pacific—provided the United States made no encroachments upon their lands beyond the Ohio. After a declaration of their surprise that they were not included in the treaty of peace, they observed that they had nevertheless received a message from the King, advising them to remain quiet. They had likewise received two very agreeable messages from the thirteen States, from the tenor of which they had anticipated a period of repose. But while they were devising the best measures to secure this result and form a lasting reconciliation—while they had "the best thoughts in their minds, mischief had happened." Still, they were anxious to prevent farther trouble, as a principal means of which they recommended that no treaties should be formed by the United States with separate Indian tribes or nations; but that all treaties for lands should be negotiated openly and above board, in the most public manner, and by the united voice of the Confederacy. They attributed the "mischief and confusion" that had arisen, to the fact that the United States would have every thing their own way—that they would "kindle the council-fires wherever they thought proper, without consulting the Indians." At the treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784, they had urged a different policy; and they believed that, had the course then recommended, of treating only in a general conference of the nations, been pursued, all would have continued peace and concord between them. Notwithstanding the mischiefs that had happened, the council professed their strong desire of peace. "This," they said, "is the determination of all the chiefs of the Confederacy, now assembled, notwithstanding that several Indian chiefs were killed in our villages, even when in council, and when absolutely engaged in promoting peace with you, the thirteen United States." In order to ensure this desirable result, they proposed a grand confederate council, to be holden at some half-way place in the ensuing spring—recommending to the United States, in the meantime to prevent their surveyors and other people from crossing to the Indian side of the Ohio. This important address concluded in the following words:—"Brothers: It shall not be our faults, if the plans which we have suggested to you should not be carried into execution. In that case the event will be very precarious, and if fresh ruptures ensue, we hope to be able to exculpate ourselves, and shall most assuredly, with our united force, be obliged to defend those rights and privileges which have been transmitted to us by our ancestors; and if we should be thereby reduced to misfortunes, the world will pity us when they think of the amicable proposals we now make to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood. These are our thoughts and firm resolves, and we earnestly desire that you would transmit to us, as soon as possible, your answer, be it what it may."