There was another cause of disquietude. It was feared that, flushed with this defeat of a second expedition, even the five of the Six Nations who had concluded treaties with the United States, but of whose ultimate fidelity many grains of distrust had been entertained, would now grasp their hatchets, and rush to the ranks of the Miamis and their western allies. The most earnest appeals to the government for protection were therefore sent forward by the inhabitants of the border towns, to which a deaf ear could not be turned.
The popular clamor against St. Clair, in consequence of his disastrous defeat, was loud and deep. With the great mass of the people, it is success only that constitutes the general, and St. Clair had been unfortunate. The surrender of Ticonderoga in 1777, was an event which had occasioned great disappointment and dissatisfaction at the time, and the recollection was revived, in connection with this signal reverse. But in neither instance did the fault lie at the door of the commanding General, Ticonderoga was evacuated because indefensible, and the battle lost by the cowardice of the militia. Fully conscious, himself, that no blame was justly attributable to him, General St. Clair applied to the President for an investigation by a court of inquiry. The request was denied, only for the reason that there were not officers enough in the service, of the requisite rank, to form a legal court for that purpose. [FN-1] Aware of the prejudices excited against him in the public mind, the unfortunate General spontaneously announced his intention of resigning his commission, suggesting, however, that he should prefer retaining it until his conduct could be investigated in some way; but as the military establishment at that time allowed only one Major General, and as the service required the speedy designation of a successor, this request was also denied, though with reluctance, by the President. [FN-2] Complaints, it is true, were poured into the ears of the President against him. Among others, General John Armstrong, the hero of Kittaning, and an experienced Indian fighter in Pennsylvania, addressed a letter to the President, censuring the generalship of St. Clair. [FN-3] It is believed, however, that the veteran Governor of the North-western Territory continued in the full enjoyment of the President's confidence to the last.
[FN-1] Letter of President Washington to General St. Clair, March 28, 1792.
[FN-2] Letter of the President to General St. Clair, April 4, 1792.
[FN-3] Sparks's Life and Correspondence of Washington, Vol. X, p. 223.
The appointment of a successor to St. Clair as Commander-in-chief of the army, was a source of no little perplexity to the President. His own inclinations were in favor of Governor Henry Lee of Virginia; but it was apprehended that difficulties would arise in procuring the services of officers who had been his seniors in the army of the Revolution, as subordinates under him. There appear to have been several candidates, among whom were Generals Morgan and Scott, and Colonel Darke, who had served under St. Clair during the last campaign. Ultimately the appointment was conferred upon General Anthony Wayne. The selection was most unpopular in Virginia; but the result demonstrated its wisdom. [FN]
[FN] Governor Lee wrote to President Washington on the 15th of June, respecting the selection of a successor of General St. Clair at large, and on the subject of Wayne's appointment in particular, he said:—"You cannot be a stranger to the extreme disgust which the late appointment to the command of the army excited among all orders in this state." To this letter the President replied at length. The following paragraph contains the answer to the remark of Governor Lee given above:—"How far the appointment of General Wayne is a popular or an unpopular measure, is not for me to decide. It was not the determination of the moment, nor was it the effect of partiality or of influence; for no application (if that in any instance could have warped my judgment) was ever made in his behalf from anyone who could have thrown the weight of a feather into his scale; but because, under a full view of all circumstances, he appeared most eligible. To a person of your observation and intelligence it is unnecessary to remark, that an appointment, which may be unpopular in one place and with one set of men, may not be so in another place or with another set of men, and vice verse; and that to attempt to please every body is the sure way to please nobody; because the attempt would be as idle as the exertion would be impracticable. General Wayne has many good points as an officer, and it is to be hoped that time, reflection, good advice, and, above all, a due sense of the importance of the trust which is committed to him, will correct his foibles or cast a shade over them."
Rufus Putnam, a son of the veteran of Bunker Hill, who had served with credit in the war of the Revolution, and who had settled in the North-western Territory soon after the close of that contest, was appointed a brigadier-general, to serve with Wayne. This appointment was tendered to Colonel Willett of New-York, but declined by that gentleman upon the ground of conscientious scruples with regard to fighting the Indians. "It has been uniformly my opinion," said the Colonel in a letter to the President, "that the United States ought to avoid an Indian war. I have generally conceived this to be our wisest policy. The reasons alleged in support of the present Indian war have never brought conviction to my mind. From my knowledge and experience of these people, I am clear that it is not a difficult thing to preserve peace with them. That there are bad men among them, and that these will at times do acts which deserve punishment, is very clear. But I hold, that to go to war is not the proper way to punish them. Most of the Indians that I have had any knowledge of, are conceited and vain. By feeding their vanity, you gain their good opinion; and this in time procures their esteem and affection. By conciliating their good-will, you will render them susceptible of almost any impression. They are credulous, yet suspicious. They think a great deal; and have in general good notions of right and wrong. They frequently exhibit proofs of grateful minds; yet they are very revengeful. And though they are not free from chicanery and intrigue, yet if their vanity is properly humored, and they are dealt justly by, it is no difficult matter to come to reasonable terms with them. The intercourse I have had with these people, the treatment I have myself received from them, and which I have known others to receive, make me an advocate for them. To fight with them, would be the last thing I should desire. And yet, Sir, I declare, from the experience I have had, I do not conceive it difficult to beat them when brought to action. When in small parties they scatter themselves along a frontier, they have always been found exceedingly troublesome and dangerous. This kind of warfare is their forte; and in it they are found to be truly tremendous. But when they attempt anything in large bodies, I have found, notwithstanding their great dexterity in the wilderness, and the advantage they usually derive from the admirable position they take, that they are easily beat. In marching through woods, where troops are exposed to attacks from Indians, particular attention should be paid not only to the mode and line of march, but also to extend small parties and single men far on the flanks in front and in rear. But whenever a serious attack is made, which is usually furious, an instantaneous charge, with huzzaing sufficiently loud to drown the noise the Indians make, will never fail to repel them. And this stroke repeated and pursued, will, I am well convinced, terminate in victory. And yet victory even over Indians is generally paid for; but defeats are terrible. The honour, however, of fighting and beating Indians, is what I do not aspire after. If in any way I could be instrumental in effecting and maintaining peace with them, it would be a source of great gratification."