There were incidents marking that battle, however, involving the conduct of the young Chief, and connected with the life of an American officer whose name from that day forth has been identified with the military glory of his country, which forbid that the transaction should be thus summarily despatched. Aside, moreover, from the part borne by John Brant in the battle, and the exciting incidents to be related, sufficient of themselves to form a chapter that might well be entitled "the romance of history," many facts connected with that singular engagement have to this day remained unwritten.
The command of the Niagara section of the American frontier, during the Autumn of 1812, had been committed by Governor Tompkins to Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, the senior officer of the State Cavalry of New-York. Attached to his staff was Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, an officer who, as a subaltern in the regular service, had signalized himself by his undaunted bravery, and coolness and intrepidity in action, during the Indian wars, and particularly under the command of General Wayne at the Miamis. The situation of General Van Rensselaer had been exceedingly embarrassing during the whole period of his command, or nearly three months before the movement under review. His selection for that post by the Commander-in-chief of New-York, considering the adverse state of their political relations, was deemed an equivocal act on the part of the Governor. But, although opposed to the policy of the war, and in the possession of the first paternal estate in America, and in the enjoyment of every blessing which can sweeten life, General Van Rensselaer hesitated not to comply with the call of his country, and took the field immediately. [FN-1] After reconnoitering the frontier from Ogdensburgh to Lake Erie, he determined to establish his head-quarters at Lewiston, on the Strait of Niagara. After the failure of the expedition of General Hull, who had been ingloriously captured with his army at Detroit, the next point of attack upon the enemy's country was obviously the Canadian peninsula at Niagara. But the season for active military operations had almost glided away under the tardy levy of regular troops, and the uncertain assemblages of the militia; and it was October before General Van Rensselaer found himself in force to warrant offensive operations. His solicitude, not only for the interests of the public service and the honor of his country, but for his own reputation, determined him to strike a blow at the enemy if possible, [FN-2] in order to obtain a position for winter-quarters on the Canada shore. Added to which was the manifestation of a strong and impatient desire by the militia to be led against the enemy. This desire rose to such a height that resistance seemed scarcely possible, and patriotism was apparently passing the limits of subordination. [FN-3] Indeed, the determination of the militia was expressed to the General through various channels, as an alternative, that they must have orders to act against the enemy or they would go home. [FN-4] Nor was the General himself less desirous of action than his troops professed to be. He felt that the disgrace of the American arms at Detroit, at the opening of the campaign, could only be wiped away by a brilliant close of it; and that unless a signal blow should be struck, the public expectation would be disappointed; all the toil and expense of the campaign would be thrown away; and, worse than all, the whole would be tinged with dishonor. [FN-5]
[FN-1] Memoirs of General Wilkinson.
[FN-2] Ibid.
[FN-3] Low's History of the War.
[FN-4] General Van Rensselaer's official report.
[FN-5] Letter of General Van Rensselaer to Governor Tompkins, Oct 8, 1812.
Impressed by considerations like these, and encouraged by the apparent desire of the militia to take the field, dispositions were made for an attack upon Queenston Heights, with a view of moving thence upon Fort George at Niagara, which it was proposed to carry by storm, and then take up the quarters of the army there for the winter—an excellent position for obtaining supplies, and making the necessary arrangements for opening the campaign early in the following Spring. [FN-1] General Brock, the British commander on the opposite shore of the river, was watching the motions of the Americans with unwearied vigilance; but a spy, who had been despatched across the river, having returned with the erroneous information that that officer had moved in the direction of Detroit with all his disposable force, arrangements were made by General Van Rensselaer for crossing the river and attacking Queenston Heights early on the morning of the 11th of October. The design, however, was frustrated, either by the ignorance, the cowardice, or the treachery of a boatman, who had been selected as the leading waterman for his skill and steadiness. The enterprise was to be led by Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer,—"The corps designated for the expedition, and principally composed of militia, assembled punctually and in good order at the place of rendezvous, and, with the exception of the weather, which was wet and windy, every thing wore a propitious aspect. But when, after long and patiently abiding the pelting of a north-easterly storm, the embarkation was ordered and the boats called for, none were found to be in readiness; and on inquiry it was discovered that the person having charge of them had not only withdrawn himself, but had carried with him all the oars necessary for the service. For this unexpected occurrence there was no remedy but patience; the expedition was accordingly suspended, and the troops sent back to their cantonments." [FN-2]