"His Excellency, General Haldimand, commands me to acquaint you that Captain Brant's intention meets highly with his approbation, and wishes to assist it; which might be done from this place in the following manner, but the General desires you will keep it inviolably secret. He has for some time intended sending a party of about sixty chosen loyalists, under the command of Major Jessup, toward Fort Edward; this party might join Joseph against Palmerstown could he ascertain the time and place, which might be nearly done by calculating the time his express would take to come from Carleton Island—his march from thence, and Major Jessup's from Point au Fez, alias Nikadiyooni. If Joseph wishes to have this assistance, he must confer with Major Ross, who will send off an active express; otherwise, if Joseph should prefer aid from that quarter, Major Ross and Captain Robertson are directed to afford it; and, indeed, the delays and uncertainty of the parties joining punctually, incline the General to think it more eligible.
"Should you upon this adopt the General's offer and opinion, and proceed from Carleton Island to Palmerstown, which place I am sure several of Major Ross's men and others at the island are well acquainted with, I wish you the aid of Providence with all the success imaginable; in which case it will be one of tho most essential services you have rendered your king this war, and cannot but by him be noticed and rewarded; your return by Canada will be the shortest and most eligible, and we shall be very happy to see you here. As I received the General's letter this afternoon only, I could not speak with Odeserundiye, but have wrote to him by express to let you know the precise time he intends meeting you. Mrs. Claus and all friends are well here, and salute you heartily; also your sister and daughters; the others here are well, and desire their love and duty. I hope she received the things safe which I sent lately by Anna. Adieu. God bless and prosper you.
"Yours most sincerely, Dan'l. Claus.
"Captain Brant.
"P. S. The great advantage of setting out from Carleton Island, is the route, which is so unexpected a one, that there is hardly any doubt but you will surprise them, which is a great point gained. Whereas, were you to set out from Canada, there are so many friends, both whites and Indians, to the rebel cause, that you could not well get to the place undiscovered, which would not do so well.
"D. C."
Happily, from some cause now unknown, this project, so well devised, and apparently so near its maturity, was never executed. The narrative is therefore resumed.
So great, and so universal, was the distress for provisions, already adverted to, that, on the 29th of March, General Clinton wrote to the Governor, "I am hourly under apprehensions that the remaining different posts occupied for the defence of the frontiers of this State, will be abandoned, and the country left open to the ravages of the enemy." Such continued suffering of course produced disaffection in this department also; and the greatest possible prudence was required, on the part of the officers, to prevent desertions of whole bodies. So critical was their situation, that in a letter to the Governor, of May 3d, General Clinton mentions the fact, that a small scout, commanded by a corporal, in the neighborhood of Port George, having captured a party of the enemy, "with a packet, had been bribed to release them for a guinea each and two silk handkerchiefs." Still worse than this was the fact that the General was afraid to proceed openly to punish the delinquency. On the 5th General Clinton again wrote to the Governor—"From the present appearance, I am convinced that the troops will abandon the frontier. It is absurd to suppose they can or will exist under the present circumstances. However, let what will be the consequences, I have nothing to reproach myself with. I have repeatedly called for assistance from every quarter, but could obtain none." On the 8th of May, General Schuyler, writing from Saratoga, said—"I wrote you this morning, since which, finding the troops exceedingly uneasy, Colonel Van Vechten and I turned out each one of the best cattle we had; the meat proved better than was expected, but the soldiers still continue troublesome; they have hung part of it on a pole with a red flag above a white one, and some of them hold very alarming a conversation. I dread the consequences, as they can so easily a join the enemy. If a body of nine-months men were here, it a would probably deter the others from going off to the northward, [the enemy meaning] if they should have such an intention."
Great blame was imputed to Congress; and likewise to the State governments, for allowing the commissariat to come to such a deplorable pass. The resources of the country were known to be abundant for the comfortable sustenance of a much larger army than was at that time in the field; but the efficient action of Congress was fettered by its want of power. The States, jealous of their own sovereignty, had withholden from the central government powers which were essential to the vigorous prosecution of the war, while it was but seldom that they could be brought into a simultaneous and harmonious exertion of those powers themselves. Hence the frequent and keen distresses of the army, and the complicated embarrassments under which the officers were compelled to struggle during the whole war. Still, the blame did not rest wholly with the States. There were jealousies, and heart-burnings, and intrigues, in the Congresses of that day, as in later times; and their conduct was often the subject of bitter complaint in the letters of the Commander-in-chief. The following letter from General Schuyler bears hard upon the officers of the federal government, while at the same time it depicts the extreme destitution of the country at the north, at the period under consideration:—
"General Schuyler to General Clinton.