[FN-3] Life of Governor Morris.
Meantime Governor Clinton, inflexibly determined to preserve the disputed jurisdiction, was exerting himself to the utmost for that object; and in order, apparently, to bring the question to a test, several persons were arrested in the course of the Summer of 1781, within the territory of the Grants, under the pretext of some military delinquency. This procedure was the signal for another tempest. Governor Chittenden wrote to officers of New-York, demanding the release of the prisoners taken from the Grants—asserting their determination to maintain the government they had "set up," [FN-1] and threatening that, in the event of an invasion of the territory of New-York by the common enemy, unless those prisoners were given up, they would render no assistance to New-York. This letter also contained an admonition, "that power was not limited only to New-York." [FN-2] Nor was this all. While the country was threatened by invasion both from the north and the west, the spirit of the Vermont insurgents began to spread among the militia in the northern towns east of the Hudson, belonging to General Gansevoort's own brigade. Thus, on the one hand, General Stark was calling upon him for assistance against the enemy apparently approaching from Lake Champlain, at the same time that Governor Clinton was directing him to quell the spirit of insubordination along the line of the New Hampshire Grants; and both of these duties were to be discharged, with a knowledge that a portion of his own command was infected with the insurgent spirit. Added to all which was, the necessity of watching, as with an eagle's eye, the conduct of the swarms of loyalists within the bosom of Albany and in the towns adjacent; while for his greater comfort, he was privately informed that the Green Mountain Boys were maturing a plot for his abduction. Meantime the government of the Grants had effected an organization of their own militia, and disclosures had been made to the government of New-York, imputing to the leading men of the Grants a design, in the event of a certain contingency, of throwing the weight of their own forces into the scale of the Crown. The following letter may be considered important in this connexion:—
[FN-1] MS. Letter from Thomas Chittenden to Captain Van Rensselaer, among the Gansevoort papers.
[FN-2] This dark and rather awkward saying was full of meaning, as will appear in a subsequent portion of the present chapter.
"Governor Clinton to General Gansevoort.
"Poughkeepsie, Oct. 18, 1781.
"Dear Sir,
"Your letter of the 15th instant was delivered to me on the evening of the 16th. I have delayed answering it, in hopes that the Legislature would ere this have formed a quorum, and that I might have availed myself of their advice on the subject to which it relates; but as this is not yet the case, and it is uncertain when I shall be enabled to lay the matter before them, I conceive it might be improper longer to defer expressing my own sentiments to you on this subject.
"The different unwarrantable attempts, during the Summer, of the people on the Grants to establish their usurped jurisdiction, even beyond their former claim, and the repetition of it (alluded to in your letter,) in direct opposition to a resolution of Congress injurious to this State and favorable to their project of independence, and at a time when the common enemy are advancing, can only be accounted for by what other parts of their conduct have given us too much reason to suspect—disaffection to the common cause. On my part, I have hitherto shown a disposition to evade entering into any altercation with them, that might, in its most remote consequence, give encouragement to the enemy, and expose the frontier settlements to their ravages; and from these considerations alone I have submitted to insults which otherwise would not have been borne with; and I could have wished to have continued this kind of conduct until the approaching season would have secured us against the incursions of the common enemy. But as from the accounts contained in Colonel Van Rensselaer's letter, it would appear that the militia embodying under Mr. Chittenden's orders are for the service of the enemy, and that their first object was to make you a prisoner, it would be unjustifiable to suffer them to proceed. It is therefore my desire that you maintain your authority throughout every part of your brigade, and for this purpose, that you carry the laws of the State into execution against those who shall presume to disobey your lawful orders. I would only observe that these sentiments are founded on an idea that the accounts given by Col. Van Rensselaer in his letter may be relied on; it being still my earnest desire, for the reasons above explained, not to do any thing that will bring matters to extremities, at least before the close of the campaign, if it can consistently be avoided.