[FN-3] "From the post of Saratoga to that of Dobbs's Ferry inclusive, I believe there it not at this moment one day's supply of meat for the army on hand. Supplies, particularly of beef cattle, must be speedily and regularly provided, or our posts cannot be maintained, nor the army kept in the field much longer."—Letter of Washington to President Weere of New Hampshire.
With the discomfiture and retreat of Major Ross on the one hand, and the return of St. Leger to St. John's on the other, all active operations ceased with the enemy at the north. But the difficulties of the state Government with the New Hampshire Grants were on the increase; and the controversy ran so high, that by the 1st of December an insurrection broke out in the regiments of Colonel John Van Rensselaer and Colonel Henry K. Van Rensselaer, in the north-eastern towns of the State; while the regiment of Colonel Peter Yates—also belonging to the brigade of General Gansevoort—was in a condition not much better. These disturbances arose in Schaghticoke, Hoosic, and a place called St. Coych, and parts adjacent, belonging then to the county of Albany; but being on the east side of the Hudson, north of the parallel of the northern line of Massachusetts, the Government of the New Hampshire Grants had extended its aegis over that section of country, claiming jurisdiction, as heretofore stated, to the Hudson river. General Gansevoort was apprised of the insurrection on the 5th. He immediately directed Colonels Yates and Henry K. Van Rensselaer, whose regiments, at that time, were the least affected with the insurgent spirit, to collect such troops as they could, and repair to St. Coych, to the assistance of Colonel John Van Rensselaer. An express being dispatched to the Governor, at Poughkeepsie, with the unwelcome information, and a request for directions what course to pursue in the emergency, the return of the messenger brought very explicit orders from the indomitable chief magistrate:—"I perfectly approve of your conduct," said the Governor; "and have only to add, that should the force already detached prove insufficient to quell the insurrection, you will make such addition to it as to render it effectual. I have transmitted to General Robert Van Rensselaer the information, and have directed him, in case it should be necessary, on your application, to give assistance from his brigade." [FN-1] Although the fact had not been stated in the dispatches forwarded to Governor Clinton, that the movement was beyond doubt sympathetic with, or instigated from, the Grants, yet the Governor was at no loss at once to attribute it to the "usurped government of that pretended State;" [FN-2] and it was his resolute determination to oppose force to force, and, in regard to the Grants themselves, to repel force by force.
[FN-1] MS. letter of Governor Clinton to General Gansevoort, Dec 11, 1781.
[FN-2] Idem.
Gansevoort did not receive his instructions from the Governor until the 15th. Meantime Colonels Yates and Henry Van Rensselaer had made no progress in quelling the insurrection; the insurgents, on the other hand, being on the increase, and having thrown up a block-house for defence. On the 16th General Gansevoort took the field himself, repairing in the first instance to the head-quarters of General Stark at Saratoga, in order to obtain a detachment of troops and a field-piece. But the troops of Stark were too naked to move from their quarters; and it was thought improper for him to interfere without an order from General Heath. [FN-1] Gansevoort then crossed over to the east side of the river, in order to place himself at the head of such militia as he could muster in Schaghticoke and Hoosic; but was soon met by Colonel Yates, in full retreat from the house of Colonel John Van Rensselaer. He had been able to raise but eighty men to put down the insurgents of John Van Rensselaer's regiment; and on arriving at St. Coych, he discovered a force of five hundred men advancing from the Grants to the assistance of the rebels. Gansevoort retired five miles farther, in order to find comfortable quarters for his men, and then attempted, but without success, to open a correspondence with the leader of the insurgents. Calls had been made upon four regiments, viz. those of Colonels Yates, and Henry K. Van Rensselaer, as heretofore stated, and upon Colonel Van Vechten and Major Taylor. But from the whole no greater force than eighty men could be raised. Of Colonel Van Vechten's regiment, only himself, a few officers, and one private could be brought into the field. Under these discouraging circumstances, the General was compelled to relinquish the expedition, and the insurgents remained the victors, to the no small terror of those of the inhabitants who were well-disposed, inasmuch as they were apprehensive of being taken prisoners and carried away, as had been the case with others, should they refuse taking the oath of allegiance to the government of Vermont. [FN-2] Thus terminated the military events of the north, of all descriptions, for the year 1781.
[FN-1] In his official report upon the subject, Gansevoort rather distrusted whether Stark assigned the true reason for withholding his aid on this occasion. Governor Chittenden, of the Grants, having just addressed him a letter requesting him not to interfere with hie troops.
[FN-2] The materials for this rapid sketch of the insurrection of Dec. 1781, at the north-east of Albany, have been drawn from the Gansevoort papers, which are broken and imperfect. The controversy with Vermont was continued, with greater or less force, and in different ways, for several years. But a calm and powerful letter from General Washington to Governor Chittenden, written early in January, 1782, had great influence in causing the government of the Grants to relinquish the territory of New-York, twenty miles broad, upon the eastern side of the Hudson, upon which they had seized. The leaders who had entered upon the correspondence with the enemy in Canada, continued an interchange of communications during several months of the following year; but the course of things soon stripped that strange negotiation of its danger, and rendered it of no importance. Meantime, although Governor Clinton was fully determined to subdue the refractory spirits of the Green Mountains, the latter continued to gain strength and friends, and as their local government became settled, it was for the most part wisely and efficiently administered. Time and again the question was brought before Congress, where nobody cared to act upon it definitively. Hamilton, Jay, and Governeur Morris, all seemed to think it the part of wisdom to allow the secession and independence of Vermont. Things remained in an unsettled state, however, until after the adoption of the federal constitution by New-York in 1788, after which the controversy was amicably adjusted; Vermont agreeing to pay thirty thousand dollars as a full indemnification to persons in New-York holding titles to lands within its boundaries.
There yet remain a few occurrences, connected with the Indian operations of the year, to be noted before closing the present chapter. It was in the Spring of this year that what was called the Coshocton campaign of Colonel Brodhead was performed, and was attended by circumstances that cannot be recalled with other than painful emotions. [FN-1] It had at different times been the purpose of the Commander-in-chief that Colonel Brodhead should penetrate through the Ohio territory to Detroit; but that design was never accomplished. The expedition now under review was led by Brodhead against the villages of the unfriendly Delaware Indians at the forks of the Muskingum. In passing through the settlement of the Moravian Indians at Salem, under the religious care of the Rev. Mr. Heckewelder, some of Brodhead's men manifested a hostile disposition toward those inoffensive noncombatants; but their hostile feelings were repressed by Brodhead, whose exertions were seconded by Colonel Shepherd, of Wheeling. The towns against which the Americans were proceeding were under the control of Captain Pipe, who had espoused the cause of the crown at the instigation of McKee, Elliott, and Girty. On approaching Coshocton, Brodhead's forces were divided into three divisions; and so secret and rapid was their march, that the villages on the eastern bank of the river were fallen upon, and all the Indians who were at home taken, without firing a gun. [FN-2] The immediate object of this visitation was to punish, as it was alleged, the Indians of those towns for some recent cruelties of unwonted atrocity. They had made a late incursion upon the frontiers of Virginia, in the course of which a considerable number of prisoners were taken; but, having been disappointed in the measure of their success, in a moment of rage they bound all the adult male captives to trees, and put them to death by torture, amidst the tears and lamentations of their families. [FN-3] It was now Colonel Brodhead's design to inflict summary vengeance for those murders. He had with him a friendly Delaware chief, named Pekillon, who pointed out sixteen of the captive warriors, upon whom he charged the murders in question. A council of war was convened in the evening, which decided that those sixteen warriors should be put to death. They were therefore bound, and despatched with tomahawk and spear, and scalped. [FN-4]