German Spies in England: An Exposure

by William Le Queux

"After this war," however, may be too late. I contend we should make an end of spies now, and with that end in view I would propose very strong measures—so strong that, I willingly admit, only very grave national peril would justify it. That peril, I contend, actually exists to-day, and no steps we can take to minimise it can be regarded as excessive.

At the present moment it is perfectly easy for any German agent to travel quite freely between England and the Continent. As we know, the Germans have in their possession a large number of stolen British and American passports. By means of these passports their agents can come and go between England and the Continent practically as they please, taking with them any information they can pick up. And, although the collecting of information has been made much more difficult by the additional precautions taken since the outbreak of war, information is still to be obtained by those who know where and how to look for it.

Now, the only channels by which this information can be conveyed abroad at present are, first by correspondence in invisible ink beneath an unsuspicious letter addressed to a neutral country—this was proved at the court-martial of the prisoner of war, Otto Luz, at the Douglas Internment Camp—secondly, by travellers between England and the Continent, and thirdly, by secret wireless stations communicating between our shores and the German ships—probably submarines—lying off the coast. All three of these channels of leakage must be stopped.

The first step should be the absolute closing of the sea routes from these shores to all persons, excepting those who are vouched for by the British Foreign Office. The second is a much closer and more persistent search for concealed wireless plants, and a third, a closer censorship upon outgoing mails to neutral countries. I happen to know that in certain instances censorship upon both cables and correspondence is quite inadequate.

As to the second proposal, there will be no two opinions. Wireless is already forbidden, and there is no hardship in taking steps to see that the law is obeyed. With regard to the first suggestion, I am well aware that many people will think it, as indeed it is, extremely drastic. It would, of course, cause great inconvenience, not only to British subjects, but to the subjects of neutral Powers with whom we are on the best of terms. It would seriously interfere with business which we have every wish should continue, and I should never suggest it unless I were convinced of the urgent need.

A correspondent who has just returned from Holland, where, says the Evening News, he saw British tradesmen doing business with German manufacturers, shows how easy it is for the Germans to send professional spies to England via Flushing. A German permit will pass anyone over the Belgian frontier into Holland: a Belgian passport is not necessary, but such passports are issued by the local authorities. There is nothing to prevent a German commander getting a Belgian passport and issuing it to a German if it suits his purpose, while the present examination arrangements on the English side offer no obstacles to spies landing, especially from boats containing five or six hundred refugees.

The remedy is to make the landing test far more stringent, and to use responsible Belgians in the work. One can readily understand that the average Englishman, even though he spoke French and Flemish, would not be able to detect a German, speaking both languages, as being anything but a genuine Belgian. Such a man, however, would be readily detected by a Belgian; however well he spoke the languages, some trick of accent or pronunciation would be sure to "give him away." Thus our Belgian friends could do much to prevent the German spy getting into the country.

Assume that the spy is here; how are we to prevent him getting out?

By closing the sea routes to all who could not produce to our Foreign Office absolutely satisfactory guarantees of their bona fides. The ordinary passport system is not sufficient; the Foreign Office should demand, and see that it gets not only a photograph, but a very clear explanation of the business of every person who seeks to travel from England to the Continent, backed by unimpeachable references from responsible British individuals, banks, or firms.

In every single case of application for a passport it should be personal, and the most stringent enquiries should be made. I see no other means of putting an end to a danger which, whatever the official apologists may say, is still acute, and shows no signs of diminishing.