Another despatch from Mr. Edgar Hamilton, of the Tribune, was published in that journal on Friday, the 14th September:—
“Brentwood, Thursday, September 13, 1910.
“The events of the last three days have been so tremendous, so involved, and so disastrous to us as a nation, that I hardly know how to deal with them. It is no news now that we have again been beaten, and beaten badly. The whole right of our line of defence has been driven back in disorder, and we are now practically at the ‘last ditch.’ The remnants of that fine force which has, up to now, not only been able to hold the Saxon Army in check, but even to be within an ace of beating it at the memorable battle of Purleigh, less than a week ago, is now occupying the entrenchments which have been under construction ever since the landing of the Germans, and which form a section of the works that have been planned for the defence of the metropolis.
“Here, too, are portions of the Braintree Army Corps and some of the troops lately constituting the garrison of Colchester, whom I accompanied on their night march out of that city when it had been decided to abandon it. We have only the vaguest rumours as to what has happened to the other portion of the 1st Army Corps that was occupying Dunmow and the upper part of the river Chelmer. We can only hope that these troops, or at any rate a considerable portion of them, have been able to gain the shelter of the defensive enceinte to the north-westward. It is to be feared this reverse will necessitate the retreat of the Second, Third, and Fourth Armies from Saffron Walden, Royston, and Baldock, that position which they so gallantly defended against the flower of the German Army, emerging victorious from the glorious battle of Royston. For to stay where they are, in the face of the combined forward movement of the IXth, Xth, and XIIth Corps of the invaders, and the rumoured resumption of the offensive by the two corps defeated before Royston, would be to court being outflanked and cut off from the rest of our forces at a time when every single soldier is urgently required to man the northern portion of the defences of London.
“But to return to the relation of our latest and most disastrous defeat, which I must preface by saying that my readers must not be deceived by the words ‘Army Corps’ as applied to the various assemblages of our troops. As a matter of fact, ‘Divisions,’ or even ‘Brigades,’ would be nearer the mark. The ‘Army Corps’ at Braintree had only four, or perhaps later six, regular infantry regiments, with a very small force of cavalry and not too many guns. Compare that with the Xth German Army Corps under General von Wilberg, which was more immediately opposed to it. This formidable fighting unit may be taken as a representative one, observing that the Garde Corps is yet stronger. Von Wilberg’s Corps is a Hanoverian one, and comprises no less than twenty-three battalions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, twenty-five batteries of artillery, a train battalion, and a pioneer battalion. What chance has a so-called army corps of half a dozen regular infantry battalions, perhaps a dozen Volunteer and Militia Corps, a scratch lot of cavalry, and half the number of guns, against such a powerful, well-organised, and well-trained force as this?
“In the recent fighting about Chelmsford we have had at the outside thirty regular battalions to oppose the onslaught of three complete German Army Corps such as that described above. We have had a number of auxiliary troops in addition, as well as a preponderance in heavy long-ranging artillery, but the former cannot be manœuvred in the same way as regular soldiers, however brave and devoted they may be; while, if weaker in big guns, the enemy outnumbered our mobile horse and field artillery by five or six to one. So it must be understood that while a defeat is deplorable and heartbreaking, yet a victory against such odds would have been little less than a miracle. No blame can be attached either to our officers or their men. All did as much, or more, than could be humanly expected of them. The long and short of it is that since we, as a nation, have not chosen to have a sufficient and up-to-date Army, we must take the rub when an invasion comes.
“We knew well enough—though most of us pretended ignorance—that we could not afford to pay for such an Army at a rate comparable to the current labour market rates, even if we had been twice as rich, and if shoals of recruits had been forthcoming. We were aware, in consequence, that some form of universal service was the only possible method of raising a real Army, but we shrank from making the personal sacrifices required. We were too indolent, too careless, too unpatriotic. Now we have got to pay for the pleasures of living in a fool’s paradise, and pay through the nose into the bargain. We have no right to grumble, whatever may be the outcome, and God only knows what the bitter end of this war may be, what final defeat may mean for our future as a nation. But I must quit moralising and betake myself to my narrative.
“In my letter of the 9th I left the Colchester garrison making their breakfast at Witham. I had understood that they were coming on to Chelmsford, but, as it turned out, the Leicestershires and Dorsets got orders to turn off to the right just before reaching Boreham, and to take up a position on the high ground east of Little Waltham, which is about four miles due north of Chelmsford. With them went a number of the heavy 4.7-inch guns we brought away with us. The Volunteers, Scottish Borderers, and the Lancasters—the latter of whom had been covering the flank of the retreat at Wickham Bishops—came in to Chelmsford, and during the evening were marched out and billeted in the houses thickly scattered along the Braintree road. The cavalry, after some slight skirmishing with the advanced patrols of Von Kronhelm’s Army, who came up with them near Hatfield Peverell, turned up in the afternoon.
“In Chelmsford, when I halted at the Saracen’s Head, I found there were the 2nd Lincolnshire and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had come up from Salisbury Plain, the 1st Hampshire and the 1st Royal Fusiliers from Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. The 2nd South Wales Borderers from Tidworth and the 1st Border Regiment from Bordon Camp arrived in the afternoon, and were marched out to Great Baddow, half-way to Danbury. The 14th Hussars from Shorncliffe and the 20th from Brighton had also come in the day previously, and they at once moved out to the front to relieve the 16th Lancers and 7th Hussars, who had been covering the retiral from Colchester. The town was crowded with Volunteers in khaki, green, red, blue—all the colours of the rainbow—and I noticed two very smart corps of Yeomanry marching out to support the two regular cavalry regiments. Everyone seemed in good spirits on account of the news from Royston and the successful issue of the cavalry skirmish of the morning before. As Chelmsford lies in a kind of hollow, I could not see much from there, so in the afternoon I thought I would run out to the high ground near Danbury and see if I could get any idea of what was going on.
“As I passed Danbury Place I heard the deafening report of heavy guns close at hand. I found that the firing came from some of the Bluejackets’ 4.7’s near the church, where I had seen them at work at the opening of Purleigh Battle. I got out of my car and went up to the officer in charge, whom I met on that occasion. I asked him at what he was firing. ‘Look over there,’ he said, pointing towards Maldon. I saw nothing at first. ‘Look higher,’ said the sailor. I raised my eyes, and there, floating hundreds of feet over and on this side of the old town, a great yellow sausage-like something glistened in the sunlight. I recognised it at once from the photographs I had seen of the German manœuvres. It was their great military balloon, known as the ‘Wurst,’ or sausage, from its elongated shape. Its occupants were doubtless hard at work reconnoitring our position.