THE ASSAULT.
Cockerell was at length ordered forward and the attack began. According to French’s account, everything went as successfully as possible. He represents the triple lines of intrenchments and Redoubts on the west side as being captured one, after another, his troops resting but briefly at each to gather strength and survey the work before them, and again rushing forward in murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with dead, until they were masters of the “Second Redoubt,” and the “Third or Main Redoubt” was filled with those driven from the captured works and further crowded by the refugees from the eastern fort and its defences, who had been driven out by the attack of Sears. He represents the Federal forces, their fire almost silenced, as being herded into the one Redoubt on the west, of which French’s troops occupied the ditch and were preparing for the final attack.
At this critical moment, with the garrison and the precious stores, as it were, in the hollow of his hand, French received word that General Sherman, who had been “repeatedly signalled during the battle,” was close behind him with his whole army, and within two miles of the road he would have to take to rejoin his corps.
On this point of Sherman’s proximity to French as his reason for leaving, we have not only full knowledge of the exact position and movement of our troops to show that such was really not the case, but a brief piece of testimony from the other side in the shape of a dispatch from Major Mason, Hood’s adjudant-general, from which it is evident that French, becoming hopeless of success, had sought in advance to justify at headquarters the failure of his enterprise. The date and hour of this dispatch, which reads as follows, are of interest:
“Carley’s House, Oct. 5, 1864. 8:15 p. m.
Lt. Gen’l Stewart,
Com’d’g Corps.
General French’s dispatch, forwarded by yourself, is just received. Gen. Hood directs me to say that he does not know where a division could march at this time to give any assistance to Gen. French, but that you will endeavor to send some scouts to him, and direct him to leave the railroad and march to the West, to New Hope Church.
Gen. Hood does not understand how Gen. French could be cut off at the point he designates in his dispatch, as he should have moved directly away from the railroad to the West, if he deemed his position precarious.
A. P. M.”
It is of course obvious from the map that if French found Sherman approaching from the South, he had only to follow westward the road up which he had been charging at Allatoona all day and free himself from danger in an hour. It would be of interest to see this dispatch of French’s and observe the hour when sent, but it is not forthcoming. The hour of the reply is significant. It need not have taken a mounted man three hours to get word to Stewart, then near a junction with Hood and to Hood himself, less than 15 miles away. The reply, made at once, is written at 8:15 p. m., and French’s message must certainly have been sent later than 4 p. m. French had probably been gone from Allatoona an hour or more when he bethought him to send the request for a division to extricate him.