Governor Dinwiddie canvassed the whole subject with Washington, so that he was prepared to make definite suggestions to the Legislature when that body convened. He advised them to raise two thousand troops and make a liberal appropriation of money, "to carry the war into Africa," on the ground that otherwise the enemy would be emboldened to prosecute an aggressive war.
When the Legislature assembled, leading members opposed aggressive warfare, and advised only defensive operations on the frontier. So they voted to raise a thousand troops only, and appropriated money accordingly, a very great disappointment to Washington and those who took the same view of the situation that he did. At the same time Washington was appointed commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, with the unusual power of appointing his own field officers and aide-de-camp and secretary. This was on the 14th of August, 1755.
On a former page we said that expeditions against the French and Indians at Niagara and Crown Point were planned at the same time the expedition against Duquesne was determined upon. Both of these expeditions failed. They started from Albany, N.Y., the first under the command of Governor Shirley of Massachusetts; the other under William Johnson, an Irishman, who was on intimate terms of friendship with the most powerful chiefs of the Six Nations. When these two expeditions were fairly under way, news of the disastrous defeat of Braddock reached them, and completely demoralized the troops. The Indians, who were always inclined to join the winning side, deserted the ranks, and many white soldiers followed their cowardly example. The expedition under Johnson accomplished something in another direction; but both expeditions failed, so far as the proposed reduction of Niagara and Crown Point was concerned.
"A fatal mistake!" remarked Washington to Mr. Fairfax. "Such timid measures are just suited to encourage the enemy."
"It cannot be otherwise," answered Fairfax. "To provide just enough men to make a good target, and just enough money to pay for shooting them down, is very poor policy, in my judgment."
"When it comes to actual service," continued Washington, "there will not be over seven hundred reliable soldiers for fighting. To defend three hundred and sixty miles of frontier with this small force is next to impossible. To mass them in one locality will leave other localities exposed; and to divide them up into squads, and scatter them over the whole distance, is arranging them for the enemy to readily cut them off one after another."
"A bloody work, that infuriated savages will enjoy," remarked Mr. Fairfax. "The more I think of it, the more I shrink from the contemplation of the horrible butchery that will probably follow this serious mistake of the government."
"Yet I accept my appointment, lest a refusal be misconstrued," continued Washington. "But I have served so long with inadequate support by the government, followed by disasters, that I had hoped for the most liberal provisions now."
"And they should have been freely granted," added Mr. Fairfax.
"No one can be more sensible of my failures than I am," Washington remarked with his usual modesty. "If an old proverb will apply to my case, I shall certainly close with a share of success, for surely no man ever made a worse beginning than I have. Still, I want a fair chance to redeem my fortunes if I can."