By request, General Lee returned from the South at this time. He was an accomplished military officer, and his successes at the South added much to his laurels. Many regarded him superior to Washington. The latter esteemed him highly as an officer of skill and experience. At a council of war held soon after his arrival, General Lee said:
"A position is not a good one simply because its approaches are difficult. No army can maintain itself with the enemy in front and rear, especially when the enemy's ships command the water on each side, as they do here. Your recent experience on Long Island and in New York shows the danger of such position."
"That is very true," answered Washington. "We cannot afford to hazard too much in the present condition of the army. I have satisfactory evidence that General Howe's purpose is to surround our camp, and capture the whole American army."
"And he is not much of a general if he does not do it," responded Lee. "For my part, I would have nothing to do with the islands to which you have been clinging so pertinaciously. I would give Mr. Howe a fee-simple of them."
"Where and when shall we be in a better condition to meet the enemy?" inquired General George Clinton, a brave but inexperienced officer. "We must fight the enemy somewhere; why not here?"
"I will answer your inquiry," replied Washington. "We shall be in a better condition to meet the foe when the Colonies have had time to furnish their quotas of recruits, as recently ordered by Congress."
At the earnest solicitation of Washington, Congress had voted that the Colonies should furnish eighty-eight battalions, in quotas, according to their abilities; that the pay of officers should be raised; troops serving throughout the war should receive a bounty of twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land, with a new suit of clothes annually. Those enlisting for three years were to receive twenty dollars bounty, but no land. This provision was a response to Washington's frequent protests against short enlistments and small pay, and it pointed to a reorganization of the army, on a permanent footing, according to Washington's frequently expressed ideas. The general had great expectations of relief from this more liberal policy.
"Our present action should look solely to the safety of the army," interjected Lee. "To save it from annihilation or capture is our first duty."
"Certainly," rejoined Washington; "and now let this question be answered definitely: whether (considering that the obstructions in the North River have proved insufficient, and that the enemy's whole force is in our rear on Grog Point), it is now deemed possible, in our situation, to prevent the enemy from cutting off the communication with the country, and compelling us to fight them at all disadvantages or surrender prisoners at discretion?"