For example:—
If A is B, A is C, and if A is not B, A is D. But A either is or is not B. Therefore, A either is C or is D.
If A acted of his own motive, he is a knave; if A did not act of his own motive, he is a catspaw. But A either acted of his own motive or he did not. Thereupon A is either a knave or a catspaw.
This is an example of the Constructive Dilemma, the form of it corresponding to the common use of the word as a choice between equally unpleasant alternatives. The standard example is the dilemma in which the custodians of the Alexandrian Library are said to have been put by the Caliph Omar in 640 A.D.
If your books are in conformity with the Koran, they are superfluous; if they are at variance with it, they are pernicious. But they must either be in conformity with the Koran or at variance with it. Therefore they are either superfluous or pernicious.
Where caution has to be exercised is in accepting the clauses of the Major. We must make sure that the asserted relations of Reason and Consequent really hold. It is there that fallacy is apt to creep in and hide its head. The Alexandrian Librarians were rash in accepting the first clause of the conqueror's Major: it does not follow that the books are superfluous unless the doctrines of the Koran are not merely sound but contain all that is worth knowing. The propounder of the dilemma covertly assumes this. It is in the facility that it affords for what is technically known as Petitio Principii that the Dilemma is a useful instrument for the Sophist. We shall illustrate it further under that head.
What is known as the Destructive Dilemma is of a somewhat different form. It proceeds upon the denial of the Consequent as involving the denial of the Antecedent. In the Major you obtain the admission that if a certain thing holds, it must be followed by one or other of two consequences. You then prove by way of Minor that neither of the alternatives is true. The conclusion is that the antecedent is false.
We had an example of this in discussing whether the inference in the Hypothetical Syllogism is Immediate. Our argument was in this form:—
If the inference is immediate, it must be drawn either from the Major alone or from the Minor alone. But it cannot be drawn from the Major alone, neither can it be drawn from the Minor alone. Therefore, it is not immediate.
In this form of Dilemma, which is often serviceable for clearness of exposition, we must as in the other make sure of the truth of the Major: we must take care that the alternatives are really the only two open. Otherwise the imposing form of the argument is a convenient mask for sophistry. Zeno's famous dilemma, directed to prove that motion is impossible, covers a petitio principii.
If a body moves, it must move either where it is or where it is not. But a body cannot move where it is: neither can it move where it is not. Conclusion, it cannot move at all, i.e., Motion is impossible.