In effect, Mill's doctrine of Connotation helped to fix a conception of the general name first dimly suggested by Aristotle when he recognised that names of genera and species signify Quality, in showing what sort a thing is. Occam carried this a step farther towards clear light by including among Connotative Terms such general names as "monk," name of classes that at once suggest a definite attribute. The third step was made by Mill in extending the term Connotation to such words as "man," "horse," the Infimæ Species of the Schoolmen, the Species of modern science.
Whether connotation was the best term to use for this purpose, rather than extension, may be questioned: but at least it was in the line of tradition through Occam.
[Footnote 2:] The history of the definition of the Proprium is an example of the tendency of distinctions to become more minute and at the same time more purposeless. Aristotle's ῐδιον was an attribute, such as the laugh of the man or the bark of the dog, common to all of a class and peculiar to the class (quod convenit omni soli et semper) yet not comprised in the definition of the class. Porphyry recognised three varieties of ῐδια besides this, four in all, as follows:—(1) an attribute peculiar to a species but not possessed by all, as knowledge of medicine or geometry; (2) possessed by a whole species but not peculiar to it, as being a biped in man; (3) peculiar to a species, and possessed by all at a certain time, as turning grey in old age; (4) Aristotle's "proprium," peculiar and possessed by all, as risibility. The idea of the Proprium as deducible from or consequent on the essence would seem to have originated in the desire to find something common to all Poryphyry's four varieties.
[Footnote 3:] It is a plausible contention that in the case of the Singular name the extension is at a minimum and the intension at a maximum, the extension being one individual, and the intension the totality of his attributes. But this is an inexact and confused use of words. A name does not extend beyond the individual except when it is used to signify one or more of his prominent qualities, that is, is used with the function of a general name. The extension of a Singular name is zero: it has no extension. On the other hand, it suggests, in its function as a Singular name, no properties or qualities; it suggests only a subject; i.e., it has no intension. The ambiguity of the term Denotation helps the confusion in the case of Singular names. "Denote" in common speech means to indicate, to distinguish. But when in Logic we say that a general name denotes individuals, we have no thought of indicating or distinguishing: we mean only that it is applicable to any one, without respect of individuals, either in predication or epithetic description.
[Footnote 4:] Strictly speaking, as I have tried to indicate all along, the words Connotation and Denotation, or Extension and Intension, apply only to general names. Outside general names, they have no significance. An adjective with its noun is a general name, of which the adjective gives part of the Connotation. If we apply the word connotation to signify merely the suggestion of an attribute in whatever grammatical connexion, then an abstract name is undoubtedly as much connotative as an adjective. The word Sweetness has the same meaning as Sweet: it indicates or signifies, conveys to the mind of the reader the same attribute: the only difference is that it does not at the same time indicate a subject in which the attribute is found, as sweet apple. The meaning is not connoted.
Chapter II.
THE SYLLOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS INTO TERMS.
I.—The Bare Analytic Forms.
The word "term" is loosely used as a mere synonym for a name: strictly speaking, a term (ὅρος, a boundary) is one of the parts of a proposition as analysed into Subject and Predicate. In Logic, a term is a technical word in an analysis made for a special purpose, that purpose being to test the mutual consistency of propositions.