The position of the Irish tenant would thus be greatly improved; the sphere of the ‘Three F’s’ would be largely extended; he would have ‘fixity of tenure,’ for a long time, at least, without the hazard and loss of litigation every fifteen years; his right of ‘free sale’ would be less restricted; and he would have distinct advantages, as respects ‘fair rent,’ under the part of my plan I am about to explain. I turn to the position of the Irish ‘landlord’—I still use this expression and that of ‘tenant,’ though both words are hardly applicable to existing facts; this, too, in my judgment, would be made much better. The estate that is now created against him would still be preserved; I wish it were a perpetual estate, but it would be one for thirty years at least; he would, therefore, remain assimilated to a rent-charger, as he is at present. But like his tenant he would be comparatively free from lawsuits; he would be less harassed by claims in respect of improvements; he would have, in many particulars, a more stable tenure. He should, of course, retain the ‘royalties’ still reserved to him—mines, minerals, timber, and such things; and he should have the title to the statutory conditions he now has; but as his reversionary rights would be somewhat lessened, he should be compensated for these by a small money payment. With one great exception he should have the legal remedies to enforce the rights he now possesses; and that exception would be of great importance. I have always thought the law of ejectment for non-payment of rent harsh; it is an innovation on the ancient Common Law; it sometimes causes forfeitures far from just; it is not properly applicable to tenancies of long duration. I would certainly abolish this mode of procedure; I would instead of it give the landlord a power to sell the tenant’s lands, by a procedure analogous to that of bankruptcy, should default be made in the payment of the rent, or rather the rent-charge that might be due. The advantage to both landlord and tenant would be great: the first would have a remedy more expeditious and just than he has; the second, should the land be sold and lost to him, would, as a rule, have a surplus over and above his debts; unlike what is sometimes the case in evictions, he would realise for himself his whole legitimate interest in the land. This single reform would do much to make ‘fair rent’ a less onerous charge than it now is.
By these means the status of the Irish landlord would be made by many degrees more secure; the Irish tenant would acquire an interest in the land much more durable and stable than he has now, in fact, nearly equivalent to full ownership, subject to a rent-charge; and if his interest were made a perpetuity, as I hope would be the case at last, he would be assimilated to an owner subject to a perpetual rent, or to an English copyholder subject to a similar render. This is the position Burke proposed he should have, considerably more than a century ago;[149] it is that which has been advocated by John Stuart Mill, and, I am happy to add, by Mr. John Morley; it is the only position, compatible with common sense and justice, which the new Irish land code has left possible, for I put the quackery of compulsory purchase out of sight, and voluntary purchase is a bad half-measure. The great subject of fixing rent by the State would remain; for, unjustifiable as this expedient is, it is impossible, after what has happened, to dispense with it. Without imputing personal motives or moral blame to any one, the Land Commission and its Sub-Commissions ought, I am convinced, to cease to be the agency to fix ‘fair rents;’ however unconsciously, in my judgment, they have often proceeded on false principles, and have done immense, if not wilful wrong; they are decried by landlords and tenants alike in Ireland. Besides, there is a constitutional objection to their adjusting rent; the Land Commission is entrusted with the task of carrying out ‘land purchase;’ it has a direct inducement to whittle rents away, in order to facilitate the sale of land; its interest and its duty are thus placed in conflict. Be this as it may, my plan for fixing ‘fair rents’ in Ireland by the State would be altogether different. In the first place, a definition of ‘fair rent’ should be made by statute, and should dominate, so to speak, the subject; the omission of this criterion has caused grave injustice. This having been made, I would adjust Irish rents by a method much better, I believe, than that now in existence. A body of competent and well-paid valuers of land should be formed—there would be no difficulty about this in Ireland; these men should visit, when required, estates; and having heard what landlords and tenants had to say on the spot, should declare what they consider the ‘fair rents’ of farms, making a deduction for improvements as arranged by a reformed law, and taking waste and deterioration into account. The reports made by the valuers should be complete and explicit; they would probably satisfy landlords and tenants in most instances; but dissatisfied persons should have a right to an appeal, which should be a full rehearing of all the facts in issue; but the appeal should be at the peril of costs against unsuccessful suitors. The tribunals to decide the appeals should, I suggest, be composed of two eminent judges, for each of the four provinces, assisted by trained agricultural experts; but the authority of the judges should prevail on all questions. From these Courts a further appeal should run to the Court of Appeal in Ireland, on all matters of law and fact, and ultimately should run to the House of Lords; the present restricted appeal to the Land Commission has been little better than a sorry mockery of right.
The scheme I propose has obvious defects; it sanctions the vicious principle of State-settled rents, a thing unknown in lands outside of Ireland, a defiance of the simplest axioms of economic science. But it endeavours at least to improve a bad system of tenure dealing with accomplished facts now beyond recall; I certainly think it would make the relations of Irish landlords and tenants better than they are, and would tend to place both classes in the positions which, as affairs now stand, they will probably, in the long run, occupy. As regards ‘alternative policies,’ as they have been called, I have set forth the reasons that the compulsory purchase of the Irish land would be, I believe, impossible, and, were it possible, would be a confiscation of the foullest kind, ruinous to Great Britain and Ireland alike. I have also shown how the present system of so-styled ‘voluntary purchase’ is, in my judgment, essentially immoral, and pregnant with dangers; and I have indicated the results being already produced. That system, however, must go on; for the present it cannot be arrested; a Conservative Government still pins its faith on it, as a Whig Government, half a century ago, pinned its faith on the Encumbered Estates Act; but a ‘peasant proprietary’ rooted in corruption will hardly succeed, and ‘voluntary purchase’ draws the worst kind of distinctions in Irish land tenure. The acceleration, indeed, of this ‘remedy’ has been deemed advisable; and as long as the sum voted by Parliament is not expended, the system evidently must continue in force. Some of its evils, however, would be lessened were the State to reserve to itself the woodland, which tenant ‘purchasers,’ as a rule, cut down and sell; and if tenants proved to be solvent were compelled to advance part of the money required to transfer their lands to themselves. It is revolting to my mind to see a wealthy Irish farmer bribed into the ownership of his farm by an Act of the State, without having paid a shilling of the price. I commend this spectacle to the hard-pressed general taxpayer.
I need hardly say that, under the scheme I propose, existing interests of tenants should remain intact, and statutory leases should be allowed to come to an end, before a change should be made by law in the position they hold. The question of compensating the Irish landlords would remain; a very few words on this will suffice. I must remind the reader, as I have already shown, that the Land Act of 1881 was passed on the condition that, should experience prove that real injury had been done to this order of men, their right to indemnity would be plain; Mr. Gladstone’s language was unequivocal; the House of Commons approved. Nor can any reasonable doubt exist that the course of legislation from 1881 to 1896 has confiscated the property of the class to an immense extent; the simple fact that the value in Ireland of the fee simple in land has been reduced by a third at least, and that the value of the tenant right has been increased in about the same proportion, points to a conclusion evident to impartial minds. I am satisfied as to what would be the report on this subject of the Commission I should wish to see appointed; it could not avoid drawing an inference that cannot be resisted. The question, therefore, will have to be faced; the good faith of Parliament is virtually at stake; and if a pledge made in the name of the State is not to be broken, the right of the Irish landlords to compensation is complete. Independently, too, of considerations of this kind, it is a recognised principle that should a policy have caused loss to a class, the State is morally bound to make the loss up; a violation of this principle is unjust and dangerous alike. I quote from John Stuart Mill on this very question: ‘The principle of property gives the landowners no right to the land, but only a right to compensation for whatever portion of their interest in the land it may be the policy of the State to deprive them of. To that their claim is indefeasible. It is due to landowners and to owners of any property whatever, recognised as such by the State, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they have derived from it. If the land was bought with the produce of the labour of themselves or their ancestors, compensation is due to them on that ground; even if otherwise, it is still due on the ground of prescription. Nor can it ever be necessary for accomplishing an object by which the community altogether will gain, that a particular portion of the community should be immolated. When the property is of a kind to which peculiar affections attach themselves, the compensation ought to exceed a bare pecuniary equivalent.... The legislature, which, if it pleased, might convert the whole body of landlords into fundholders or pensioners, might, à fortiori, commute the average receipts of Irish landowners into a fixed rent-charge, and raise the tenants into proprietors; supposing always that the full market value of the land was tendered to the landlords, in case they preferred that to accepting the conditions proposed.’[150]
Assuming, then, the case for compensating the Irish landlords to have been made out, compensation can be afforded without the loss of a shilling to the State. The bonâ fide encumbrances on their estates, that is, those which represent advances in cash, are now at an interest of from 4 to 5 per cent.; the State could pay off those which were perfectly secure at an interest of 2¼ per cent., and could make the landlords chargeable with interest at 3 per cent., in order to provide against possible loss. As for encumbrances that were not perfectly secure, the State should only pay off what was well charged; but it should do this on the same conditions; and it should declare hopeless encumbrances extinct. This would be a considerable and just boon to the Irish landlords; the securities taken by the State should be in the form of debentures, which would pass from hand to hand in the market; and many owners of encumbrances would no doubt accept sums less than their full demands, for these, they well know, are at present in danger. I would go, however, farther in relieving the Irish landlords; their estates are subject to a mass of family charges created under a different order of things; if the State has arbitrarily cut down the fund set apart for these, by a wholesale reduction of rents, I cannot understand how it is not the simplest justice to cut the charges down in some fair proportion. At all events, I make these suggestions for what they may be worth; if right is to be done to the Irish landed gentry, and a gross breach of public faith is not to be made, some relief of this kind should be extended to them. Very possibly this will not be afforded; but I venture to remind politicians that even an unpopular class cannot be cruelly wronged and sacrificed, without doing injury to all classes, and shaking to their foundations the clear rights of property. And I openly avow that, in my judgment, it would be in the highest degree against the national interest to annihilate this body of men, as must probably happen, should things in Ireland be left as they are. What if they are the heirs of conquest and confiscation in the past? Is that a reason for destroying them after the lapse of centuries, and when England planted them in the land to be her mainstay? What if, in instances, comparatively few in the extreme, they have abused the social trust imposed on them? Was not this because the opportunity was given by law, and was not the law the work of successive Parliaments? Is it not a fact that British ministers, so to speak, of yesterday, declared that they were secure in their proprietary rights; and that Mr. Gladstone solemnly acquitted them of what had been laid to their charge? On the other hand, have they not been for ages the staunchest friends of England in Irish affairs, especially in troubled and perilous times? Is it for nothing that they have been called the British garrison by her foes, the strongest obstacle to rebellion and treason? And is a class, which has, on the whole, been a civilising influence, for many years, in Ireland, and which has given the State far more than a due proportion of worthies—warriors, orators, statesmen, thinkers, men of eminence in all the arts of life—to be sacrificed at the bidding of a conspiracy bent on subverting British rule in Ireland, or in deference to false and perilous theories?
CHAPTER VII
THE QUESTION OF THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
The subject briefly considered—Financial position of Ireland before 1782, and under Grattan’s Parliament—Her taxation and debt small before 1798—Ireland financially a distinct country—At the Union, Pitt wished to ‘assimilate her in finance’ with Great Britain, but this impossible, and why—Ireland’s contribution after the Union—This was unjust, but it left her financially a distinct country—Ireland made nearly bankrupt—The compromise of 1816—The Irish Exchequer closed, and the Irish and British debts consolidated—The object of the compromise was rather to relieve Ireland from her burdens than to assimilate her in finance with Great Britain—She still remained for many years financially distinct from Great Britain, and is so still to some extent—The conduct of Peel a striking proof of this—Mr. Gladstone imposes the income tax on Ireland, and her spirit duties are largely raised—Injustice of this policy—The Committee of 1863-64—Ireland does not obtain financial justice—The Report of the Childers Commission made upon a reference by Mr. Gladstone following Mr. Goschen—The Commission declares that Ireland has been greatly overtaxed for many years—Evidence on which it has founded this conclusion—Examination of arguments to the contrary—Another Commission promised, but the promise not fulfilled—Importance of settling this question.