I beg farther to state, that after the motion for the Bill of which so much has been said, was passed, an Address to His Majesty was moved and carried, praying him to take such further measures as to him seemed proper, to strengthen the Connection between the two Countries. His Majesty’s most Gracious Answer, stating, that in compliance with the Address, he would immediately take such measures as might be necessary for that purpose, was delivered to the House by an Honourable Gentleman who then filled the office of Secretary of State, and whom we have not lately seen in the House, though he still continues to be a Member of it. I do assert, without the least fear of contradiction from any Gentleman whatever, that it was in the contemplation of the Government of that day, to adopt some measures of the nature alluded to in the Address; since that period, however, no such measure has been taken. I do also maintain, that that very system which by these very Ministers who brought it forward was found to be imperfect, even for the purpose of maintaining the Connection between the two Countries, remains at this moment in the same imperfect state. It leaves the two Countries with separate and independent Legislatures, connected only with this tie, that the Third Estate in both Countries is the same—that the Executive Government is the same—that the Crown exercises its power of assenting to Irish Acts of Parliament under the Great Seal of Great Britain, and by the advice of British Ministers.
This is the only principle of Connection which is left by the Final Adjustment of 1782. Whether this is a sufficient tie to unite them in time of Peace; whether in time of War it is sufficient to consolidate their strength against a Common Enemy; whether it is sufficient to guard against those local jealousies which must necessarily sometimes exist between countries so connected; whether it is calculated to give to Ireland all the important commercial and political advantages which she would derive from a closer Connection with Great Britain; whether it can give to both Nations that degree of strength and prosperity which must be the result of such a Measure as the present, I believe needs only to be stated to be decided.
But I have already said, that I have upon this point, the authority of an opinion to which I before alluded—an opinion delivered upon a very important Measure, very soon after the Final Adjustment of 1782. The Measure to which I refer, was that of the Commercial Propositions which were brought forward in 1785. I am not now going to enter into a discussion of the merits of that Measure. The best, perhaps, that can be said of it is, that it went as far as circumstances would then permit, to draw the two Countries to a closer Connection. But those who think that the Adjustment of 1782 was final, and that it contained all that was necessary for the establishment of the Connection between the two Countries upon a firm basis, can hardly contend that the Commercial Propositions of 1785 were necessary to prevent the danger of separation between the two Countries, and to prevent the conflicting operation of Independent Legislatures. Yet, if I am not mistaken, there will be found, upon a reference to better Records than those in which Parliamentary Debates are usually stated (I mean a statement of what passed in the discussion upon those Propositions fourteen years ago, made, as I have understood, by some of the principal parties themselves) that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day in Ireland, in a Debate upon the Irish Propositions, held this language—“If this infatuated Country gives up the present offer, she may look for it again in vain.” Here the Right Honourable Gentleman was happily mistaken; Ireland has again had the offer of the same advantages, but more compleat, and in all respects better calculated to attain their object; and this offer the Right Honourable Gentleman has exerted all his influence to reject. But he goes on to say—“things cannot remain as they are—Commercial jealousy is roused—it will increase with two independent Legislatures—and without an united interest in commerce, in a commercial Empire, political Union will receive many shocks, and separation of interest must threaten separation of Connection, which every honest Irishman must shudder to look at, as a possible event.”
Gentlemen will have the goodness to observe, that I am not now quoting these expressions as pledges given by that Right Honourable Gentleman that he would support a proposal for a Union between the two Countries, but I am adducing them to prove that the situation of the two Countries after the Final Adjustment of 1782, was such, in his opinion, as led to the danger of a separation between them. I am not now arguing that a Legislative Union is the only measure which can possibly be adopted, but I am contending that the Adjustment of 1782 was never considered as final, by those who now state it to be so as an argument against the consideration of the present measure. How the Honourable Gentleman on the other side of the House will evade this authority I do not know;—an authority too, which, I must observe, he seems much more inclined to treat with respect than he was formerly.
But, Sir, it does not stop there. What is the evil to which he alludes? Commercial jealousies between two Countries acting upon the laws of two independent Legislatures, and the danger of those Legislatures acting in opposition to each other.—How can this evil be remedied? By two means only; either by some Compact entered into by the Legislatures of the two Countries respecting the mode of forming their commercial regulations, or else by blending the two Legislatures together; these are the only two means. I defy the wit of man to point out a third. The mode of compact was proposed in 1785, but unfortunately, in spite of that Right Honourable Gentleman’s eloquence and authority, who then stated the importance of guarding against the evil, it so happened that doctrines, derived chiefly from this side of the water, succeeded in convincing the Parliament of Ireland, that it would be inconsistent with their independence, to enter into any compact whatever. We have then the authority of that Right Honourable Gentleman to whom I have so often alluded, that the unsettled state in which the matter was left, would give “Political Union many shocks, and lead to a separation of Connection.” The experiment of a mutual Compact has been tried without success; the arrangement of that sort, which was proposed in 1785, in order to obviate the inconveniences stated by the Right Honourable Gentleman, was then attacked with the same success against his authority, as another and more effectual remedy has recently experienced under his auspices. The result then is—you must remain in the state which that Right Honourable Gentleman has described, with the seeds of separation in the system now established, and with the Connection, on which the mutual prosperity of both countries depends in danger of being hourly dissolved, or you must again recur to the proposal of a compact similar to that rejected in 1785, or you must resort to the best and most effectual remedy,—a Legislative Union.
I have dwelt longer, perhaps, upon this part of the subject than was absolutely necessary, because I believe there is scarcely any man who has ever asked himself, whether there is a solid, permanent system of Connection between the two Countries, who could, upon reflection, answer the question in the affirmative. But besides the authorities of the persons who made the arrangement in 1782, and of those who have since treated of it, to shew that it was not deemed to be final and complete; I have further the test of experience to shew how imperfect it was, and how inadequate in practice to the great object of cementing the Connection, and placing it beyond the danger of being dissolved. In the single instance, which has occurred, (and that a melancholy one which all of us deplored,) in which we could feel the effects of two jarring Legislatures, We did feel it. On that occasion, it might have produced the most signal calamities, had we not been rescued from its danger by an event, to which no man can now look back without feeling the utmost joy and exultation; feelings, which subsequent circumstances have served to heighten and confirm. Every Gentleman will know, that I must allude to the Regency. With two independent Legislatures, acting upon different principles, it was accident alone that preserved the identity of the Executive Power, which is the bond and security of the Connection: And even then the Executive authority, though vested in one person, would have been held by two different tenures, by one tenure in England, by another in Ireland, had not the interposition of Providence prevented a circumstance pregnant with the most imminent perils, and which might have operated to a separation of the two kingdoms.
After seeing the recorded opinion of Parliament, of those who made the arrangement of 1782, and after the decided testimony of experience on the subject, within the short period of sixteen years, perhaps, it is hardly necessary to appeal to farther proofs of its inadequacy, or to desire Gentlemen to look forward to possible cases, which I could easily put, and which will naturally suggest themselves to the minds of all, who chuse to turn their attention to the subject.
But when we consider the distinct powers possessed by the two Legislatures on all the great questions of Peace and War, of alliances and confederacies,—(for they each have in principle, a right to discuss them and decide upon them, though one of them has hitherto been wisely restrained by discretion, from the exercise of that right),—have we not seen circumstances to induce us to think it possible, at least, that on some of these important questions the opinions and decisions of the two Parliaments might have been at variance? Are we talking of an indissoluble Connection, when we see it thus perpetually liable to be endangered? Can we really think that the interests of the Empire, or of its different branches rest upon a safe and solid basis at present? I am anxious to discuss this point closely with any man, either here, or in Ireland. Will it be said, that the Parliament of the latter Country is bound by our decision on the question of Peace or War? And if not so bound, will any man, looking at human Nature as it is, contend, that there is a sufficient certainty that the decision on that important subject will always be the same in both countries? I should be glad to receive a distinct answer to this question, from the Honourable Gentleman who has declared himself to be as warm a friend to the Connection between the two Countries as I am.
Suppose, for instance, that the present war, which the Parliament of Great Britain considers to be just and necessary, had been voted by the Irish Parliament, to be unjust, unnecessary, extravagant, and hostile to the principles of humanity and freedom.—Would that Parliament have been bound by this Country? If not;—what security have we, at a moment the most important to our common interest and common salvation, that the two Kingdoms should have but one friend and one foe? I repeat it; I am eager to hear what can be said in justification of a basis so imperfect and unsound, and liable to be shaken by so many accidents. I have already observed, that in the peculiar circumstances of the present moment, we may find stronger reasons to prove the necessity of correcting the system of Connection between this Country and Ireland, of supplying its imperfections, and strengthening its weakness, than are to be found at any former period.
Having thus stated, Sir, and I think sufficiently proved, that the Settlement of 1782, in every point of view in which it can be considered, is imperfect, and inadequate to the object of maintaining the connection between the two kingdoms, I proceed next to the circumstances which peculiarly call upon us at the present moment to remedy that imperfection.