It would be useless to enlarge on so self-evident a consequence; yet, even in this case, we shall find something of that mixture of good, along with the bad, which is to be found in all human things.
As exertion originates in necessity or want, which it removes, taxation has the effect of prolonging the operation of necessity, after it would otherwise have ceased, and of rendering its pressure greater than it otherwise would be; the consequence of this is a greater and larger continued exertion on the part of those who have to pay the taxes. Human exertion, either in the way of invention or of industry, is like a spring that is pressed upon, and gains strength according to the pressure, until a certain point, when it gives way entirely.
Those investigators, who have calculated the effect of such and such a degree of taxation, of national debt, &c. have all erred, in not making any, or a sufficient, allowance for the action of this elastic power. Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith, certainly, both of them, men of profound research, have erred completely in this. The former, in calculating the ultimatum of exertion, at a point which we have long since passed; and, the latter, in reasoning on the taxation at the time he wrote, as if nearly the utmost degree, though it has since trebled, and the difficulty in paying seems to be diminished; at least it appears not to have augmented.
To fix the point at which this can stop is not, indeed, very easy; particularly, as the value of gold and silver, which are the measures of other values, do themselves vary. Thus, for example, a working man can, with his day's wages, purchase as much bread and beer as he could have done with it forty years ago. Though the national debt [end of page #114] is five times as great as it was then, at the present price of bread, it would not take twice the number of loaves to pay it that it would have required at that time.
The depreciation of money, then, as well as the continuation and augmented pressure of necessity, counteract, to a certain degree, and for a certain time, the natural tendency of taxes; but that counteraction, though operating in all cases, in its degree and duration, must depend upon particular circumstances; and though, perhaps, it cannot be, with much accuracy, ascertained in any case, it is impossible to attempt resolving the question in a general way; we shall, therefore, return to the subject, when we apply the general principles to the particular situation of England.
One conclusion, however, is, that as taxes, carried to a great extent, are very dangerous, though not so if only carried to a certain point; as that point cannot be ascertained, it ought to be a general rule to lay on as few taxes as possible; and the giving as little trouble and derangement to the contributor as may be, is also another point, with respect to which there cannot be two different opinions. [end of page #115]
CHAP. IV.
Of the interior Causes of Decline, arising from the Encroachments of public and privileged Bodies, and of those who have a common Interest; on those who have no common Interest. {96}
FROM the moment that any particular form of government or order is established in a nation, there must be separate and adverse interests; or, which is the same thing, bodies acting in opposition to each other, and seeking their own power and advantage at the expense of the rest.
In a country where the executive government is under no sufficient control, its strides to arbitrary power are well known; but, in a government poised like that of England, where there are deliberative bodies, with different interests, acting separately, and interested in keeping each other and the executive in check, it is not from the government that much danger is to be apprehended.