The British, through the strong trading companies of Canada, were hot for getting control of the Indian traffic of the Northwest—indeed, their prestige was already quite firmly fixed, and they were on their guard against any semblance of encroachment upon that domain of activity. This condition, coupled with other and acuter differences, made it highly probable that England would not take kindly to the expedition, should its object be openly avowed.
Spanish opposition would be even stronger. Spain had but lately surrendered possession of the Louisiana Territory, whence her agents had for a long time derived large revenues from the Indian trade, after the age-long manner she has pursued in dealing with her colonies and dependencies. Spain still held the Floridas, practically controlling the commerce of the Gulf and the navigation of the Mississippi; so that, while the people of the United States asserted the right of dépôt at New Orleans and the further right of passage of the river throughout its length, their enjoyment of these rights was precarious. Further, though the crown had transferred the territory west of the Mississippi, its subjects had not quit their efforts for supremacy in trade; their influence long outlived the extinction of territorial rights. Bitterly hostile to the growth of American ideas, they would certainly do what they could to oppose the expedition.
It was with France, however, that our government had to deal directly. In 1800 Napoleon had acquired title to Louisiana, trading with Spain, giving in exchange the little kingdom of Etruria. But his control of the territory was more tacit than actual; he was so busily engaged at home that he found no time to reduce his property to possession; his dominion west of the Mississippi was never more than potential. War between France and England was imminent. Napoleon had in America no adequate means for defending his new domain, which would therefore be likely to fall into the hands of the British at once upon the outbreak of war. He was growing anxious to be rid of the load. Jefferson thought it probable that the territory would one day belong to the United States,—indeed, negotiations were pending for the transfer when the "confidential communication" to Congress was written, in January, 1803. Although the outcome was still problematical, Jefferson considered that the proper time for discovering what the land held; and this was the primary purpose of the Lewis and Clark expedition.
For all of these reasons, and more, it was deemed necessary to cover from general view the real character of the enterprise. The appropriation by Congress was made for the ostensible and innocent purpose of "extending the external commerce of the United States." In his letter to Congress, which was for a long time kept secret, Mr. Jefferson said that France would regard this as in the nature of a "literary pursuit," and that whatever distrust she might feel would be allayed. But, though his ulterior purposes were sought to be concealed, the powers of France no doubt knew well enough what was in the wind.
It was on June 30, 1803, that Jefferson gave to Captain Lewis detailed instructions for the conduct of his work. In the meantime (on April 30th), treaties had been signed at Paris, ceding Louisiana to the United States. That was a distinct triumph for American statecraft. On the one hand were ranged Napoleon, Talleyrand, and Marbois; on the other, Jefferson, Livingston, and Monroe. The French were at a disadvantage; their position was that of holding perishable goods, which must be sold to avoid catastrophe. Napoleon said, not without reason, that the government of the United States availed itself of his distress incident to the impending struggle with England. However that may be, the territory changed owners for a consideration of $15,000,000.
Formal notification of the transfer was not received in Washington until the early part of July, when active preparations for the exploration were being made. Its receipt did not alter the character of the expedition, though many of the international complications were dissipated. Thereafter the work was purely domestic in most of its aspects.
CHAPTER III
TERMS OF THE COMMISSION
Mr. Jefferson's instructions to the young officer showed his own farsighted earnestness. Had he who received them been any less in earnest, the task assigned to him must have seemed appalling. The primary instruction was to blaze a path, more than four thousand miles long, through an unstudied wilderness. It was conceived that this could best be done by following the Missouri to its head waters, crossing "the Highlands" to the navigable waters of the Columbia, and going down that river to the Pacific; but this was only conjectural. The map in the hands of the explorers, the only basis for a preliminary outline of their route, was drawn partly from hearsay, partly from imagination; it showed the source of the Missouri to be somewhere in Central California; it showed nothing of the mighty barrier of the Rocky Mountains. There was one thin, uncertain line of hills, far to the west, that might have been the Sierra Nevadas; further than that there was nothing but a broad interior plain, seamed with rivers. Practically nothing was known of the difficulties that would be encountered. White men had ventured for a little way up the Missouri in earlier years, to carry on a desultory fur-trade with the Indians; but these traders had been mostly happy-go-lucky Frenchmen, who had taken but little thought for the morrow. They had no trustworthy information to give that would be of service to scientific travelers. So far as sure knowledge of it was concerned, the land was virgin, and Lewis and Clark were to be its discoverers.