Floridablanca’s formal reply to the British memorial reached London June 15. Merry had received it from the Spanish Court on the 4th of the same month.[304] It declared that His Catholic Majesty would claim nothing but what he could base on treaty rights, on the consent of nations, and on immemorial possession. The discussions with the new ambassador would turn on these points. If Spanish subjects had gone beyond these rights they would be punished, and the injured parties would be indemnified. Spain did not mean to carry her claim to all of the South Sea, but only to “the Indian continent, islands, and seas, which by discovery, treaties, or immemorial possession have belonged and do belong to her by the acknowledgment of all nations.” The Spanish King denied that Spain’s not having settled any particular spot was a proof that it did not belong to her. Were this admitted, the Count argued, any nation might establish herself on the dominions of any other nation wherever there was not an actual establishment. This, he said, would be absurd to think of. Satisfaction and indemnification should rest on the question of right, which was to be settled by the negotiation.[305]
This review of the essential points of the two memorials shows that the Courts were as far apart as ever. The conflicting colonial principles were clearly stated, and each nation stubbornly persisted in its own view. In his remarks on this communication Merry conceived that there was little or no room left to expect that any change would occur in the sentiments of the Spanish Court. He thought that the Spanish delay had probably been occasioned by the fluctuating advices from France. He could attribute the conduct of Spain to no other motive than a hope that her being attacked by England might put France under the necessity of engaging in the war.[306]
Fitzherbert conducted the English negotiations from this point. His record as a diplomat was already established. He had negotiated the treaty of peace with France and Spain in 1783. The next four years he had been envoy extraordinary to Russia. After that he had been for some time chief secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He had also been made a member of the privy council. He left London May 9[307] and went to Paris, where he tarried for some time. His delay at this place was due partly to sickness, partly to his being engaged in making some representations to the French Court in connection with Fitzgerald,[308] and partly to his awaiting written instructions from London to govern him in his negotiations with Spain.[309] He reached Madrid June 9.[310] The next day he wrote a note to Floridablanca, who, with the whole Spanish Court, had gone to Aranjuez. This note announced his presence and his intention of reaching Aranjuez the same evening. It also inclosed his credentials signed by the English King.[311]
The following day he had an interview with Floridablanca. Two days later, June 13, he received his formal introduction to the King and Queen.[312]
In their interview of June 11 Fitzherbert and Floridablanca exchanged views on the question in dispute. The former, conceiving that the memorial given to Merry on June 4 must fall short of His Britannic Majesty’s just expectations, urged the latter to give him a more favorable communication. The latter insisted that the paper in question contained the utmost that Spain ought to grant. He declared that compliance with the British demand for satisfaction would invalidate the Spanish claims to sovereignty, rendering further discussion useless. Therefore the British demand and the Spanish claim, he maintained, ought to be discussed at the same time. He asked that Fitzherbert’s statements should be presented in writing. Consequently, two days later the British ambassador sent a brief memorial presenting the British demand in language which makes it seem plausible. Stripped of its verbiage it declares that England desires a peaceable settlement, but that there can be no further negotiation until Spain shall have fulfilled three conditions: First, restored the vessels; secondly, indemnified the injured parties; thirdly, given satisfaction to the British sovereign for the insult offered to his flag. A declaration that the Spanish King would grant these demands would be accepted as ground for the negotiation.[313]
After this first exchange of views with the Spanish minister, Fitzherbert reported his observations to the British Cabinet. He thought that Spain was bent on war, and was refusing satisfaction in hope of inducing England to make reprisals which would serve as a pretext for demanding French aid. As to her motive, he thought that she certainly could not hope to regain Gibraltar or her West Indian possessions; and it could not be to counteract French revolutionary infection, for everything was quiet in Spain. He believed the real cause to be Floridablanca’s suspicion that England had designs on the Spanish colonies. The Spanish minister seemed to count little on French aid, but to expect substantial help from the United States. Some advances had been made to that power, and Carmichael, the American chargé, was much caressed at Court. The American agent thought that his Government would not be favorable.[314] A few days later, Fitzherbert expressed his confidence that no encouraging communication had been received from America. On the contrary, there had recently been marked symptoms of coldness.[315]
In answer to the British ambassador’s communication of June 13, Floridablanca replied five days later that he could not consent to the principles which it laid down. However, for the sake of peace, he offered to make the declaration proposed, provided one of three explanations be added: First, the question of insult and satisfaction should be decided by the arbitration of a king of Europe, to be chosen by England; or, second, no facts should be admitted in the subsequent negotiation unless fully established by Great Britain; or, third, the satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain nor prevent her from exacting equivalent satisfaction from Great Britain if it should be found that she had a right to do so.[316] In spite of the evident fairness of these proposals, they were not accepted. In reporting them to the British Court, Fitzherbert suggested that he considered them inadmissible. The English Cabinet seems to have agreed with him. This makes it appear that England was afraid to submit her case to the judgment of a third party, even though she had the privilege of selecting the judge. Further, she seemed unwilling to confine the negotiation to established facts, or to suffer the consequences in case the negotiation should show her to have been in the wrong. It appears that the English Court had decided to force from Spain once and for all an acknowledgment of the British principle of colonization. Nothing less would be accepted. It was this, and not simply justice, that she demanded.
For some time after this the British ambassador received no communication from the Spanish minister. This was partially accounted for by accident. On the same day that Floridablanca had written the document last studied an attempt was made to assassinate him. He was stabbed by a fanatical Frenchman. The wound was not serious. In letters of June 24 and 28 Fitzherbert reported that the Count still refused to see him on the pretense of indisposition, though he was transacting other business. The Spanish Court had assumed a more pacific attitude and seemed sincerely desirous of an accommodation. The delay was continued in hope that a reply would soon be received from London to the Spanish memorial presented to Merry June 4.[317]
The pacific intentions of the Spanish Court were further shown by the fact that orders had been given to the commanders of various ports to treat British war ships, which were hovering in the neighborhood, as they would be treated in a period of profound peace. Furthermore, in an informal interview of July 1, Floridablanca said that he had been busying himself on a plan for an ulterior arrangement which he thought would entirely fulfill the views and objects of both parties.[318] At a conference on July 10 the Count presented his plan. The essential points were: First, Spain should retain exclusive possession of the Northwest Coast up to and including Nootka; second, from Nootka to the sixty-first degree the two Crowns should have common rights, except that south of the fifty-sixth degree British influence should not extend beyond a certain distance inland; third, Great Britain should have the right of fishing in the South Sea and of landing and erecting temporary buildings in unoccupied places, though no English vessels should approach a Spanish settlement; and fourth, the mutual rights should not be discussed and the mutual demands for satisfaction should be waived, in which case Spain would pay the losses on ships taken at Nootka. Fitzherbert declared the plan inadmissible, but said that it might possibly be modified to make it acceptable.[319] This is interesting as foreshadowing in some respects the final settlement.