On the 10th of June, Louis XIV. appeared before Maestricht with an army of forty thousand men. This place, esteemed one of the keys of the Netherlands and the United Provinces, was defended by a garrison of five thousand men, and by an intrepid governor, named Farjaux, a Frenchman by birth, but in the service of Holland. On the 17th the trenches were opened, and five batteries were directed against the city. Vauban, who in this siege first distinguished himself, employed the parallels invented by some Italian engineers in the service of the Turks, before Candia. He added places of arms in the trenches, to draw up troops in battle order, and the better to rally them in the event of sorties. Louis proved himself, in this famous expedition, more particular and laborious than he had ever been. By his example he accustomed a nation till that time accused of having nothing but a brilliant courage which fatigue easily exhausted, to patience in labour and endurance in protracted operations. As long as the siege lasted, he was up the whole night, from ten o’clock in the evening till five in the morning. After having ordered everything he thought necessary for the attack, he retired to his tent to take some repose till dinner-time. On leaving table, he mounted on horseback to make the tour of the lines and visit the quarters: in consequence of this, the companions of his labours went to the assaults and performed their duties in the most exemplary manner. The most furious assault was that of the 24th of June, and was made at the counterscarp of the Tongres gate; in it the French and the Dutch were by turns conquerors and conquered, whilst disputing an advanced half-moon. The first company of musketeers was commanded to fall upon this half-moon, whilst the second precipitated itself upon the palisades between that post and the hornwork. “The signal was given,” says M. de Saint-Foix; “they marched, and in spite of the vigorous resistance of the enemy, in spite of the fire of the fourneaux which were sprung, and the terrible reports of the grenades which were incessantly cast among them, these works were carried almost at the same moment.” Four bloody conflicts were necessary; and they only triumphed in the last, after losing many men. Night separated the combatants. The action of the morrow was still more warm and murderous; it was believed that the lodgments were secured, and the musketeers had returned to the camp. The enemy sprang a fourneau, which the French had not discovered, in the half-moon: there was reason to think it was not the only one. Farjaux, who had placed himself at the head of the best troops of his garrison, profiting by this moment of alarm, entered the work and drove out the French soldiers. The musketeers were ordered to take it again, and they did retake it. In an obstinate and sanguinary conflict, fifty-three musketeers were wounded and thirty-seven killed, with the famous count d’Artagnan, commander of the first company. “The musketeers who returned from this fight,” says Pelisson, “had all their swords blooded up to the guards, and bent and notched with the blows they had given.” So many repeated and terrible attacks destroyed the defenders of Maestricht without weakening the courage of the survivors. Farjaux in particular was determined to hold out to the last minute; he preferred a glorious death to life at the hands of a conqueror, and he formed the resolution of making one more attempt. A mine was dug, and set fire to with too much precipitation; the soldiers of Farjaux were blown up by it instead of the French. This accident so completely disconcerted the besieged, that even their bold governor was forced to think of composition. They were satisfied, on the 29th of June, with a favourable capitulation. The remains of the garrison retired with the honours of war, and the inhabitants retained their privileges. This conquest cost France nearly eight thousand men; the besieged lost more than three thousand.
FIFTH SIEGE, A.D. 1676.
Louis XIV., aware of the importance of his victory, placed in the city a garrison of six thousand foot and twelve hundred horse. Three years after, the prince of Orange laid siege to Maastricht with an army of twenty-five thousand men, whilst the duke of Villa-Hermosa on one side, and the count de Waldeck on the other, intrenched in advantageous posts, watched the operations of the French, and held themselves in readiness to prevent their succouring the besieged. The count de Calvo commanded in Maestricht, in the absence of Marshal d’Estrades, the governor. This officer was a Catalan, in the service of France; the king had not a braver soldier; but as he had all his life served in the cavalry, he was thought to be more in his place at the head of a squadron of horse than of a garrison. As soon as the place was invested, he assembled the principal officers: “Gentlemen,” said he, “I have served all my life as a cavalry officer, and have very little acquaintance with the defence of cities. All that I know is that I will never surrender. Concert among you the means of an obstinate and insurmountable resistance, and I will undertake to have them executed with as much vigour as celerity.” The frankness of the commander won all hearts, and the confidence he placed in his subalterns elevated and expanded their minds. There was established, without pride, mistrust, or jealousy, a communication of ideas which saved the city, and which places the name of Calvo among the few that will descend to posterity.
Calvo made a vigorous and considerable sortie, the commencement of which was fortunate. The prince of Orange, informed of what was going on in the trenches, flew to the succour of his people with the greatest courage, drove back the French with the sword to their gates, and being wounded in the arm, exclaimed to those who had fought without spirit, “This is the way you should act, gentlemen! It is you who have caused the wound for which you appear to entertain so much regret.” Calvo first introduced the use of back-handled scythes; his soldiers, armed with these in the sorties, killed three men at a stroke. The trenches were opened on the 19th of July, and the batteries were erected on the 22nd: during eight days the firing never ceased. At length a large breach was made in the Dauphin bastion, and an assault was ordered for the 30th. It was terrible, but proved useless. The Dutch retired with loss. The next day the prince of Orange ordered a second attack, still more sanguinary and quite as unsuccessful. A suspension of arms was then entered into to bury the dead. Not at all discouraged, the prince gave a third assault, and succeeded in gaining the bastion. Scarcely had he gained a lodgment, when the French sprang two mines, the bursting of which they followed up by a furious sortie: they were, however, repulsed, and the work remained in the hands of the Dutch. Some days after they took another bastion, and drew near to the counterscarp. Whilst the Hollanders were preparing to pour their thunders upon this part of the fortifications, the powder and grenades of the besieged were suddenly set fire to. Taking advantage of the consequent disorder, the enemy gained possession of the counterscarp: they then prepared to attack the hornwork. Twice they gave the assault, and twice they were driven back with loss. The dragoons and the cavalry having dismounted to sustain the infantry, discouraged by so many repulses, a third effort was made. It was so terrible that the covered way was choked with dead bodies, and the blood of the slaughtered discoloured the waters of the fosse. But the assailants were forced to regain their former posts, after having lost a host of soldiers.
But now news was brought that Marshal Schomberg was hastening to the succour of the place, and the prince of Orange, having already lost twelve thousand men, did not think it prudent to wait for him. He decamped in the night of the 26th of August, after forty days of open trenches, and, to make the more haste, embarked thirty pieces of cannon, five hundred wounded, and a great quantity of munitions on the Meuse. At daybreak, the garrison perceiving the retreat of the Dutch, pursued them, and took some prisoners.
SIXTH SIEGE, A.D. 1748.
“Peace is in Maestricht,” said the Marshal de Saxe. It was with preparations for this siege that the campaign of 1748 commenced. It was necessary to secure all the passages, to force an army to retreat, to render it powerless for action, to deceive the enemy, and leave his own troops in ignorance of his secret. Marshal Saxe succeeded in all this; he only communicated his views to M. de Cremille; he made the allies believe that his object was Buda, and he went, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, to conduct a convoy to Bergen-op-Zoom, feigning to turn his back towards Maestricht. Three divisions advanced upon Tirlemont, Tongres, and Luxembourg; and at length all four took their route towards Maestricht. The enemy quitted their posts precipitately, abandoned immense magazines, and knew nothing of the designs of the count de Saxe until it was too late to oppose them. The city was invested, without a possibility of any succour being introduced. The siege was pushed on with vigour. The baron d’Aylva, the governor, and the count de Marshal commanding the Austrian garrison, displayed in vain all their skill to dispute the ground, and drive back the besiegers. They were on the point of submitting to the conqueror, when a courier, despatched by the duke of Cumberland, came to announce the cessation of hostilities, and to confirm the saying of Marshal Saxe with which we commenced this article.
There is scarcely a siege on record which does not convey a lesson to students in the military art, even to experienced generals, and above all to kings or ministers directing a war—the lesson in this is secrecy before the attempt: had Maurice de Saxe told all the world what was the object of his preparations, he might as well have attempted to besiege the moon as Maestricht.
Maestricht was besieged in vain by the French, under Meranda, in 1793, but yielded to the troops of that country, commanded by Kleber, in 1794, after eleven days of open trenches.