The Great Sieges of History

by William Robson

This took place on the 5th of July, 1779; and from that date to the 26th of November, 1781, the siege or blockade was one continuance of mutual attempts at annoyance, interspersed with occasional want of provisions and attacks of the scurvy on the part of the garrison, frequent boat-assaults, always attended with repulses, on the side of the allies; with a strange but perpetual desertion of individuals from both garrison and army. But at the last-named period the enemy had constructed such formidable batteries, and appeared to be approaching so inconveniently near, that General Elliott determined upon the bold expedient of a sortie. This was effected with his usual prudence, foresight, and spirit. As soon as the gates were shut, and the evening gun fired, a considerable detachment was ordered to assemble on the Red Sands, at midnight, with devils, fire-fagots, and working implements, to make a sortie on the enemy’s batteries; the general and other officers to be employed were in the mean time convened, and, lest some matters might have escaped him in the multiplicity of arrangements, the governor desired every person to propose, without restraint, whatever would, in his or their opinion, further promote the success of the enterprise. We place the last passage in italics, as a lesson to self-sufficient commanders: no captain ever more completely performed the duties intrusted to him by his country, and yet he was never averse to receiving advice from the lowest of his staff. On a subsequent occasion an important use of red-hot shot was suggested to him, by Lieutenant-General Boyd, his second in command, and, without the least of the paltry jealousy some superiors would have felt, he not only openly adopted the idea, but intrusted the execution of it to his friend who had thought of it.

“The detachment being formed in three lines, the right column in the rear and the left in front, tools for demolishing the works were delivered to the workmen, and the following directions for their destination were communicated to the principal officers:—‘The right column to lead and march through Forbes’s barrier for the extremity of the parallel, keeping the eastern fence of the gardens close on their left. The centre immediately to follow, marching through Bay-side barrier, and directing their route through the gardens for the mortar-batteries. The left column to bring up the rear, marching along the strand for the gun-batteries. No person to advance before the front unless ordered by the officer commanding the column: and the most profound silence to be observed, as the success of the enterprise may depend thereon. The 12th and Hardenberg’s regiments to form in front of the works, as assaulting corps, and are to detach to the right and left, as occasion may require. The reserve to take post on the furthest gardens. When the works are carried, the attacking troops are to take up their ground in the following manner:—The grenadiers of Reden’s and La Motte’s behind the parallel; the 39th and 73rd flank companies along the front of the fourth branch; and the 72nd grenadiers and light infantry with their right to the fourth branch and left to the beach.’

“The force consisted of ninety-nine officers, one hundred and forty-seven subalterns, and two thousand and thirty-four rank and file.

“By the time the destination of the columns was made known to the different officers, and other arrangements had taken place, the morning of the 27th was far advanced; and as the moon had then nearly finished her nightly course, the detachment, about a quarter before three o’clock, began its march by files from the right of the rear line to the attack. Although nothing could exceed the silence and attention of the troops, the enemy’s advanced sentries discovered the right column before they passed Forbes’s barrier, and after challenging fired upon them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, commanding this column, finding they were alarmed, immediately formed the attacking corps, and pushed on at a brisk pace for the extremity of the parallel; there, finding no opposition, he took possession, and the pioneers began to dismantle the works. Part of Hardenberg’s regiment, which was attached to this column, mistook the route of the grenadiers, owing to the darkness of the morning; and in pursuing their own, found themselves, before they discovered their error, in front of the St. Carlos battery. In this dilemma no other alternative offered but pressing forward, which they gallantly did, after receiving the enemy’s fire. Upon mounting the parapet, the enemy precipitately retreated, and with great difficulty they descended the stupendous work, forming with their left to the tower. They were thus situated, when Lieutenant-Colonel Duchenhausen, at the head of the 39th flank companies, entered the St. Carlos battery, and naturally mistaking them for his opponents, fired, and wounded several. Further mischief was, however, prevented by the countersign; and the Hanoverians joined the remainder of the corps, which now formed en potence in front of the parallel. The 73rd flank companies were equally successful in their attacks, and Lieutenant-Colonel Trigge, with the grenadiers and light company of the 72nd regiment, carried the gun-batteries with great gallantry. The ardour of the assailants was irresistible. The enemy on every side gave way, abandoning in an instant, and with the utmost precipitation, those works which had cost them so much expense, and employed so many months to perfect.

“When our troops had taken possession, the attacking corps formed agreeably to their orders, to repel any attack which the enemy might make to prevent the destruction of the works, whilst the 12th regiment took post in front of the St. Carlos battery, to sustain the western attack; and the reserve, under Major Maxwell, drew up in the further gardens. The exertions of the workmen and artillery were wonderful. The batteries were soon in a state for the fire-fagots to operate, and the flames spread with astonishing rapidity into every part. The columns of fire and smoke which rolled from the works beautifully illuminated the troops and neighbouring objects, forming altogether a coup d’œil from the rock, not possible to be described.

“In an hour, the object of the sortie was fully effected; and trains being laid to the magazines, Brigadier Ross ordered the advanced corps to withdraw, and the sustaining regiments to cover their retreat; but by some oversight, the barrier at Forbes’s was locked after the flank companies had returned; which might have proved of serious consequence to Hardenberg’s regiment, as they were from that circumstance under the necessity of following the 12th regiment through Bay-side barrier.

“Several small quantities of powder took fire whilst the detachment was on its retreat; and just as the rear had got within the garrison, the principal magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion, throwing up vast pieces of timber, which, falling into the flames, added to the general conflagration. Although the enemy must have been early alarmed, not the smallest effort was made to save or avenge their works. The fugitives seemed to communicate a panic to the whole; and instead of annoying the English troops from the flanking forts, their artillery directed a ridiculous fire towards the town and our upper batteries, whence we continued a warm and well-served discharge of round shot on their forts and barrier. Only two officers and sixteen privates were taken prisoners, and, so little opposition being made, very few were killed in the works.

“Thus was this important attack executed beyond the most sanguine expectations of every one. The event challenges greater admiration, when we reflect that the batteries were distant near three-quarters of a mile from the garrison, and only within a few hundred yards of a besieging enemy’s lines, mounting one hundred and thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The detachment had only four privates killed, and one officer and twenty-four privates wounded. The ordnance spiked in the enemy’s works amounted to ten thirteen-inch mortars and eighteen twenty-six pounders. Although subject to the little derangements naturally attending on a night attack, not one musket, working-tool, or other instrument, was left behind.”

Such is Captain Drinkwater’s account of a spirited and successful action of which he was an eye-witness. The French historians of the siege say that the British could not stand against the fire of the batteries, and retreated. This is one of the innumerable contradictions to truth offered by French authors whenever the military honour of their country is concerned. They always forget that their contemporaries and posterity will judge which party was victor in a conflict, by the results. Victor Hugo poetically said, that Buonaparte was never conquered: at Moscow it was fire—at Waterloo it was fate. Headers of history are nevertheless convinced of the reality of the two defeats, by the events which followed them.

The affair had now been so prolonged, and had excited so much attention throughout Europe, that the Spaniards and French began to think it a point of honour to subdue this general on his rock; and the duke de Crillon, accompanied by the eminent French engineer D’Arçon, and followed by an army of thirty thousand men, came to Algeziras. Immediately upon his arrival, D’Arçon changed the mode of attack: it had been previously mostly confined to the land side of the rock; he, most unfortunately for the cause he served, directed almost all his offensive efforts from the sea, and yet by no means neglecting his fortifications. General Elliott’s principal extraordinary preparation consisted in grates and various apparatus for heating shot, as he found red-hot balls by far the most efficient instrument of destruction he could employ. But he was too watchful and prudent a commander to let this engross all his attention: in addition to constant labours at the works, he ordered holes to be blasted in the rocks, nearly on a level with the water, from which he could pour showers of stones and other missiles upon his assailants. He likewise had a number of gun-boats built; and, having received supplies and reinforcements from the British fleet under Lord Hood, he felt himself in a condition to cope with his powerful enemies. Determined to have no idle hands, even the serjeants and drummers were armed with muskets; and musicians, who had before been exempted from duty, had to exchange their instruments for firelocks and shovels. The strength of the garrison with the marine brigade, including officers, amounted to seven thousand five hundred men.