Two English armies directed their course towards Seringapatam, the capital of the kingdom of Mysore. General Harris crossed the Cauvery on the 31st of March, and established himself at two miles from the south-west of that city; he there waited for General Stuart, who joined him seven days after with a body of troops detached from the army of Madras. Confident in the strength of the works which surround the island in which Seringapatam is situated, Tippoo Saib made no effort to oppose this junction. The works were furnished with four hundred pieces of cannon, and constructed with the greatest care. For some time he satisfied himself with defending his outworks. The resistance of the sultan, on this point, was as short as it was useless. General Stuart made the Indian troops fall back to within eight hundred toises of the western angle of the place, and carried an intrenchment which separated him from General Harris, so that Seringapatam was completely invested, and the first parallel was immediately opened. Battery in breach was commenced on the 1st of May; by the 4th it was deemed practicable. Four regiments were selected to mount to the breach. General Harris, the more to surprise the sultan, deferred giving the signal till the moment of the greatest heat, in the middle of the day. The English troops and the sepoy grenadiers marched out of the trenches, crossed the pebbly bed of the Cauvery under a murderous fire, and mounted to the breaches effected in the fausse-braie and the rampart. The combat was bloody and obstinate. Tippoo Saib, taken by surprise, and rendered desperate by the fear of loss of empire and life, faced death wherever the greatest peril threatened: he perished in the mêlée, together with his principal officers. All the fortifications were carried, but the children of the sultan still defended themselves in the palace, which contained his family, his wives, and his treasures. General Harris promised safety and protection to the inhabitants of the palace, and they surrendered immediately. The body of Tippoo was sought for, and found beneath a heap of slain, near one of the gates; he was recognised by his family, and deposited in the tomb of his father, Hyder Ali. The treasures of his palace were distributed among the victorious army. After the taking of Seringapatam, Tippoo’s children, his relations, and the princes engaged in alliance with him, submitted. This brilliant operation rendered the English absolute masters of the peninsula of India.
SARAGOSSA.
A.D. 1809.
Although, like the most trivial accident of life, every small siege which occurred in the memorable Peninsular war had, doubtless, its bearing upon the general result, we can afford room only for the most prominent. The siege of every place remains, to all time, an interesting epoch in its own annals, but the student of history only pauses at such conflicts of the kind as have been distinguished by the presence of great captains, have been brought about by remarkable circumstances or revolutions, or have led to consequences important to nations or to mankind in general. We have another cause, likewise, for not dwelling upon the Spanish sieges; they have been laid before the public so admirably, that to go into their details after Sir William Napier, would not only be a work of supererogation, but would lead to a comparison in which we could but suffer.
After glancing over the vast number of sieges that have been the subjects of our attention, we cannot but consider that of Saragossa to be one of the most anomalous. A strongly-fortified city, admirably placed, was filled to overflowing with a population enthusiastic in the cause, and with thirty thousand cannoniers, and a body of peasants, sappers, miners, and navigators from the canal-works, contained a mass of fifty thousand combatants. In addition to this, many, if not most of the houses were fire-proof; and there were innumerable large buildings, such as convents and churches, that were all capable of being fortified, and supplying defences in detail against an enemy who might penetrate into the interior. They had abundance of provisions, and all the munitions of war,—even its sinews, money,—that could be required in a long protracted siege. But above all this was the cause; every man might be said to be a volunteer, fighting for all he held dearest in life. “Doors and windows were built up, house-fronts loop-holed, internal communication opened, streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was a fortification: there was no weak point, there could be none, in a city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the measure of the ramparts.” So, and admirably, says Sir William Napier; but in one so well read in the history of sieges as he must be, this is saying a great deal. For our part, we think there is no fortification in which genius equal to that of the constructor, backed by courage, vigilance, and enterprise, cannot find a weak point. Look back at the impregnable Valenciennes, taken by a coup-de-main in a few hours, from the discovery of an imprudently-constructed door.
But what marks the siege of Saragossa so distinctly from all others, is the small number of the besieging army. To invest a large city, so garrisoned and provided, the French had but thirty-five thousand men, and were only able to complete their investment in a thin indefensible manner. In addition to the siege, they were compelled to be perpetually on the watch, as the whole country around was against them, and Palafox’s brother, Lazan, hovered about with a body of troops, to throw in when occasion offered.
In reading the details of the siege, we meet with little or no defection, because defection was punished with the utmost severity; the garrison having only the “choice of the enemy in front of their dwellings, and the gibbet behind them.” The public enthusiasm was kept up by processions, sham miracles, false manifestoes, indeed everything that could work upon a superstitious, excited people; and yet from the beginning the progress of the French was steady, and almost unbroken. They had certainly vicissitudes; in such a conflict how could it be otherwise? They even became dispirited for a moment, by fatigue and the prospect of the obstacles before them; but we do not think that Lasnes had ever a doubt of ultimately obeying Napoleon’s commands, by taking the city. It certainly was a great triumph of seasoned disciplined soldiery, conducted by courage and skill in their commanders, over a much superior force, surrounded by all the defences art and nature could furnish. As soldiers, we think the taking of Saragossa highly to the honour of the French.
Napoleon was very desirous of the capture of Saragossa, which is looked upon as the bulwark of the eastern provinces of Spain; and his preparations for effecting it were those of a general and a politician. But Lasnes, to whom he had assigned the command, fell sick; Moncey and Ney committed strategic errors, and his purpose was at least delayed. This gave the Spanish leaders time to prepare likewise, and they did not neglect it. In the sieges of cities, when people are earnest in their defence, they do not confine themselves to the operations of art, or even the weapons of war; they think everything a legitimate instrument that can protect themselves or annoy the enemy: thus we see in one the citizens hurling their beehives, with their swarms of stinging insects, upon their invaders; and in another, one of the greatest, but at the same time the most senseless of the world’s disturbers, killed by a tile thrown by an old woman. So with the inhabitants of Saragossa: while paying due attention to their military works, they took advantage of everything that could be converted to the one great purpose in hand.
The only unpardonable error was that of Palafox; although zealous in all ways at the commencement of the contest, when the French had made serious way into the heart of the city, he seems to have abandoned his post, and to have passed his time in intemperance and debauchery.