[41] To be found in the book called Præstantium ac eruditorum virorum Epistolæ Ecclesiastique & Theologicæ. Amstelodami apud Franciscum Halman. 1704.
[42] To a certain ambassador.
In this letter was set down first the objection of the heer Paets, to wit, that since the being and substance of the Christian religion consisted in the knowledge of, and faith concerning, the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ Jesus, he considered the substance of the Christian religion as contingent truth; which contingent truth was matter of fact. And matter of fact could not be known but by the relation of another, or by the perception of the outward senses; because there are naturally in our souls no ideas of contingent truths, such as are concerning necessary truths, viz. that God is, and that the whole is greater than the part. And since it might without absurdity be said, that God cannot make a contingent truth to become a necessary truth; neither can God reveal contingent truths or matters of fact, but as contingent truths are revealed; and matters of fact not being revealed but by the outward senses, the conclusion drawn from thence is, that men are not obliged to believe God producing any revelation in the soul concerning matter of fact, whether of a thing done, or to be done, unless there be added some miracles obvious to the outward senses, by which the soul may be ascertained that that revelation cometh from God. All these arguments Barclay answered very circumstantially, premising first, that it was falsely supposed that the essence of the Christian religion consisted in the historical faith and knowledge of the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ. That faith and historical knowledge is indeed a part of the Christian religion, but not such an essential part as that without which the Christian religion cannot consist; but an integral part, which goes to the completing of the Christian religion, as the hands or feet of a man are the integral parts of a man, without which nevertheless a man may exist, but not an entire and complete man. Yet he agrees, that the historical knowledge of Christ is commonly manifested to us by the holy Scriptures as the means; but nevertheless he asserts, that God could without such an outward mean manifest the said historical knowledge to our minds: and also, that a contingent truth may be known by a supernatural knowledge. And he saith, that when God doth make known unto men any matter of fact by divine immediate revelation, he then speaks as to the ear of the heart of the inward man. And, that as when any natural idea is excited in us, we clearly know it; so also when a supernatural idea is raised, we clearly know that whereof it is the idea. He also holds forth, what properly is the inward supernatural sense in man; and then he distinguisheth between contingent and necessary truths, and shows how a divine revelation may be known to be such, saying that natural and spiritual senses are distinguishable by their objects, and demonstrating how godly men may know they are in the favour of God, and how the wicked feel the wrath of God as fire. He also relates after what manner the spiritual senses distinguish the good and the evil; and he confesseth there is in all men, as well the godly as the ungodly, some sort of idea of God, as of a most perfect being: but he asserts, that the supernatural idea of God differeth much from the natural; and that in all men there is a supernatural idea of God. He also shows, wherein the motions of the mind differ from those of the body; and that there are ideas as well of supernatural, as of natural things. And showing from whence the errors of false likenesses of reason proceed, he says, that the natural reason cannot perceive supernatural things. He also asserts, that the revelations to the prophets were by inward inspirations in their minds; and that they were most certainly persuaded that they were divinely inspired, even without any outward miracle; and that it is by the inspiration of the same divine Spirit, by which the prophets prophesied, that we do believe their words and writings to be divine, concerning contingent truths, as well past as to come. Moreover he inquires, whether faith comes by outward hearing, and he shows how the outward senses may be deceived; nay, that often they are vitiated both by outward casualties and natural infirmities, whereunto the godly are no less subject than the wicked.
All this is treated at large by Barclay, as may be seen in the said letter, and several years after, when the heer Paets was at London, being one of the commissioners for the Dutch East India company, Barclay spoke with him again, and so represented the matter, that he readily yielded that he had been mistaken in his notion of the Quakers; for he found they could make a reasonable plea for the foundation of their religion. And thereupon R. Barclay translated the said letter into English as follows:
‘My Friend,
‘Albeit I judge I did fully answer to all thy arguments in that conference we had, concerning the necessity and possibility of inward immediate revelation, and of the certainty of true faith from thence proceeding; nevertheless, because after we had made an end, and were parting, thou wouldest needs remit to my further consideration the strength of thy argument, as that in which thou supposedst the very hinge of the question to lie: that I might satisfy thy desire, and that the truth might more appear, I did further consider of it, but the more I weighed it, I found it the weaker. And therefore that thou thyself mayest make the truer judgment of it, I thought meet to send thee my further considerations thereon; (which I had done ere now, had not I, both at London and elsewhere, been diverted by other necessary occasions,) wherein I doubt not, but thou wilt perceive a full and distinct answer to thy argument. But if thou canst not as yet yield to the truth, or thinkest mine answer in any part to be defective, so that there yet remains with thee any matter of doubt or scruple; I do earnestly desire thee, that as I for thy sake, and out of love to the truth, have not been wanting to examine thy argument, and to transmit to thee my considerations thereon; so thou mayest give thyself the trouble to write and send me what thou hast further to say: which my friend, N. N. who delivers thee this will, at what time thou shalt appoint, receive from thee, and transmit to me thy letter; that at last the truth may appear where it is.
‘And that the whole matter may the more clearly be understood, it will be fit in the first place, to propose thy argument, whereby thou opposest the immediate revelation of God in the saints: thence concluding thou hast fully overturned the foundation of the people called Quakers. Which argument of thine is;
‘That since, (as thou judgest,) the being and substance of the Christian religion consisteth in the knowledge of, and faith concerning, the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ Jesus, thou considerest the substance of the Christian religion as a contingent truth; which contingent truth is matter of fact. Whence thou reasonest, that:
Matter of fact cannot be known but by the relation of another, or by perception of the outward senses; because there are naturally in our souls no ideas of contingent truths, such as are concerning necessary truths: to wit, that God is; and that the whole is greater than the part.—And since it may without absurdity be said, that
God cannot make a contingent truth to become a necessary truth; neither can God reveal contingent truths or matters of fact, but as contingent truths are revealed: but matters of fact are not revealed but by the outward senses.—From whence thou concludest, that