[Greek: Τὸ: To][44] Formale, The form or mode, how the revelation is made: which form is an inward, divine, and supernatural revelation, which is the voice or speech of God, inwardly speaking to the ear of the inward man or mind of man, or a divine writing supernaturally imprinted therein. Now as to the material part, or the thing and matter revealed, this is indeed a contingent truth, and of itself is not manifest to the mind; but because of the form, that is, because of the divine mode, and supernatural inward operation, the matter is known to be true. For that divine and supernatural inward operation, which the mind doth feel and perceive in itself, is the voice of God speaking unto man, which by its nature and specific property is as clearly distinguished and understood to be the voice of God, as the voice of Peter or James is known to be the voice of such men. For every being as a being is knowable, and that by its own specific nature, or property proceeding from its nature; and hath its proper idea, by which it is distinguishable from every other thing, if so be its idea be stirred up in us, and clearly proposed to us.
[44] The in Greek. Latin lacks a definite article.—Transcriber.
‘Sixthly: Now as some beings are natural, some supernatural, so some ideas are natural, some supernatural: and as when any natural idea is excited in us, we clearly know it; so also when a supernatural idea is raised, we clearly know that, whereof it is the idea. But the voice of God speaking to the mind of man, is a supernatural being, and stirreth up in us a supernatural idea, by which we clearly know that inward voice to be the voice of God, and not the voice or operation of another, or of any evil spirit, or angel, because none of these have a supernatural idea, as the voice of God, and his divine operation hath: for it is full of vigour, virtue, and divine glory, as saith the psalmist, who had often experience of it; and we also in our measures are witnesses thereof, for the voice of God is known to be his by its divine virtue.
‘Seventhly: The senses are either outward or inward: and the inward senses are either natural or supernatural; we have an example of the inward natural sense in being angered or pacified, in love and hatred; or when we perceive and discern any natural truth, such as the natural maxims, to wit, that the whole is greater than the part, &c. or when we deduce any conclusion by the strength of natural reason, that perception also in a larger sense, may be called an inward sense. But an example of an inward supernatural sense is, when the heart or soul of a pious man, feels in itself divine motions, influences, and operations, which sometimes are as the voice or speech of God, sometimes as a most pleasant and glorious illustration or visible object to the inward eye, sometimes as a most sweet savour or taste, sometimes as an heavenly and divine warmness, or, so to speak, melting of the soul in the love of God. Moreover, this divine and supernatural operation in the mind of man, is a true and most glorious miracle; which when it is perceived by the inward and supernatural sense divinely raised up in the mind of man, doth so evidently and clearly persuade the understanding to assent to the thing revealed, that there is no need of an outward miracle: for this assent is not because of the thing itself, but because of the revelation proposing it, which is the voice of God. For when the voice of God is heard in the soul, the soul doth as certainly conclude the truth of that voice, as the truth of God’s being, from whom it proceeds.
‘These things being thus premised, I now proceed to a direct answer. For what is said, that God cannot make a contingent truth to become a necessary truth, I agree; but when any contingent truth is manifest to us by the immediate revelation of God, there is in it two things to be considered, to wit, the thing revealed, which is contingent; and the revelation itself: which upon the supposition, that it is a divine revelation, is no contingent truth, but a most necessary truth. And this all mankind will say, that this proposition, every divine revelation is necessarily true, is as clear and evident, as that proposition, that every whole is greater than its part.
‘But thou wilt say; how knowest thou that a divine revelation is a divine revelation? I answer, how knowest thou that a whole is a whole, and a part is a part? thou wilt say, by the natural idea excited in me of a whole, and of a part. I answer again; even so a divine revelation is known to be such by a supernatural idea of divine revelation stirred up in us, and that by a divine motion, or supernatural operation. But it is no wonder that men, who have no experience of supernatural ideas, or at least do not heed them, do deny them; which is, as if a man naturally blind denied light or colours; or a deaf man sounds, because they experience them not. Therefore, we cannot dissemble, that we feel a fervent zeal even divinely kindled in us against such an absurd opinion, as affirms, that God cannot ascertain us of his will in any contingent truth, but by proposing it to the outward senses. This opinion does in a manner turn men into brutes, as if man were not to believe his God, unless he propose what is to be believed to the outward senses, which the beasts have common with us; yea, it derogates from God’s power, and imputes weakness to him, as if he could not do that, which not only both good and evil angels can do, but which the meanest creatures can do, and the most insensible. As for instance: the heat of the fire, the coldness of the air and water worketh upon us; yea, if a pin prick us, we feel it, and that by the outward sense; because the objects are outward and carnal: but since God is a most pure and glorious Spirit, when he operateth in the innermost parts of our minds by his will; shall not he and his will be clearly felt according to his nature, that is, by a spiritual and supernatural sense? For as the nature of God is, so is the nature of his will, to wit, purely spiritual, and therefore requireth a spiritual sense to discern it; which spiritual sense, when it is raised up in us by a divine operation, doth as clearly and certainly know the voice or revelation of the will of God, concerning any thing which God is pleased to reveal, however contingent, as the outward sense knows and perceives the outward object. And it is no less absurd, to require of God, who is a most pure Spirit, to manifest his will to men by the outward senses, else not to be credited; as to require us to see sounds, and hear lights and colours. For as the objects of the outward senses are not to be confounded, but every object is to have its proper sense; so must we judge of inward and spiritual objects, which have their proper sense, whereby they are to be perceived. And tell me, how God doth manifest his will concerning matters of fact, when he sends his angels to men, since angels, (as is commonly received,) have not outward senses, or at least not so gross ones, as ours are? Yea, when men die, and appear before the tribunal of God, whether unto eternal life or death, how can they know this, having laid down their bodies, and therewith their outward senses? And nevertheless this truth of God is a truth of fact, as is the historical truth of Christ’s birth in the flesh. And which is yet more near: how do good and holy men even in this life most certainly know, that they are in the favour and grace of God? no outward revelation doth make this known unto them; but the Spirit, as saith the apostle, beareth witness with our spirits, that we are the children of God. For the mere testimony of a human conscience, without inward testimony of the holy Spirit, cannot beget in us a firm and immoveable testimony of our sonship, because the heart of man is deceitful; and if the testimony thereof were true, at most it is but a human testimony, which begetteth in us only a human faith: but that faith, by which holy men believe they are the sons of God, is a divine faith, which leans upon a divine testimony of the holy Spirit, witnessing in them that they are the sons of God. Moreover, when a good man feels in himself that undeclarable joy of the holy Spirit, concerning which the holy Scripture speaks, and which is the common privilege of the saints, how or whence feels he this joy? Truly, this argument concludes no less against this heavenly spiritual joy, which is begotten in the souls of the saints by the holy Spirit, than it does against the immediate revelation of God: for there is no natural idea of this spiritual joy, else mere natural men, yea, such as are profane and ungodly, would feel it as much as the godly: but because it is a supernatural thing, therefore it can have no true idea but what is supernatural. Moreover, whence is it that profane men feel sometimes in themselves the wrath of God as fire, when all things, as to the outward, go as prosperously with them as with the godly, and oftentimes more prosperously? For there is no natural idea in men of this inward wrath of God. There is also an inward grief oftentimes raised up in wicked men from the sense of this wrath of God, which very much vexeth and tormenteth their minds; and nevertheless this grief hath no natural idea in us: for oftentimes wicked men feel not this sorrow; for God sometimes is, as it were, silent, while the wicked sin, as in Psalm 1.
‘All which things do most clearly demonstrate, that there are in men supernatural ideas of supernatural beings; which ideas are nevertheless not perceived by us, unless they be stirred up by some supernatural operation of God, which raiseth up in us supernatural and spiritual senses, which by their nature are as distinguishable from the natural senses, whether inward or outward, as the natural senses are distinguished one from another by their specific difference. Of which spiritual senses the Scripture speaks frequently, as Heb. v. and xiv. where is spoken of the spiritual senses in general, by which the spiritual man hath the discerning of good and evil: which good is of a spiritual nature, and conduceth to feed in us a spiritual and divine life; and the evil is of that kind, by which the spiritual life is in us hurt; to wit, sins, whether carnal or spiritual; all which cannot be discerned but by such who have spiritual senses stirred up in them, as saith the apostle. In other places the Scripture also speaketh of these spiritual senses in particular; as of the spiritual seeing, Psalm xxxiv. 9. Of the spiritual hearing, Psalm lxxxv. 9. Of spiritual tasting, Psalm xxxiv. 8. Of spiritual smelling, Cant. i. 3. Of spiritual touching, Acts xvii. 8, and in many other places of Scripture we read of those spiritual senses in particular. Yea, it is the promise of the gospel, that the glory of God shall be seen of holy men, such as are clean of heart, even in this life: Isaiah xxxiii. 17. Mat. v. 8. Which were fulfilled in the primitive Christians, see John i. 14. 1 John i. 2, 3, 4. 2 Cor. iii. 18, and chap. iv. 6. But what is this vision of God and divine glory, which the souls of the saints enjoy in this life, which is only as the earnest or first-fruits of that more abundant glorious vision in the life to come, concerning which the Scripture so much declareth, which is the highest happiness of the immortal soul.
‘For this argument seemeth to do no less injury to the saints, than to rob them of this most glorious treasure both in this life, and that to come. For there is in us no natural idea of this divine glory, as there is not of God himself which is any ways proportionable unto so great happiness, which the Scripture so much declareth of, by which the godly are rewarded partly in this life, and plenarily in that which is to come. We confess indeed, there is in all men, as well the godly as ungodly, some sort of idea of God, as of a most perfect being; and that therefore this proposition, there existeth a most perfect being, doth as clearly appear to human understanding, as that the whole is greater than the part: and therefore this proposition, that a most perfect being existeth, ought to be numbered among the principles, that of themselves are manifest. But this idea of God is as manifest to ungodly, as to godly men; yea, it is clearly perceived by the devil, as by the most holy angels: for all the devils know that God is; but yet how blind is the devil, and all wicked men, as to the vision of God, which is the chief reward of the saints.
‘There is then either no such vision of God, neither in this life, nor in that to come; or there is a supernatural idea of God in us, by which we are made capable of this vision; which supernatural idea of God differeth much from that natural idea of God, which Cartesius and his followers so much talk of, (albeit others long before Cartesius did observe this natural idea of God, and spoke of it.) But the happiness of the saints consists not in contemplating this natural idea of God, else the wicked would be as happy as the godly; yea, the very devil as the most holy angel: since, as is said, both the devil and most wicked men do as clearly perceive this natural idea of God, as the most holy men or angels.
‘If the Scripture then be true, there is in men a supernatural idea of God, which altogether differs from this natural idea: I say, in all men; because all men are capable of salvation, and consequently of enjoying this Divine vision. Now this capacity consisteth herein, that they have such a supernatural idea in themselves: for if there were no such idea in them, it were impossible they should so know God. For whatsoever is clearly and distinctly known, is known by its proper idea; neither can it other-ways be clearly and distinctly known: for the ideas of all things are divinely planted in our souls; for they are not begotten in us by outward objects, or outward causes, as the better philosophy teacheth, but only are by these outward things excited or stirred up. And this is true not only in supernatural ideas of God, and things divine, and in natural ideas of the natural principles of human understanding, and conclusions thence deduced by the strength of human reason: but even in the ideas of outward objects, which are perceived by the outward senses; as that noble Christian philosopher Bœtius hath well observed; to which also the Cartesian philosophy agreeth. For when I see any outward object, whether it be a man, or horse, or bird, the outward object does not treat in my eye, nor yet in my mind the idea of those things; for the outward object does nothing but imprint in our sensible organs a corporeal motion. Now there is nothing in a corporeal motion that can form in us the ideas of those things; for all ideas are of a spiritual nature: now nothing that is corporeal can produce that which is spiritual, because the less excellent cannot produce the more excellent, else the effect would exceed its cause: which is against all sound reason, that it should bring forth what were of a higher and more excellent kind. Therefore all ideas, whether of natural or spiritual things, are divinely implanted in our minds; which nevertheless do not always appear, but sometimes appear, and sometimes are as it were hid in us, and sometimes are stirred up in us by causes outward or inward, and again do as it were sleep and shun our observation, and seem not to be otherways distinguished by our minds, but as thoughts and perceptions of the mind from the mind itself; that is, as the mode from the subject, or as a bodily motion from the body, whereof it is the motion: for as is the relation of a bodily motion to a body, so is the relation of a thought or perception of the mind to the mind. In this nevertheless they differ, that the mind can move itself, and operate in itself: which a body cannot do: but as a body can be moved by another, so also can the mind after this manner be moved by another, and that both by outward and inward causes, but chiefly by God himself, in whose hand all souls and creatures are. But of these things there is enough said at present; and I hope, I have not thus far impertinently philosophised.