Now, the main subject of the arbitration, ending in the treaty from which this excerpt has been taken, was the custody of certain castles and estates. After the right to occupy each separate castle in dispute had been carefully determined, provision was then made, in the general words cited above, against this arrangement being disturbed without a judgment of the curia regis. Disseisin, and particularly disseisin of castles, was thus in 1191, as in 1215, a topic of special prominence.
Early in 1213 the king attempted to take vengeance upon his opponents in a manner which they are not likely to have forgotten two years later at Runnymede, and which probably influenced the wording of the present chapter. John, resenting bitterly the attitude of the northern barons who had refused alike to accompany him to Poitou and to pay scutage, determined to take the law into his own hands. Without summoning his opponents before a commune concilium of his feudal tenants, without even a trial and sentence by one of his Benches, without making any effort to investigate the justice or injustice of their pleas for refusing, he set out with an army to punish them. He had gone as far north as Northampton on his mission of vengeance when he was overtaken by the archbishop of Canterbury, a strong advocate of conciliation. On 28th August, 1213, Stephen Langton persuaded the king to defer forcible proceedings until he had obtained a legal sentence in a formal Curia.[[838]] That John once again threatened recourse to violent methods may be safely inferred from the words of a letter patent issued in May, 1215, when both sides were armed for war. He proposed arbitration, and promised a truce until the arbitrators had given their award. The words of this promise are notable; since, not only do they illustrate the procedure of August, 1213, but they agree closely with the clause of Magna Carta under discussion. The words are:—“Know that we have conceded to our barons who are against us, that we shall not take or disseise them or their men, nor shall we go against them per vim vel per arma, unless by the law of our kingdom, or by the judgment of their peers in curia nostra.”[[839]] Magna Carta repeats this concession in more general terms, substituting “freemen” for the “barons” of the writ—an alteration which necessitated the omission from the charter of the concluding words of the writ, “in curia nostra”; because the peers of freemen, other than barons, would be found, not among the barons in the king’s court, but among the freeholders in the court baron.[[840]]
The words of Magna Carta, taken in connection with the treaty of 1191 and the writ of 1213, are thus seen to have a narrower meaning than that extracted from them by subsequent commentators.
VI. Later History of “Judgment of Peers.” The claim made by the barons at Runnymede was re-asserted in somewhat varying forms by the same barons or by their descendants on many subsequent occasions. The “judicium parium” was destined to enjoy a long and brilliant career, and the interpretations put upon it by the Crown and by the opposition respectively, while interesting in themselves, afford strong confirmation of the somewhat restricted estimate of the scope of the present chapter, which has been above enunciated.
(1) The baronial contention. The earls and barons, throughout the reign of John’s unhappy son, attempted to place a broad interpretation on the privilege secured to them by this chapter—claiming that all pleas, civil and criminal (such at least as were raised against them at the instance of the Crown) should be tried by their fellow earls and barons, and not by professional judges of lower rank.
(2) The royal contention. The Crown, on the other hand, while not openly infringing the charter, tried to narrow its scope. The judges appointed by the king to determine pleas coram rege, no matter what their original status might be, became (so the Crown argued) by such appointment, the peers of any baron or earl. This doctrine was enunciated in 1233 when Henry III. and his justiciar, Peter des Roches, denounced Richard, Earl Marshal, as a traitor, in a meeting (colloquium) of Crown tenants held at Gloucester on 14th August of that year. Thereafter, “absque judicio curiae suae et parium suorum,” as Matthew Paris carefully relates,[[841]] Henry treated earl Richard and his friends as outlaws, and bestowed their lands on his own Poitevin favourites. An attempt was made, at a subsequent meeting held on 9th October, to have these proceedings reversed on the ground, already stated, that they had taken place absque judicio parium suorum.
The sequel makes clear a point left vague in Matthew’s narrative: there had been a judgment previous to the seizure, but only a judgment of Crown officials coram rege, not of earls and barons in the commune concilium. The justiciar defended the action of the government by a striking argument: “there were no peers in England, such as were in the kingdom of France,” and, therefore, John might employ his justices to condemn all ranks of traitors.[[842]] Bishop Peter was here seeking to evade the provisions of Magna Carta without openly defying them, and his line of argument was that the king’s professional judges, however lowly born, were the peers of an English earl or baron.[[843]] Neither the royal view nor the baronial view entirely prevailed. A distinction, however, must be drawn between criminal and civil pleas.
(3) Criminal pleas. Offenders of the rank of barons partially made good their claim to a trial by equals; while all other classes failed. A further distinction is thus necessary. (a) Crown tenants. The conflicting views held by king and baronage here resulted in a compromise. In criminal pleas, the Crown was obliged to recede from the high ground taken by Peter des Roches in 1233. Unwillingly, and with an attempt to disguise the fact of surrender by confusing the issue, Bracton in theory and Henry III. in practice admitted part of the barons’ demand, namely, “that in cases of alleged treason and felony, when forfeiture or escheat was involved, they should be judged only by earls and barons.”[[844]] This concession was by no means based on the broad ground taken by the Charter. Bracton does not admit that the king’s justices were not “peers” of barons; but deduces their disability from the narrower consideration that the king, through his officials, ought not to be judge in his own behalf, since his interests in escheats might bias his judgment. This is the reason why, from Bracton’s day to our own, “the privilege of peers,” which gradually assumed its modern form, has never extended to misdemeanours, since such convictions never involved forfeiture or escheat to the Crown.
The manner of giving effect to this concession is noteworthy. The judicium parium was secured to earls and barons in later reigns, not merely by giving seats on the judicial bench to a few holders of “baronies,” but by bringing the case before the entire body of earls and barons in commune concilium. What the barons got at first was “judgment” by peers. The actual “trial” was the “battle,” the fellow-peers acting as umpires and enforcing fair play.[[845]] Although new modes of procedure came to prevail, the Court of Peers continued its control, and the judgment of peers gradually passed into the modern trial by peers.[[846]] The subject has been further complicated by the gradual growth of the modern conception of a “peerage,” embracing various grades of “nobles.” In essentials, however, the rights of a baron (or of any magnate of higher grade) accused of crime have remained unchanged from the days of Henry III. to our own. The privilege of “trial by peers,” whatever the reason underlying it, still extends to treason and felony, and is still excluded from misdemeanours. When competent it still takes place before a "Court of Peers"—namely, the House of Lords if Parliament is in session, and the Court of the Lord High Steward if not. Petty offences committed by peers, like those committed by commoners, come before the ordinary courts of law. Under these limitations, then, the privilege of a peer to be tried only in the House of Lords (or in the Court of the Lord High Steward) has been for centuries a reality in England for earls and barons, and also for members of those other ranks of the modern “peerage” unknown in 1215—dukes, marquesses, and viscounts.[[847]]
(b) For tenants of a mesne lord, however, no similar privilege has been established, even in a restricted form. In charges of felony, as in those of misdemeanour, all freemen outside the peerage are tried, and have been tried for many centuries past, in the ordinary courts of law. There is no privileged treatment for the knight or the landed gentleman. All are judged in the same tribunals and by the same procedure. Private feudal courts never recovered from the wounds inflicted by Henry II. The clauses of Magna Carta which sought to revive them were rendered nugatory by legal fictions or simply by neglect.