A woman’s right of accusation (even when thus safeguarded from abuse) was restricted to two occasions, the murder of her husband and the rape of her own person. Magna Carta mentions only one of these two grounds of appeal; but silence on the subject of assault need not be interpreted as indicating any intention to deprive women of their rights in such cases.[[1031]]

The present chapter of the Great Charter confines itself to appeals of murder, declaring that no woman has the right to institute proceedings in this way for the death of father, son, or friend, but only for that of her husband. Hard as this rule may seem, the barons here made no change on existing law. Glanvill does not seem to recognize the possibility of a woman’s appeal of homicide save for the death of her husband.[[1032]] He seems to deduce the reason for allowing it in that case from the principle already explained: "A woman is heard in this suit accusing anyone of her husband’s death, if she speak as being an eye-witness to the fact, because husband and wife are one flesh"—another example of constructive presence.[[1033]]

There seems to be no authority whatever for Coke’s hasty inference from the provisions of this chapter, that previous to 1215 a woman had an appeal for the death of any one of her “ancestors.”[[1034]] The chapter, in spite of its declaratory nature, seems an ungallant one, indicating that the barons were more careful to guard themselves against unnecessary risk than to champion the cause of defenceless women.[[1035]]


[1021]. Cf. supra, c. 36.

[1022]. Bracton, folio 151 b., cites the case of a champion sentenced to mutilation of a foot because he confessed that he was paid to appear, and was not really a witness. The Statute of Westminster, I. (3 Edward I. c. 41), enacted that champions need not swear to the personal knowledge of what they maintained. See also Neilson, Trial by Combat, 48–51.

[1023]. The appellant “in all cases except murder, that is, secret homicide, made oath as a witness that he had seen and heard the deed.” Neilson, Trial by Combat, 48.

[1024]. Glanvill, XIV. c. 3.

[1025]. See Bracton, II. ff. 142 b, 145 b; also Neilson, Trial by Combat 47, and authorities there cited.

[1026]. Glanvill, XIV. c. 3.