[56]. Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 3.
[57]. The original bull with the seal of Innocent still attached is preserved in the British Museum (Cotton, Cleopatra E 1), and is carefully printed by Bémont, Chartes des Libertés Anglaises, p. 41. It may also be read inter alia in Rymer and in Blackstone.
[58]. The text is given by Rymer.
[59]. See Rymer, and Bémont, Chartes, xxv.
PART II.
FEUDAL GRIEVANCES AND MAGNA CARTA.
I. The Immediate Causes of the Crisis.
Many attempts have been made to explain why the storm, long brewing, broke at last in 1214, and culminated precisely in June of the following year. Sir William Blackstone[[60]] shows how carefully historians have sought for some one specific feature or event, occurring in these years, of such moment as by itself to account for the rebellion crowned for the moment with success at Runnymede. Thus Matthew Paris, he tells us, attributes the whole movement to the sudden discovery of Henry I.’s charter, long forgotten as he supposes, while other chroniclers agree in assigning John’s inordinate debauchery as the cause of the civil dissensions, dwelling on his personal misdeeds, real and imaginary. “Sordida foedatur foedante Johanne, gehenna.”[[61]] Blackstone himself suggests a third event, the appointment as Regent in John’s absence of the hated alien and upstart, Peter des Roches, and his misconduct in that office.
There is absolutely no necessity to seek in such trivial causes the explanation of a great movement, really inevitable, the antecedents of which were deeply rooted in the past. The very success of Henry Plantagenet in performing the great task of restoring order in England, for effecting which special powers had been allowed to him, made the continuance of these powers to his successors unnecessary. From the day of Henry’s death, if not earlier, forces were at work which only required to be combined in order to control the licence of the Crown. When the battle of order had been finally won—the complete overthrow of the rebellion of 1173 may be taken as a crucial date in this connection—the battle of liberty had, almost necessarily, to be begun. The clamant problem of the hour was no longer how to prop up the weakness of the Crown; but rather how to place restrictions on its unbridled strength.
We need not wonder that the crisis came at last, but rather why it was so long delayed. Events, however, were not ripe for rebellion before John’s accession, and a favourable occasion did not occur previous to 1215. The doctrine of momentum accounts in politics for the long continuance of old institutions in a condition even of unstable equilibrium; an entirely rotten system of government may remain for ages until at the destined moment comes the final shock. John conferred a great boon on future generations, when by his arrogance and by his misfortunes he combined against him all classes and interests in the community.
The chief factor in the coalition which ultimately triumphed over John was undoubtedly the baronial party led by those strenuous nobles of the north, who were, beyond doubt, goaded into active opposition by their own personal and class wrongs, not by any altruistic promptings to sacrifice themselves for the common good. Their complaints, too, as they appear reflected in the imperishable record of Magna Carta, are mainly grounded on breaches of the technical rules of feudal usage, not upon the broad basis of constitutional principle.