The powers of this assembly also widened almost automatically, with the widening of its composition. Taxation was its original function, since that was the primary purpose (so the best authorities maintain in spite of some adverse criticism) for which the representatives of the counties and the boroughs had been called to it. Legislation, or the right to veto legislation, was soon added—although at first the new-comers had only a humble share in this. The functions of hearing grievances and of proffering advice had, even in the days of the Conqueror, belonged to such of the great magnates as were able to make their voices heard in the Curia Regis; and similar rights were gradually extended to the humbler members of the augmented assembly. The representatives of counties and of towns retained rights of free discussion even after Parliament had split into two separate Houses. These rights, fortified by command of the purse strings, tended to increase, until they secured for the Commons some measure of control over the executive functions of the king. This parliamentary control varied in extent and effectiveness with the weakness of the king, with his need of money, and with the political situation of the hour.
The new position and powers of Parliament logically involved a corresponding alteration in the position and powers of the smaller but more permanent council or Concilium Ordinarium (the future Privy Council). This had long been increasing in power, in prestige, and in independence, a process quickened by the minority of Henry III. The Council was now strengthened by the support of a powerful Parliament, usually acting in alliance with the leaders of the baronial opposition. The members of the Council were generally recruited from Parliament, and their appointment as king’s ministers and members of the Curia was strongly influenced by the proceedings in the larger assembly.
The Council thus became neutral ground on which the conflicting interests of king and baronage might be discussed and compromised. Wild schemes like that of chapter 61 of Magna Carta or like that typified in the Committee appointed by the Mad Parliament in 1258, were now unnecessary. The king’s own ministers, backed by Parliament, became an adequate means of enforcing the constitutional restraints embodied in royal Charters. The problem was thus, for the time being, solved. A proper sanction had been devised, fit to change royal promises into realities.
To sum up, Edward’s aim of ruling as a national king implied the frequent assembling of a central parliament composed of individuals fitted to act as links between the Crown and the various classes of the English nation whom he expected to contribute to the national Exchequer. It implied also that the national business should be conducted by ministers likely to command the confidence of that parliament.[[284]] Thus, Edward’s policy dimly foreshadowed some of the most fundamental principles of modern constitutional government—parliament, representation, ministerial responsibility. Edward Plantagenet was, of course, far from realizing the full meaning of these conceptions, and if he had realized it, he would have been most unwilling to accept them; yet he was unconsciously helping forward the cause of constitutional progress.
This temporary solution, during the reign of Edward I., of an ever-recurring problem of government has been viewed in two different aspects. It is sometimes regarded simply as the result of the pressure of events—as a natural phenomenon evolved, subject to natural laws, to meet the needs of the age. By other writers it is attributed to the wisdom and conscious action of King Edward. The two views are perhaps not so inconsistent as they at first sight seem, since great men work in harmony with the spirit of their times, and appear to control events which they only interpret and express. The bargain made at Runnymede between the English monarch and the English nation found its necessary counterpart and sanction, before the close of the thirteenth century, in the conception of a king ruling through responsible ministers and in harmony with a national Parliament. Edward Plantagenet was merely the instrument by whose agency the new conception was for a time partially realized. Yet, he merits the gratitude of posterity for his share in the elaboration of a working scheme of government, which took the place of the clumsy expedients designed as constitutional sanctions by the barons in 1215. He supplied the logical complement of the theories vainly enunciated in John’s Great Charter, thus changing empty expressions of good intentions into accomplished facts. The ultimate triumph of the principles underlying Magna Carta was assured through the constitutional machinery devised by Edward Plantagenet.
[283]. The best proof of this will be found in a comparison of Magna Carta with the Statute of Marlborough, and the chief statutes of Edward’s reign, notably that of Westminster I.
[284]. The doctrine that the Commune Concilium should have some voice in the appointment of the Ministers of the Crown had indeed been acted upon on several occasions even in the reign of Henry III. See Stubbs, Const. Hist., II. 41.
PART V.
MAGNA CARTA: ORIGINAL VERSIONS, PRINTED EDITIONS, AND COMMENTARIES.