The life of Poggio Bracciolini

by William Shepherd

This work is highly interesting on account of the anecdotes which it contains of several eminent men, who flourished during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the course of its perusal, we find that many an humorous tale, which the modern jester narrates as the account of circumstances that occurred under his own observation, were of the number of those which caused the walls of the Bugiale to re-echo with laughter. Like all collections of the kind, the Liber Facetiarum contains, amongst a number of pieces of merit, some stories, in which we look in vain for the pungency of wit. When, however, we are inclined to condemn Poggio as guilty of the crime of chronicling a dull joke, we should remember, that bons mots frequently borrow their interest from aptness of introduction, and an humorous mode of delivery; and that though the spirit of a witticism, which enlivened the conversation of a Lusco or a Cincio, may evaporate when it is committed to paper, yet at the time when it was recorded by Poggio, it sported in his recollection with all the hilarity of its concomitant circumstances. But too many of the Facetiæ are liable to a more serious objection than that of dulness. It is a striking proof of the licentiousness of the times, that an apostolic secretary, who enjoyed the friendship and esteem of the pontiff, should have published a number of stories which outrage the laws of decency, and put modesty to the blush; and that the dignitaries of the Roman hierarchy should have tolerated a book, various passages of which tend not merely to expose the ignorance and hypocrisy of individuals of the clerical profession, but to throw ridicule on the most sacred ceremonies of the Catholic church. Recanati indeed endeavours to defend the fame of Poggio, by suggesting the idea, that many of the most licentious stories were added to his collection by posterior writers; and he supports this opinion by asserting, that he has seen two manuscript copies of the Facetiæ, in which many of the obnoxious passages in question are not to be found.[406] The validity of this defence is, however, rendered extremely questionable by the consideration of a fact, of which Recanati was probably ignorant, namely, that Lorenzo Valla, in the fourth book of his Antidotus in Poggium, which was published about the year 1452, not only impeaches the Facetiæ of blasphemy and indecency; but recites, by way of holding that work up to reprobation, the most scandalous stories which are now to be found in the whole collection.[407]

It has been ascertained by Monsieur le Grand, that a few of the stories which occur in the Facetiæ are to be found in the Fabliaux, or tales which were circulated in various parts of Europe by the Provençal bards of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, whose sportive effusions of fancy furnished a rich fund of materials for the poets and novelists of Italy and of England.[408]

The Liber Facetiarum, soon after its publication, acquired a considerable degree of popularity, and was eagerly read, not only in the native country of its author, but also in France, in Spain, in Germany, and in Britain.[409] This is by no means a surprising circumstance. Wit and humour possess almost irresistible charms. The idle and the dissipated are pleased with a sally of hilarity, which gives a stimulus to their fancy; and they who are habituated to study, or who are fatigued by the more weighty concerns of life, are happy to enjoy an opportunity of occasional relaxation. As a vehicle of sentiment, a book may be considered as the representative of its author; and in a world of anxiety and trouble, he who is endued with the happy talent of causing the wrinkle of care to give place to the pleasing convulsion of mirth, will find few circles of society in which he is not a welcome guest.

In the Facetiæ Poggio aimed a most mischievous thrust at his old antagonist, Filelfo, by making him the hero of a tale, the ridiculous oddity of which disturbs the steady countenance of gravity itself, and causes the strictest severity for a moment to smile at the indelicacy which it condemns.[410] The war between these redoubted champions was carried on till the year 1453, when they were reconciled by the interposition of their common friend, Pietro Tommasi.[411]

During Poggio’s temporary residence at Terranuova, he was one day visited by Benedetto Aretino, a civilian of distinguished reputation; by Niccolo di Foligni, a physician of considerable eminence;[412] and by Carlo Aretino, the chancellor of the Florentine republic. These guests Poggio hospitably entertained in his villa; and from the conversation which occurred after their repast, he collected materials for a work which he dedicated, in the year 1451, under the title of Historia disceptativa convivialis, to the cardinal Prospero Colonna. This work consists of three parts, the subject of the first of which is not a little whimsical, namely—Whether the master of a feast ought to thank his guests for the honour of their company, or whether the guests should express their gratitude to their host for his hospitality. The discussion of this singular question does not afford any thing very interesting. The second part contains the detail of a dispute which took place between Niccolo di Foligni and Benedetto Aretino, on the comparative dignity of their respective professions. Niccolo, pleading on behalf of the healing art, observes, that if antiquity can confer honour, the practice of medicine existed in times so remote, that its first professors are enrolled amongst the number of the Gods. He also maintains, that the medical profession must needs be more honourable than the profession of law, since the doctrines of medicine are built upon the principles of science, whilst the maxims of law depend upon caprice; and that of course physicians are obliged to qualify themselves for the discharge of their duty by diligent researches into the fixed and established course of nature; whilst those who are esteemed learned in the law confine their researches to their professional books. With regard to the civil law in particular, he reminds Benedetto, that there are few states which are regulated by its dictates; whereas the inhabitants of almost all the nations in the world pay homage to the professors of the healing art, by having recourse to their assistance. Niccolo having finished his arguments, Benedetto undertakes the defence of legal studies, and asserts the high antiquity of laws, which he maintains must have existed before the practice of medicine, since medicine could not have been reduced to a science before the assemblage of men in civil communities, which are held together by the bonds of law. He also maintains the dignity of laws, as being the conclusions of reason, and the support of society. Niccolo, in reply, denies that the civil law is the result of the conclusions of reason, and vilifies it as a crude collection of regulations, adopted to suit the exigencies of the moment, without any reference to natural law, which civilians do not study—as a mass of opinions and not a collection of truths. Impeaching the general character of the professors of law, he accuses them of an inordinate thirst for gain, which leads them to nourish strife, to prolong discord by the tediousness of legal proceedings, and to pride themselves on their success in patronizing a bad cause. Benedetto, roused by these pointed reflections, observes, that it ill becomes a physician to treat with severity the characters of the professors of law; “for,” says he, “what is more notorious than the folly of many of your brethren, who kill more than they cure, and build their art upon experiments made at the risk of their wretched patients? The errors of lawyers are of trivial consequence, in comparison with those of physicians. Our unskilfulness empties the purses of our clients, but your mistakes endanger the lives of those who employ you. We cause somebody to be the gainer, whilst you both rob a man of his life, and defraud his surviving relations of the amount of your fees. Whilst we may possibly occasion the loss of a legacy, or an inheritance, you disturb the peace of nations by slaying kings and princes. And let me ask, what dignity is there in your profession? You are called in to visit a patient—you examine his natural discharges, wrinkle your brows, and assume a countenance of uncommon gravity, in order to persuade the bye-standers, that he is in a very critical situation. Then you feel his pulse, in order to ascertain the powers of nature. After this you hold a consultation, and write your prescription, in the composition of which you are not guided by any fixed rules, as is plain from the different receipts which are in the same case recommended by different practitioners. If your potion happen by chance to be followed by good symptoms, you extol the cure as a marvellous effect of art; but if it does any mischief, all the blame is laid on the poor patient. I will relate to you a curious circumstance which happened to one Angelo, a bishop of Arezzo. This ecclesiastic being afflicted by a very dangerous disorder, was told by his physicians, that if he would not take the potions which they prescribed, he would run the risk of losing his life. He for some time positively refused to take their nauseous draughts, but was at length persuaded by his friends to conform to the instructions of his doctors. The physicians then sent him a number of phials, all of which he emptied into a certain utensil, which was deposited under his bed. In the morning the physicians paid him another visit, and finding him almost free from his fever, intimated to him, that they hoped he was convinced of his folly in having so long refused to follow their prescriptions. To this remark he replied—the effect of your medicines is indeed marvellous, for by merely putting them under my bed I have recovered my health. If I had swallowed them, no doubt I should have become immortal.”[413] After the narration of this anecdote, Benedetto proceeds to enlarge upon the utility of laws, which he maintains to have been the foundation of the dignity of states and empires. This position is denied by Niccolo, who asserts, that the dominions of monarchs and republics have constantly been extended by power, which is so incompatible with law, that the powerful and mighty universally despise all legal obligations, which are binding only on the poor and humble.

In the third part of the Historia disceptativa convivialis Poggio discusses the question, whether the Latin language was universally spoken by the Romans, or whether the learned made use of a language different from that of the vulgar. Poggio maintains, in opposition to the opinion of his deceased friend, Leonardo Aretino,[414] and others, that the language used by the well-educated Romans was the vernacular language of their country, and that it differed from that of the lower classes in no other respect, than as the language of the well-educated in every country is more elegant and polished than that of the inferior orders of the community. In defence of his opinion, he quotes a considerable number of curious passages from the Roman historians and rhetoricians, which clearly prove his point, and evince his profound acquaintance with Latin literature.

The discussion of the comparative dignity of the professions of medicine and civil law naturally led to satirical remarks on the part of the respective interlocutors, on the abuse of those two branches of science; and the perusal of this dialogue will serve to shew that its author was fully competent to expose the pompous ignorances of empirics, and to display the detriment which arises to society from those most mischievous of knaves, the unprincipled practitioners of the law. It must also be allowed, that the enumeration which Benedetto Aretino and Niccolo di Foglini set forth of the merits of their respective professions, forcibly inculcates the benefits which accrue to mankind from the study of medicine and of jurisprudence, and the true principles upon which those studies ought to be conducted.[415] The following letter, which Poggio addressed to his friend Benedetto, in the year 1436, demonstrates, that the result of his serious meditations had convinced him that legal practice was not only compatible with moral rectitude, but was most likely to be productive of gain when regulated by the dictates of integrity.

“I have been highly gratified, my dear Benedetto, by your kind letter; and I cannot but admire the versatility of your genius, who have united to the most profound knowledge of the civil law, an elegance and grace of expression, which entitles you, in my opinion, to as high a rank in the school of rhetoric, as you hold among the professors of the science of jurisprudence. It is indeed a proof of an extraordinary capacity, and of a wonderful proficiency in letters, to have successfully cultivated two departments of knowledge, the cultivation of each of which is attended with no small degree of difficulty. The acquisition of the knowledge of the civil law is a work of immense labour, on account of the discordance of sentiments which occurs amongst those who have treated upon this subject, but still more on account of the almost endless volumes written by commentators, which distract the minds of their readers by the difference of opinions which they contain, and weary them by the prolixity of their style. Far from imbibing the neatness and elegance of the old lawyers, these commentators, by their perplexity and minute distinctions, shut up the road to truth. The difficulty of attaining the graces of eloquence is evinced by the fact, that in all ages truly eloquent writers are very few in number. When therefore I see you endowed with both these accomplishments, I congratulate you on your having bestowed your labour on pursuits which will confer upon you both honour and emolument. For your knowledge of the law will bestow upon you riches, which are the necessary support of human life; and the study of polite letters will be highly ornamental to you, and will tend to improve and display to the best advantage your legal talents.

“I would wish you to avoid the common error of too many legal practitioners, who, for the sake of money, wrest the law to the purposes of injustice. It has, indeed, always happened, that the bad have been more in number than the good, and the old proverb justly says, that excellence is of rare occurrence. Almost all law students, when they enter upon their profession, are stimulated by a love of gain; and by making gain the object of their unremitted pursuit, they acquire a habit of appreciating the merits of a cause, not according to the rules of equity, but according to the probability of profit. When there is no prospect of emolument, justice is disregarded, and the richer client is considered as having the better cause. As many tradesmen imagine, that they can make no profit without telling falsehoods in commendation of their commodities, so the generality of men learned in the law think they shall never prosper in the world if they scruple to subvert justice by perjury, and equity by sophisms. Acting on these principles, they do not endeavour to investigate the true nature of a cause, but at all hazards try to promote the views of the party who engages their services by a fee. But I am persuaded that you, who are by your excellent disposition instigated no less by a love of virtue than by a passion for literature, will act upon different principles, and will esteem nothing lawful which is dishonourable. I would not, however, tie you down by the strictness of that philosophy which, making happiness to consist in virtue alone, inculcates a contempt for worldly emoluments; for those who enter upon civil life will find the want of many comforts. Indeed there have been more lovers than despisers of riches amongst philosophers themselves; and the advice of those who exhort us quietly to submit to poverty is rather to be praised than followed; for it is truly melancholy to depend upon the assistance of others. But you have no reason to fear that by being honest you will become poor. On the contrary, by acting up to the principles of integrity, you will surpass others in wealth as well as in dignity. It will in the end be found much more profitable to have the reputation of honesty and justice, than that of skilfulness and craft. Virtue is valued even by the vicious, and extorts commendation from those who are unwilling to obey her precepts. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that he who has established a reputation for uprightness should not excel others in honour, in authority, and in emoluments. I would wish you, therefore, in the first place, to persevere in the practice of virtue, then to apply yourself with all diligence to the study of the law, and lastly, to add to these accomplishments the graces of polite learning. If you adopt this plan, you will not be doomed to struggle against the inconveniences of an humble station, but you will rise through the intermediate degrees of dignity to the highest stations of honour.”[416]