This admirable order of battle, at once grand, simple, and imposing, and presenting to its skilful designer the most ample means of sustaining, by an immediate and efficient support, any attack, from whatever point he might wish to direct it, and of possessing everywhere a respectable force at hand to oppose any attack upon himself, from whatever quarter it might be made, was no less remarkable for the regularity and precision with which the several masses, constituting thirteen distinct Columns, advanced to their destined stations, than for the unusual degree of warlike pomp and high martial bearing with which the Lines drew up in this mighty battle array. The movements throughout were executed under the cheering and spirit stirring sounds of bugles, drums, and trumpets, sending forth the long cherished national military airs of the Republic and of the Empire. The weather had cleared up a little, and to the Anglo-Allied Army, the crowning of the opposite Heights by the French Lines, with all its accompanying circumstances, presented a magnificent spectacle.
Napoleon has frequently been blamed for having thus consumed some very precious time in a mere ostentatious display of his forces. Public opinion, however, should not suffer itself to be too easily influenced by the apparent justness of such censure, and it would be ungenerous to the established renown of the French Leader not to attach due weight to the following circumstances. In the account of the Battle attributed to the Emperor's own dictation, one cause of delay in commencing offensive operations is represented to have been the soft and miry state of the ground after the excessive rain which had fallen during the night; in consequence of which it was found impossible to manœuvre the Artillery and the Cavalry, and it was considered advisable to wait until the ground had, in some degree, resumed its natural consistency. When, therefore, the manœuvring of these two Arms was pronounced to be practicable, though attended with some difficulty, which, however, it was added, would gradually disappear; the employment of the interval in an orderly and a deliberate formation of a well-defined order of battle, was a measure scarcely questionable at the moment, however much the subsequent course of events may have proved that it militated against the chances of success on the part of the French.
The additional impulse which this imposing spectacle was calculated to impart to the moral force of his troops, is also well worthy of consideration. His soldiers, as they contemplated the extended double Front Line of Infantry, disposed as if about to enfold the Enemy in a deadly embrace, and the fluttering of gay lance flags on either extremity, indicating that its Flanks were duly protected; as they glanced at the Second general Line, a double one of Cavalry, superbly mounted, and proudly mailed in glittering helmet and cuirass; and, as they scanned the well disposed Reserves and serried Centre; their reliance on their own strength and in the resources of their Leader was unbounded, their anticipations of success were heightened, and their eager longing for the contest was greatly augmented. And while adverting to the grand spectacle in a moral point of view, it would be well to consider whether it may not have also been designed to exert a powerful influence on that portion of the Anglo-Allied forces with which the Emperor was tampering, in the full expectation of seeing them again range themselves under his victorious Eagles: but which Wellington, with judicious foresight and prompt address, broke up as a united body, and distributed among his British troops; thus securing himself against the possible enactment of a scene similar to that which so powerfully contributed to Napoleon's disaster on the plains of Leipzig.
But supposing it to be admitted upon these grounds that the delay of the attack, having once been determined, was judiciously and advantageously employed, we ought also to consider whether the delay itself may not have been superinduced by motives of far higher import.
Although the miry state of the ground has been put forward as the ostensible cause, can we for a moment imagine that Napoleon was the man to have allowed himself to be deterred by such an obstacle from commencing the attack at an earlier hour; had he, at the moment, been sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of things to foresee that the delay, together with the possibility of a lengthened contest, and of the approach of aid to the British General from the Prussian side, tended to render his situation one of extreme peril?
May we not rather be justified in inferring, that his object was to gain time for the due execution and successful development of Grouchy's operations! The despatch which the Emperor had received from Grouchy, dated Gembloux, 17th June, at 10 P.M. (see page 300), clearly explained that General's intentions, which were, that should the mass of the Prussian forces retire upon Wavre, he would follow them in that direction, so as to prevent them from either reaching Brussels or forming a junction with Wellington; but that if, on the other hand, they should fall back upon Perwès, he would advance towards that town in pursuit of them. In the former case, Napoleon's delay was likely to facilitate the combined operation; because in order to prevent the junction with Wellington, Grouchy required sufficient time to throw himself between the Prussians and the Emperor: and, in the latter case, the delay would be immaterial, because then the Prussian co-operation with Wellington was not to be apprehended; and the battle with the Anglo-Allied Army would have to be fought by the Emperor, unsupported by Grouchy.
It may, perhaps, be argued that Napoleon, by commencing his attack much earlier, would not have been under the necessity of employing a considerable portion of his Reserve against the Prussians in defence of his Right Flank, at a time when he so urgently needed them for following up and strengthening his attacks upon the Duke of Wellington's line. There existed, however, no such striking disparity, in point of numbers, between Wellington's forces, and his own, as to warrant his throwing away a chance amounting, according to the information he had already received, almost to a certainty, of being enabled to bring his greatest mass to bear against each Army separately: and which would doubtless have been the case as regards the Anglo-Allied Army, had Grouchy, by the adoption of more vigorous and energetic measures, manœuvred in such a manner as to sufficiently impede the Prussian co-operation by posting one of his Corps so as to command the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne, and holding the other in reserve, to be employed by either the Emperor or himself, according to circumstances.
Whether Napoleon was really actuated by any such motives, must remain a doubtful point. These remarks, however, are offered for the consideration of those who censure him for his delay in commencing the Battle of Waterloo.