Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
Anglo-Allied Army 73 98 140
French 103 106 234

During this period of the Battle, the Anglo-Allied Army was thus composed:—

Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
British 26 49 78
King's German Legion 8 16 18
Hanoverians. 18 12
Brunswickers 8 5 16
Nassauers 3
Dutch-Belgians 10 28 16
Total 73 98 140

Almost all these Battalions were at one time or another in the Front Line, and all conducted themselves in the most courageous and exemplary manner, with the exception of five of the Dutch-Belgian Battalions, which hastily retreated as the French approached, when making their first grand attack upon the Anglo-Allied Centre and Left Wing, and took no further active part in the Battle. The remainder of the above ten Battalions in the service of the King of the Netherlands, were three Battalions forming the 2nd Regiment of the Nassau Contingent, and two Battalions of Orange Nassau, under Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, and occupied the houses and inclosures in the valley in front of the extreme Left of the Allied Line. These troops behaved extremely well.

Of the Squadrons above mentioned, a large proportion, nearly one third, consisted of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry; but although their numbers serve to augment the amount of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry on paper, the actual value of their services in the Battle was by no means commensurate with their display of strength: and hence it was that the brunt of the Cavalry contest devolved almost exclusively upon the British and German Dragoons. The same observation applies in an equal degree to the Artillery.

About six o'clock, the relative strength of the contending forces was altered, on the part of the French Army, by the detaching of Lobau's Corps and the Young Guard to oppose the Prussians; and on that of the Anglo-Allied Army, though somewhat later, by the bringing into the Field of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian Division; so that they stood about that time as follows:—

Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
Anglo-Allied Army 85 98 156
French Army 80 106 186

Of the assistance derived by the Duke of Wellington from this augmentation of the twelve Dutch-Belgian Battalions, a sufficient estimate may be deduced from the foregoing History of the Battle—one half of them were with great difficulty prevented from abandoning the Field, although, at the moment, they were not in contact with, nor did they even see, the Enemy; and the other half only joined the Front Line (on the left of Maitland's Brigade) at the time of the General Advance.

Whatever may have been the cause of the comparative supineness of the Dutch-Belgian troops; whether produced by dislike entertained towards recent political arrangements, which alienated each party from its native country, without, securing to either its national independence; or, by predilections imbibed for the Chief against whose arms they were now opposed, and in whose ranks they had formerly served: the fact of such supineness is too well attested to admit of any doubt respecting the value to be attached to their co-operation in the great struggle so courageously and resolutely sustained by the remainder of the Anglo-Allied Army; and becomes a most important point for consideration in any calculation of the relative strength of the Combatants, when taken into conjunction with the actual proportion of the entire Dutch-Belgian force brought into the Field to that of each of the Allies, as appears by the following table:—

Amount of the Effective Strength of the Anglo-Allied Army at the Battle of Waterloo.