The Infantry of the Imperial Guard consisted
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers, under Lieutenant General Count Friant;
of the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers, under Lieutenant General Count Roguet;
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Chasseurs, under Lieutenant General Count Morand;
of the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Chasseurs, under Lieutenant General Count Michel;
of the 1st and 3rd Regiments of Tirailleurs, under Lieutenant General Count Duhesme;
and of the 1st and 3rd Voltigeurs, under Lieutenant General Count Barrois.
The Cavalry of the Guard consisted
of two Regiments of Heavy Cavalry (Grenadiers à Cheval and Dragoons), under Lieutenant General Count Guyot;
and of three Regiments of Light Cavalry (Chasseurs à Cheval and Lancers), under Lieutenant General Lefèbvre-Desnouettes.
Attached to the Guard were 6 Batteries of Foot, and 4 Batteries of Horse, Artillery, with 3 Batteries of Reserve Artillery; comprising altogether 96 pieces of cannon, under the command of Lieutenant General Desvaux de St. Maurice.
These troops were principally in Paris.
The French Emperor having, upon the grounds explained in a former Chapter, determined to take the Field against the Allied Armies in Belgium, the commencement of active operations could no longer be deferred. When we reflect upon the disparity of force with which he was going to contend against two such Generals as Wellington and Blücher, we are bound to acknowledge that it was an undertaking daring and perilous in the extreme, even for an individual of the dauntless and adventurous character of Napoleon. A delay of only a few weeks would have secured for him, by means of the vast organisation which was in constant and rapid progress, a sufficient accession of disposable troops to have enabled him to effect a powerful diversion upon either Wellington's Right, or Blücher's Left, Flank, and thus to impart an infinitely greater degree of weight and stability to his main operations; but then, on the other hand, this delay would also have brought the powerful Armies of the confederated Sovereigns across the whole line of his eastern frontier, and have led to the consummation of that combined movement upon the capital, the execution of which it was his great aim to frustrate.
But it was not the first time that Napoleon had advanced against such fearful superiority of numerical strength. In the previous year, when nearly surrounded by the victorious forces of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, when apparently overwhelmed by a succession of disasters, and when his Army was daily diminishing by the desertion of newly raised conscripts, and presenting the mere wreck of its former self, he was at the very acme of his mental energy, and in the full possession of his determinate and all subduing will. His great genius seemed to acquire additional vigour and elasticity, with the increasing desperation of his position; and darting with electric suddenness and rapidity, now upon one adversary and then upon another, maintaining with the renowned leaders of his detached forces, a combination of movements developing the highest order of strategy, he succeeded by his brilliant triumphs at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Monterau, not only in stemming the torrent of invasion, but in causing the resumption of the diplomatic preliminaries of a Peace. This Peace, however, these very triumphs induced him, as if by a fatality, to reject with scorn and indignation, although the terms were honourable in the highest degree under his then existing circumstances.
Hence, with such a retrospect, Napoleon might well indulge in hope and confidence as to the result of the approaching Campaign, notwithstanding the want of sufficient time for a greater development of his resources. A finer or a more gallant Army, or one more complete and efficient in every respect, than that which he was going to lead in person, never took the Field.
