During the day, frequent accounts were brought to the troops of Zieten's Corps, generally corroborative of the above, by the country people who were bringing away, and seeking some place of safety for, their cattle. Intelligence was also obtained of the arrival of Napoleon, and of his brother, Prince Jerome.
Zieten immediately transmitted the substance of this information to Prince Blücher and to the Duke of Wellington; and it was perfectly consistent with that which the latter had received from Major General Dörnberg, who had been posted in observation at Mons, and from General van Merlen (through the Prince of Orange) who, as already mentioned, commanded the Outposts between that place and Binche. Nothing, however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of concentration, the probable strength of the Enemy, or his intended offensive movements, and the Allied Commanders therefore refrained from making any alteration in their dispositions, and calmly awaited the arrival of reports of a more definite character concerning the Enemy's designs.
Zieten's troops were kept under arms during the night, and were collected by Battalions at their respective points of assembly.
Later in the day Zieten ascertained, through his Outposts, that strong French Columns, composed of all Arms, were assembling in his front, and that every thing portended an attack on the following morning.
Zieten's communication of this intelligence reached Blücher between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 14th.
Simultaneous Orders were consequently despatched by eleven o'clock for the march of Pirch's Corps from Namur upon Sombref, and of Thielemann's Corps from Ciney to Namur. An Order had already, in the course of the day, been forwarded to Bülow at Liege, desiring him to make such a disposition of his Corps d'Armée as should admit of its concentration at Hannut in one march; and at midnight a further Order was despatched, requiring him to concentrate his troops in cantonment about Hannut.
Zieten was directed to await the advance of the Enemy in his position upon the Sambre; and, in the event of his being attacked by superior numbers, and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three Corps in rear of the latter point.
The vigilance which was thus exercised along both the Anglo-Allied and Prussian line of Outposts, obtained for Wellington and Blücher the fullest extent of information which they could reasonably have calculated on receiving respecting the dispositions of the Enemy immediately previous to an attack. They had been put in possession of the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the frontier beyond Tournai, Mons, and Binche, of the troops which had previously occupied that line, and their concentration in front of Charleroi, might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi, upon which a feigned attack would be made, while the real attack was intended to be by Mons. Hence no alteration was made by the Duke in the disposition of his forces; but the Prussian Field Marshal immediately ordered the concentration of his own troops at a point where they would be at hand in case Charleroi should be the real line of attack, and whence they could far more readily move to the support of Wellington, should that attack be made by the Mons road.