It is fortunate, also, that the intermediaries between the two governments were men of good sense, with an appreciative understanding of the view of the colonial government. The Duke of Argyle, postmaster general, in the Palmerston government of 1855-1858, declared that the measures taken by the Canadian government afforded no relief whatever to the British government. They had, indeed, withdrawn from the British government part of the postage it was entitled to expect when it embarked on the Cunard contract. If on the expiration of the contract existing, which had still five or six years to run, the Canadian government should undertake to perform half of the effective service, it might fairly claim exemption from all share in the other half of the service, and furthermore might claim a right to apply the amount received by way of sea postage, towards defraying the cost of the Canadian packets.
But, Argyle affirmed, the British government could hardly admit the propriety of a demand made upon it for assistance to a line of steamers, which was established by the colony—a line which had no other effect than to diminish the postal revenue upon which the British government relied to meet the outlay occasioned by the contract with the Cunard company.
Labouchere, the colonial secretary, to whom the duke's views were communicated, declined to submit them in their existing shape to the colonial government. If the British government had been in no way parties to the agreement made by the Canadian government with Allan, the Canadian government were equally unconsulted when the British government entered into the contract with the Cunard company; and Labouchere pointed out that the British government were without the means of enforcing its views on the Canadian government.
If the postmaster general or the treasury, which coincided in his views, were of a different opinion, Labouchere desired to know what steps they proposed to take in the highly probable case that the province declined the responsibility it was sought to impose upon it. On the whole, the colonial secretary thought the preferable course would be to allow the present arrangements to subsist until the Cunard contract had expired, and then enter upon negotiations with the Canadian government for sharing with it upon equitable terms in the general expense of the transatlantic service.
The correspondence between the departments of government in London—the tenor of which has been described—was submitted, confidentially, to the governor general of Canada for his opinion on the 17th of July, 1856. Sir Edmund Walker Head replied, confidentially, to Labouchere, and set out Canada's position with gratifying clearness. A Canadian, he observed, looked at the circumstances from a point of view rather different from that in which they had presented themselves to the postmaster general at St. Martins-le-Grand. The Canadian asked: "Why are we Canadians obliged to pay a subsidy at all for a line of steamers running into the St. Lawrence to a British port, by a route which we hold to be the most advantageous route? The merits of the route itself might make our bounty unnecessary, were it not that Her Majesty's government gives a large bounty to a line running into foreign ports."
"It might be admitted," continued the governor general, "that Canada was benefited by the rapid transmission of mails through the United States; but she was no party to an arrangement as one that could never be revoked. Canada, then, thought that she could arrange for the conveyance of her own mails to and fro by way of Quebec in summer and Portland in winter, more rapidly and advantageously than by Boston and New York. Why should Her Majesty's government discourage this new enterprise on behalf of Her Majesty's subjects and by a large subsidy drive the business to the United States ports?
"Canadians entertained the hope," the governor general further observed, "that no course would be pursued by the British government adverse to the principles of free trade, by the continuance of a large bounty to the Boston and New York lines. Leave the natural resources of the Canadian route to find their own level, and in the meantime do not use all the influence of the British post office so as to bear as hardly as possible on the first effort of the colony to open the St. Lawrence to a regular line of British steamers."
Head disclaimed the idea of giving these arguments as his own, but stated that, they expressed the opinion of many Canadians, among whom were some of the members of his council. In December, Labouchere informed the governor general that his view had prevailed, and that it was decided to leave the matter as it stood, until the Cunard contract expired, when it was hoped that an arrangement might be made more in conformity with what was regarded as an equitable consideration for the finances of the United Kingdom.
The lack of cordiality displayed by the government of the mother country towards the ocean transport enterprise of her colony in its initial stages yielded to no warmer feeling with the progress of the scheme. The Allan service was performed during 1856 and 1857, as the postmaster general stated, with meritorious punctuality.[305]
In the beginning of 1858 the Quebec-Portland service attracted the attention of the British post office, which intimated a desire to utilize it for the conveyance of mails between Great Britain and the United States during the period of the year when the Allan steamers made Portland their port of arrival and departure.[306]