"The military situation presented by the enemy submarine campaign is not only serious but critical."
"The outstanding fact which cannot be escaped is that we are not succeeding, or in other words, that the enemy's campaign is proving successful."
"The consequences of failure or partial failure of the Allied cause which we have joined are of such far-reaching character that I am deeply concerned in insuring that the part played by our country shall stand every test of analysis before the bar of history. The situation at present is exceedingly grave. If sufficient United States naval forces can be thrown into the balance at the present critical time and place there is little doubt that early success will be assured."
"Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are losing the war."[4]
And now came another important question: What should the American naval policy be in this crisis? There were almost as many conflicting opinions as there were minds. Certain authorities believed that our whole North Atlantic Fleet should be moved immediately into European waters. Such a manœuvre was not only impossible but it would have been strategically very unwise; indeed such a disposition would have been playing directly into Germany's hands. What naval experts call the "logistics" of the situation immediately ruled this idea out of consideration. The one fact which made it impossible to base the fleet in European waters at that time was that we could not have kept it supplied, particularly with oil. The German U-boats were making a particularly successful drive at tankers with the result that England had the utmost difficulty in supplying her fleet with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of this oil situation. "Orders have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in case of emergency," I reported to Washington on June 29th, referring to scarcity of oil. "This simply means that the enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us that the Germans knew nothing about this particular disability. Had they been aware of it, they would have resorted to all kinds of manœuvres in the attempt to keep the Grand Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and in this way they might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately for the cause of civilization, there were certain important facts which the German Secret Service did not learn.
But this oil scarcity made it impossible to move the Atlantic Fleet into European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were brought from America, we simply could not have fuelled our super-dreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917. Moreover, if we had sent all our big ships to England we should have been obliged to keep our destroyers constantly stationed with them ready for a great sea action; and this would have completely fallen in with German plans, for then these destroyers could not have been used against her submarines. The British did indeed request that we send five coal-burning ships to reinforce her fleet and give her that preponderance which made its ascendancy absolutely secure, and these ships were subsequently sent; but England could not have made provision for our greatest dreadnoughts, the oil burners. Indeed our big ships were of much greater service to the Allied cause stationed on this side than they would have been if they had been located at a European base. They were providing a reserve for the British fleet, precisely as our armies in France were providing a reserve for the Allied armies; and meanwhile this disposition made it possible for us to send their destroyer escorts to the submarine zone, where they could participate in the anti-submarine campaign. In American waters these big ships could be kept in prime condition, for here they had an open, free sea for training, and here they could also be used to train the thousands of new men who were needed for the new ships constructed during the war.
I early took the stand that our forces should be considered chiefly in the light of reinforcements to the Allied navies, and that, ignoring all question of national pride and even what at first might superficially seem to be national interest, we should exert such offensive power as we possessed in the way that would best assist the Allies in defeating the submarine. England's naval resources were much greater than ours; and therefore, in the nature of the case, we could not expect to maintain overseas anywhere near the number of ships which England had assembled; consequently it should be our policy to use such available units as we possessed to strengthen the weak spots in the Allied line. There were those who believed that national dignity required that we should build up an independent navy in European waters, and that we should operate it as a distinct American unit. But that, I maintained, was not the way to win the war. If we had adopted this course, we should have been constructing naval bases and perfecting an organization when the armistice was signed; indeed, the idea of operating independently of the Allied fleet was not for a moment to be considered. There were others in America who thought that it was unwise to put any part of our fleet in European waters, in view of the dangers that might assail us on our own coast. There was every expectation that Germany would send submarines to the western Atlantic, where they could prey upon our shipping and could possibly bombard our ports; I have already shown that she had submarines which could make such a long voyage, and the strategy of the situation in April and May, 1917, demanded that a move of this kind be made. The predominant element in the submarine defence, as I have pointed out, was the destroyer. The only way in which the United States could immediately and effectively help the Allied navies was by sending our whole destroyer flotilla and all our light surface craft at once. It was Germany's part, therefore, to resort to every manœuvre that would keep our destroyer force on this side of the Atlantic. Such a performance might be expected to startle our peaceful American population and inspire a public demand for protection; and in this way our Government might be compelled to keep all anti-submarine craft in our own waters. I expected Germany to make such a demonstration immediately and I therefore cautioned our naval authorities at Washington not to be deceived. I pointed out that Germany could accomplish practically nothing by sporadic attacks on American shipping in American waters; that, indeed, if we could induce the German Admiralty to concentrate all its submarine efforts on the American coasts, and leave free the Irish Sea and the English Channel, the war practically would be won for the Allies. Yet these facts were not apparent to the popular mind in 1917, and I shall always think that Germany made a great mistake in not sending submarines to the American coast immediately on our declaration of war, instead of waiting until 1918. Such attacks, at that time, would have started a public demand for protection which the Washington authorities might have had great difficulty in resisting, and which might have actually kept our destroyer fleet in American waters, to the great detriment of the Allied cause. Germany evidently refrained from doing so for reasons which I have already indicated—a desire to deal gently with the United States, and in that way to delay our military preparations and win the war without coming into bloody conflict with the American people.
There were others who thought it unwise to expose any part of our fleet to the dangers of the European contest; their fear was that, if the Allies should be defeated, we would then need all our naval forces to protect the American coast. This point of view, of course, was not only short-sighted and absurd, but it violated the fundamental principle of warfare, which is that a belligerent must assail his enemy as quickly as possible with the greatest striking power which he can assemble. Clearly our national policy demanded that we should exert all the force we could collect to make certain a German defeat. The best way to fight Germany was not to wait until she had vanquished the Allies, but to join hands with them in a combined effort to annihilate her military power on land and sea. The situation which confronted us in April, 1917, was one which demanded an immediate and powerful offensive; the best way to protect America was to destroy Germany's naval power in European waters and thus make certain that she could not attack us at home.
The fact is that few nations have ever been placed in so tragical a position as that in which Great Britain found herself in the spring and early summer of 1917. And I think that history records few spectacles more heroic than that of the great British navy, fighting this hideous and cowardly form of warfare in half a dozen places with pitifully inadequate forces, but with an undaunted spirit which remained firm even against the fearful odds which I have described. What an opportunity for America! And it was perfectly apparent what we should do. It was our duty immediately to place all our available anti-submarine craft in those waters west and south of Ireland in which lay the pathways of the shipping which meant life or death to the Allied cause—the area which England, because almost endless demands were being made upon her navy in other fields, was unable to protect.
The first four days in London were spent collecting all possible data; I had no desire to alarm Washington unwarrantably, yet I also believed that it would be a serious dereliction if all the facts were not presented precisely as they were. I consulted practically everyone who could give me essential details and wrote a cable despatch, filling four foolscap pages, which furnished Washington with its first detailed account of the serious state of the cause on which we had embarked.[5]